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Abstract 
The material presented in this thesis may be viewed as comprising two key parts, the 
first part concerns batch cryptography specifically, whilst the second deals with how 
this form of cryptography may be applied to security related applications such as 
electronic cash for improving efficiency of the protocols. 
The objective of batch cryptography is to devise more efficient primitive 
cryptographic protocols. In general, these primitives make use of some property 
such as homomorphism to perform a computationally expensive operation on a 
collective input set. The idea is to amortise an expensive operation, such as 
modular exponentiation, over the input. Most of the research work in this field has 
concentrated on its employment as a batch verifier of digital signatures. It is shown 
that several new attacks may be launched against these published schemes as some 
weaknesses are exposed. 
Another common use of batch cryptography is the simultaneous generation 
of digital signatures. There is significantly less previous work on this area, and the 
present schemes have some limited use in practical applications. Several new batch 
signatures schemes are introduced that improve upon the existing techniques and 
some practical uses are illustrated. 
Electronic cash is a technology that demands complex protocols in order to 
furnish several security properties. These typically include anonymity, traceability 
of a double spender, and off-line payment features. Presently, the most ef icient 
schemes make use of coin divisibility to withdraw one large financial amount that 
may be progressively spent with one or more merchants. 
Several new cash schemes are introduced here that make use of batch 
cryptography for improving the withdrawal, payment, and deposit of electronic 
coins. The devised schemes apply both to the batch signature and verification 
techniques introduced, demonstrating improved performance over the contemporary 
divisible based structures. The solutions also provide an alternative paradigm for 
the construction of electronic cash systems. 
Whilst electronic cash is used as the vehicle for demonstrating the relevance 
of batch cryptography to security related applications, the applicability of the 
techniques introduced extends well beyond this. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
"To teach is to learn twice." 
� Joseph Joubert, 
Pensees, 
1 842. 
1. Introduction
Commerce is defined as the 'exchange of merchandise' encompassing 'all forms of 
trade and ancillary services such as banking, insurance, and transport' [CCH75] .  
Electronic commerce largely encompasses the same activities, the key difference is 
that no physical interaction between merchant and purchaser occurs during the 
exchange of goods and no physical exchange of cash occurs. Over networking 
environments such as the Internet, a capability exists to significantly reduce the cost 
of transactions, in particular the costs traditionally associated with physical 
interactions. Such financial gains form part of the drive for conducting commerce 
activities over virtual mediums. And to address these needs many forms of 
electronic commerce have been devised. These include Electronic Data Interchange, 
payment card transactions, and wiring of funds. 
The economic drivers for this trend are, not surprisingly, to minimise the 
costs of conducting business. As such there is certainly some good reason for taking 
up not only electronic commerce in general but some form of an electronic cash 
medium. For instance it has been suggested that handling costs of physical currency 
incur a $60 billion fee each year in the US, it is also suggested that cash forms a key 
role in the majority of crimes [War98] . Both of these problems may be addressed by 
the introduction of an electronic currency, this will mitigate and perhaps even 
completely avoid these consequences. 
Before considering the possibility of an electronic cash form further, consider 
what happens when an international funds transfer is conducted between two banks. 
When a person wishes to wire funds to another person in another country there is no 
movement of any fungible commodity, i.e. physical cash. Rather a secure and 
private message is exchanged between the banks confirming who is the recipient and 
who is the originator. The individual accounts are duly credited or debited and the 
labeling of the fungible commodity changes from one bank to another; there is no 
physical movement. With this in mind then the notion of electronic cash does not 
seem too distant for general use in the community. 
Now it is apparent that the last vestige of this type of indirect activity is 
interaction between customers and merchants for the purchase and exchange of 
goods. One important question emerges, what is preventing the immediate take-up 
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of this technology? The preservation of the key properties such as anonymity, 
portability, off-line payments, difficulty in forgery, and prevention or detection of 
double spending. Any contemporary system must be able to maintain the integrity of 
these properties whilst the fungible asset is in the hands of (untrusted) consumers 
and merchants. Through preservation of the key properties a new virtual medium is 
then able to supplement or perhaps replace transactions that rely on physical 
exchanges. Furthermore, the offering of these properties typically involves 
computationally expensive operations, these must not come at an excessive cost of 
protocol efficiency. 
This thesis will cover the field of batch cryptography, and how these 
techniques may be employed to improve efficiency in applications such as electronic 
cash. In particular batch protocols, new and existing, are adapted to devise several 
new electronic cash systems. The scope of this thesis is to examine the efficiency 
improvements obtained through batch cryptographic techniques and to address 
several open problems relating to the field. These tools may be used in applications 
using multiplicative approaches (that typically rely on homomorphic properties in 
cryptography), hash function combiners, and batched exponentiation techniques. 
The open problems relate to the efficiency limitations of some existing techniques, 
weaknesses, and some new attacks. This thesis also introduces the design of new 
batch signers and verifiers. 
1.1 A Brief History of Cash 
The paragraph that follows provides a brief narrative of the salient events in the 
history of cash. This has been compiled from the comprehensive text by Glyn 
Davies treating the subject of the 'history of money from ancient times to the present 
day' [Dav96] . 
While cattle is suggested to be the oldest form of money dating back 
sometime around 6000 BC, the first recorded use of minted coins dates back to circa 
630 BC and involved the use of electrum, a blend of gold and silver for coins. After 
its introduction several other nations (Greece, Persia) observed its advantages and 
proceeded to mint coins in some form. Paper notes were first used as money in 
806AD by China due to a copper shortage for making coins. Later the first 
international funds transfer occurred in 1 1 56, and the introduction of the printing 
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press by Guttenburg in 1440 is modified by Leonardo da Vinci for use in minting 
coins called milled money. In 1 606 the first banknote originates from goldsmiths as 
evidence of ability to pay, marking the start of banknotes in England. John Law 
(1705) suggests that metallic money is unreliable in quality and quantity, in 
preference to bank notes issued by a public bank; notes are issued from banks 
throughout the century. The industrial revolution ( 1 800's) commences and is 
supported by the proliferation of banks. Precious metals such as gold and silver 
continue to feature in many monetary systems until 1 9 14 when Britain commences 
its withdrawal of gold from circulation in favour of paper notes. The US stock 
market boom uncontrolled in 1 928 followed by stock market crash and great 
depression. 
Today the monetary asset is transforming once again. In 1 995 two prominent 
electronic cash schemes (Mondex and DigiCash) commenced trials that enable 
commercial activities to proceed without the use of physical cash, but rather using a 
virtual cash medium that exhibits similar properties. The position of electronic cash 
as a mainstream replacement appears inevitable, and perhaps a logical progression in 
its maturity when one considers the many changes that cash has undergone since its 
inception. 
1.2 Research Goals 
Electronic cash is a field of research that seems to mandate complex security and 
cryptographic protocols. These mechanisms are put to use in order to satisfy several 
properties of the physical world that are necessary when in a virtual form, these 
properties invariably include anonymity, off-line payments, and fraud detection. 
Unfortunately furnishing these and other properties does not come without some 
form of overhead. Whilst security concerns still emerges as the biggest obstacle to 
electronic cash and electronic commerce in general [War98], performance and 
efficiency is one aspect that requires attention to detail so that the various initiatives 
remain practical in an operational sense. 
Batch cryptography is a field of research that endeavours to gather together 
primitive cryptographic operations into one batch operation so that an improvement 
in general efficiency is achieved. Given that electronic cash typically involves 
dealing with more than one coin at a time and batch cryptography is a paradigm that 
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allows similar operations to be executed simultaneously, it seems likely that the 
combination of both these concentrations may yield significant results. 
To date, there is surprisingly very little work in the area of practical 
applications for batch cryptography. Whilst several of the papers allude to some 
commercial use, such as electronic commerce transactions [Har98b ], securing 
mobile communications [BY92], and program instancing checking [BGR98], there 
is no evidence of extended work here. Inspired by the potential efficiency benefits 
that batch cryptography has to offer, this thesis explores the applicability of these 
primitives to the domain of electronic cash. Since much work revolving around 
electronic cash is based upon improving its efficiency, it is hypothesised that batch 
cryptography may be an excellent primitive, given its primary objective of 
improving cryptographic efficiency, from which to build new cash systems. 
The underlying theme for this research fundamentally involves the two 
principle components: batch cryptography with its performance qualities and 
electronic cash as an example application of its use. With this in mind several open 
problems may be observed: 
1 .  The majority of techniques devised have concentrated on the batch 
verification of signatures. The present batch signature generation algorithms 
possess some computational restriction by way of batch size limitations. As 
such some further work will be conducted to address the following. 
• Investigate approaches to improve upon the existing batch signature
generation algorithms. This may be extending the present techniques or
devising new protocols.
• Characterise the potential for using these algorithms in security related
applications.
2. The existing research into batch cryptography has left some unanswered
questions. This is mainly due to the work of Bellare et al. [BGR98] and 
some observations of other authors [LL94] . In addition, some schemes have
been shown to be insecure in the literature [NMRV94]. Several primitives
shall be examined in sufficient detail so as to address the following open
problem [BGR98] .
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• Devise fast batch verification algorithms for modular exponentiation in
groups of non-prime order.
3 .  Development of cash systems that both exercise and rely upon batch 
cryptography for improvements in efficiency is as yet unexplored. The intent 
is to explore how these signature generation and verification methods may be 
applied to general electronic commerce applications and within the more 
intricate environment of electronic cash. The specific problems to be 
addressed may be summarised as follows. 
• Devise new cash schemes that apply batch signature and batch
verification techniques.
• Determine whether batch cryptography is able to improve the efficiency
of any devised electronic cash schemes.
These problems emerge as the key research questions for this thesis, as the 
applicability of batch cryptography for constructing new electronic cash protocols 
with improved computational efficiency is researched. 
1.3 Summary of Results 
While some of the results that follow have been explicitly related to the field of 
electronic cash, it may be observed that these findings may be suitably applied in the 
greater sphere of electronic commerce and other security related applications. With 
respect to subproblem one, the following results are achieved: 
• A naive batch signature scheme is presented that illustrates the notion of
signature generation using a hash function combiner instead of the
multiplicative variants. Building upon this, a tree-structured batch signature
scheme is developed that provides greater efficiency than the previous batch
signature techniques in the literature. Several practical applications are
demonstrated including electronic commerce, electronic cash, and other
signature paradigms such as group signatures.
Subproblem two relates to some outstanding issues and weaknesses of batch 
verification in the literature. The results here are as follows. 
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• It is shown that several published schemes provide a weaker form of
signature verification than what is actually claimed. Some batch verification
schemes based upon DSS have been completely broken. A new general
attack is found that applies to most batch verification techniques in the
literature, and a repair to the general attack is presented.
The final sub-problem is concerned with applications for batch cryptography, 
where electronic cash is used as the example. A summary of results here are as 
follows. 
• An off-line electronic cash system suitable for small payments is introduced.
The scheme services several key cash-like properties not found in other
micropayment systems. This includes off-line payments, bank signature on
each coin, and exact payment capabilities.
• An anonymous off-line electronic cash scheme using batch cryptography is
introduced that exhibits comparable efficiency to the most efficient electronic
cash schemes based upon the divisibility paradigm. The scheme uses a batch
signature to generate several anonymous coins during withdrawal and several
new modified multiplicative verifiers are used during payment and deposit.
1.4 Organisation of Thesis 
Whilst a focal point of the thesis is batch cryptography, the material contained herein 
may be considered as being composed of two key parts. The first part deals with 
batch cryptography in general within chapters three, four, and five. The second part 
deals with electronic cash and is addressed in chapters two, six, and seven. The 
preliminary chapters, two and three, deal with existing body of knowledge, where 
chapters four through seven add to this knowledge. Chapter one introduces the key 
themes associated with this thesis and summarises the contents. 
Electronic cash is an active research domain that 1s slowly finding 
employment in the commercial sector. In chapter two the tools and techniques used 
to devise cash schemes are reviewed. A key theme in this chapter is to trace the 
series of innovations that have led to the construction of a well known electronic 
cash scheme. A number of additional systems are also viewed so that the various 
tools and techniques applied to electronic cash are understood. Finally, it 1s 
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recognised that a clear requirement of any proposed scheme is its ability to perform 
transactions efficiently, particularly for central processing entities such as banks and 
merchants. 
As will be highlighted in chapter three, batch cryptography is concerned with 
performing several cryptographic operations simultaneously for an improvement in 
efficiency. This is to counter the effort of performing the same or similar operation 
once for every message received, and is quite distinct from other forms of 
acceleration. For example, several signatures prepared at different times by the same 
signing authority may be aggregated, or batched, together using multiplicative rules 
(known as homomorphic properties), and verified in one verification procedure. The 
result is that the expense of one modular exponentiation required for verification is 
amortised over several messages. Now, one question posed within this thesis is: can 
this relatively straightforward idea be somehow applied to electronic cash? 
The predominant techniques in batch cryptography have focused on 
verification of signatures. In chapter four some new batch signature techniques are 
introduced and compared with other forms of signing procedures. Signing messages 
simultaneously provides a useful tool for many security applications. Some 
immediate possibilities are realisations within electronic commerce, particularly 
payment systems. This thought is further fueled by the ever growing demand for 
business-to-business electronic commerce. However, there are some more 
interesting applications related to electronic cash. 
Whilst understanding the detail of batch cryptography several weaknesses 
and attacks have come to light, and some repairs have been devised to displace the 
shortcomings. These considerations are presented in chapter five as several new 
attacks and weaknesses, and a general attack to most batch verifiers in the literature, 
are demonstrated. Before proceeding with some practical electronic cash schemes 
some generalisations and repairs are shown. 
Electronic cash protocols have evolved considerably since inception, with 
many variations attempting to satisfy new and interesting properties. Chapter six 
contains an electronic cash protocol that is intended to satisfy several cash properties 
whilst ensuring that its agility is suitable for a small payment environments. The 
scheme applies some of the tools and techniques discussed in earlier chapters, whilst 
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instituting a new protocol for the rapid verifiable exchange of coins between the 
customer and merchant. 
With several new key technologies available, an off-line anonymous 
electronic cash system is introduced in chapter seven. The scheme builds upon 
several of the batch protocols previously discussed including homomorphic verifiers 
and signature techniques. The scheme demonstrates that an alternative approach, in 
contrast to coin divisibility, is available for constructing electronic cash systems. 
In chapter eight the results and findings of this research are summarised. 
Several new, open, and unresolved problems are discussed with some suggestions as 
how they may be pursued. The are a number of appendices also attached that 
contain supplementary materials. 
1.5 Published Results 
Many of the findings contained within the chapters that follow have appeared at 
conference proceedings in some form. Details of the publication and the chapter 
they pertain to are cited here. 
Chapter Four 
+ C. Pavlovski and C. Boyd. Efficient Batch Signature Generation Using Tree 
Structures. Proceedings of Cryptographic Techniques for Electronic Commerce 
- CrypTEC '99, pp.70-77, Hong Kong, 1 999. 
Chapter Five 
+ C. Boyd and C. Pavlovski. Attacking and Repairing Batch Verification Schemes. 
To Appear in Asiacrypt 2000, Kyoto, Japan, December 2000. 
Chapter Six 
+ C. Pavlovski and C. Boyd. Microcash: Efficient Off-Line Small Payments. In C. 
Gamage and Y. Zheng, editors, Third International Workshop on Practice and 
Theory of Public Key Cryptography, PKC 2000, The Poster Papers Collection, 
Monash University, LINKS, pp.64-78, 2000. 
Chapter Seven 
+ C. Pavlovski, C. Boyd, and E. Foo. Detachable Electronic Coins. In V. 
Varadharajan and Y. Mu, editors, Proceedings of Second International 
Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS '99,  Springer­
Verlag, Vol. 1 726, LNCS, pp.54-70, 1 999. 
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+ C. Boyd, E. Foo and C. Pavlovski. Efficient Electronic Cash Using Batch 
Signatures. In J. Pieprzyk, R. Safavi-Naini, and J. Seberry, editors, 41h
Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP '99, 
Springer-Verlag, Vol. 1 587, LNCS, pp.244-257, 1 999. 
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Chapter Two 
Electronic Cash Tools and Models 
"One cannot know science completely without knowing its history." 
� Auguste Comte, 
Cours de philosophie positive, 
1 830. 
2. Electronic Cash Tools and Models
Electronic cash is in many ways a virtual manifestation of what physical cash 
represents to society, aspiring to furnish properties such as anonymity, portability, 
and transferability. In addition, electronic cash is subject to the same attempts at 
fraudulent use as physical cash. Examining some of these properties in a little more 
detail it becomes apparent that representing cash as complex mathematical 
relationships is not achievable in a straightforward manner. For instance for cash to 
be anonymous (untraceable to the customer), the bank must forward cash to the 
customer in a manner that is unrecognizable to the bank so as not to associate this 
with the customer, and with the ability to verify that it did actually issue the cash 
when finally deposited by some merchant. Before sketching out some cryptographic 
theory, a general description of what electronic cash encompasses is given. 
The physical cash model essentially involve three types of entities: 
merchants, customers, and banks. Accordingly, electronic cash systems also involve 
these entities; however, the physical notes and coins are replaced with bitstrings that 
may be easily copied and reused. To masquerade bit strings as cash, a number of 
security properties must be satisfied. These include identity detection of a double 
spending party, the ability to conduct payments without being traced, and 
verifiability by a wide and distributed audience. Whilst there are a number of other 
desirable features, such as prior restraint of double spending, these properties appear 
to be the primary constituents of many electronic cash systems. 
Electronic cash propagates through society under three prominent 
transactions (Figure 2 . 1 ) :  these are the withdrawal, payment, and deposit 
transactions. The customer, after identification, establishes an account with a bank, 
and is then able to obtain electronic notes and coins from the bank by way of the 
withdrawal transaction. To purchase items the customer presents the electronic cash 
to a merchant during the payment transaction. And finally, a merchant is able to 
redeem hard currency for the electronic cash by conducting the deposit transaction 
with the bank. A key feature of any proposed electronic cash system is the ability to 
conduct payment in an off-line manner; that is, without the involvement of a third 
party - particularly the bank. Furthermore, both the withdrawal and payment 
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transactions should be efficient, this is quite crucial as merchants and banks 
represent a central processing point in a distributed cash environment. 
De;/ �draw a/
Payment 
< 
Figure 2.1 Cash Model 
Despite the intense research in this area [Bra93, CFN88, CFT98, E094, 
Fer93, LR98, Oka95, 0091, Pai92, Tra99], electronic cash is yet to establish a 
significant presence within the commercial sector. A contributing factor to this 
predicament is the inability of commercial entities to conduct electronic cash 
transactions with practical efficiency. 
The intent of this chapter is to assist in the self-containment of this thesis. 
By providing a necessary background and overview of modem cryptography, the 
primitives, tools, and models of electronic cash are illustrated. These elementary 
concepts are then further refined by characterising how they may be applied to 
devise several electronic cash models. In particular, the sequence of innovations 
involved in the construction of an electronic cash system is presented. This provides 
some insight into how the various innovations have been built upon to devise one 
such electronic cash system based upon the representation problem. This system 
also serves at the basis for the electronic cash schemes introduced by this thesis. The 
chapter concludes with a new survey of several notable cash schemes that have been 
developed. The survey focuses on the key properties and techniques that each 
scheme has introduced, assisting in the evolution of electronic cash. These schemes 
are finally tabulated in chronological order to facilitate comparison of the various 
features each has offered. 
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2.1 Vernacular of Electronic Cash 
The notion of anonymous electronic cash was first introduced by Chaum [Cha82], 
where he demonstrated a technique for one entity to receive a signature on a message 
without revealing the message to the signer. Since its invention a nomenclature has 
emerged that accommodates many of the keys concepts relevant to electronic cash. 
These terms are used to describe several properties, tools and techniques that are 
used to build cash systems. Before moving onto the more general tools and 
techniques of electronic cash, it is useful to define the prevailing terminology, 
summarising later what properties are serviced for several well known cash schemes. 
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• Anonymous. Electronic cash is represented as a number, or bitstring, which
may be easily associated with a customer by the bank. The ability for a
customer to remain anonymous, prevents the bank from associating
deposited cash with a particular customer as long as no fraudulent activity is
conducted. This property also prevents transactions from being traced; as
such cash is often referred to as untraceable or anonymous cash.
• Blind Signature. A signature protocol that enables a recipient to obtain a
signature on a message without disclosing the message to the signer. This is
most evident in a cash scheme where a customer wishes to obtain a bank
signature on coins not visible to the bank, so that the customer's anonymity
is preserved.
• Cut-and-choose. Interactive protocol that requires several iterations of
protocol steps that enables a customer to withdraw anonymous cash from a
bank.
• Divisible Coin. The ability to sub-divide a coin into smaller portions in a
manner that prevents the customer from over spending the total worth of the
com.
• Double Spending. Due to the properties of anonymous electronic cash, it is
possible to spend the same coin more than once with several different
merchants. This repeated use is referred to as double spending. In an on-line
payment double spending is straightforward to avoid, however off-line
payments require some additional protocol constructions for its detection and 
prevention. 
• Linkable. The ability for the bank to link, or relate, two different payments
to the same withdrawal transaction. This may be evident where protocols
withdraw multiple coins during the same transaction, whether the coins are
divisible or otherwise. This linkability, is also prevalent across transactions;
that is, where coins from different withdrawals may be associated. The later
is referred to as 'linked withdrawals' .
• Multi-Term. During withdrawal the customer and bank typically engage in
some interactive protocol. Where this interaction is performed with sub­
iterations to yield one piece of electronic cash, the scheme is referred to as
multi-term. The cut-and-choose protocol is an example of a multi-term coin.
• Off-Line. The ability to conduct transactions without the involvement of a
third party. The customer and merchant may engage in a payment transaction
without the involvement of the bank to assist in the verification of coins
received.
• On-Line. Conducting payment transactions that require the involvement of a
third party in addition to the two parties involved in the exchange of goods
and services for electronic cash. The third party, typically the bank, confirms
the validity of coins presented.
• Owner Tracing. It is suggested that the availability of anonymous cash may 
be of concern to government or financial institutions. For example, where
fraud is suspected, it is desirable for a law enforcement agency to reveal the
identity associated with anonymous cash. This ability to trace cash to its
owner 1s generally performed by a third-party and referred to as 'owner
tracing' .
• Prior restraint. Prior restraint is the property whereby some device prevents
a customer from double spending.
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• Single-Term. A single-term com can be been withdrawn usmg one
execution of the withdrawal protocol, i.e. the need to repeat steps is avoided.
This approach provides greater efficiency.
• Transferability. The ability to accommodate the additional transfer
transaction in the cash system. Such an operation transfers cash from one
customer to another, or perhaps enables the merchant to transfer cash to the
customer.
2.2 Preliminaries 
Throughout this thesis a number of symbols, notations, and mathematical 
relationships are used to describe various cryptographic protocols and concepts. To 
maintain a consistent approach in describing protocols a number of preliminaries are 
defined formally in this section, all other designations will be defined as required 
during the composition. The formal definitions detailed herein are referenced 
primarily from [MOV97], some additional basic notations are found in Appendix IlL 
2.2.1 Number Theoretic Problems 
The RSA cryptographic scheme is based upon two intractable problems, widely 
known as the integer factorisation and RSA problem. 
Definition 2.1. The integer factorisation problem is, given a positive integer n, to 
find its prime factorisation such that n = pq. 
Several techniques exist to factor large numbers including brute force trial by 
division, quadratic sieve [Pom82] ,  and Pollard's Rho factoring techniques [Pol75] .  
However for sufficiently large n the integer factorisation problem is considered to be 
intractable. For example, a 1 024 bit modulus is considered practical security for 
current purposes [LVOO] . 
Definition 2.2. The RSA problem is, given positive integers c, n, and e, find the 
integer m such that me = c (mod n), where n is a product of two primes p and q, and 
e is prime with respect to (p- 1 )(q- 1 ), i.e. gcd(e, (p- 1 )(q- 1 )) = 1 .  
It i s  conjectured that both the RSA and integer factorisation problems are 
computationally equivalent in terms of their intractability. 
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Definition 2.3. The discrete log problem is, given a prime p, the generator a of the 
group z;, and an element b E z;, to find the integer X, where 0 �X �p -2, SUCh that
ax = b (mod p). 
The discrete log problem is the building block from which many digital 
signature schemes are built. This includes DSA [Kra93] ,  ElGamal [Elg84], and 
Schnorr digital signature schemes [Sch9 1 ] .  In general, the problem may be stated as, 
given y in the multiplicative group G (typically a subgroup of z;), a generator g of 
the multiplicative group G, find x such that y = gx. It is conjectured that no 
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm exists that is able to compute logg x. 
2.2.2 One-way Hash Function 
A one-way hash function takes as its input an arbitrary length binary string, referred 
to as the pre-image, producing an output binary string of some predefined fixed 
length, generally referred to as a hash-value. As its name suggests, the function is 
one-way in the sense that the transformation operation on the pre-image is intended 
to be easily computed, whilst the ability to perform a reverse operation is intractable. 
One-way hash functions are an essential primitive in many cryptographic protocols 
such as digital signatures, message checksums, and message authentication codes. 
Definition 2.4. Let h be a message dependent strong one-way hash function which 
takes as input a binary pre-image of arbitrary length and outputs a binary image of 
some fixed length denoted by n, h:{O,J/--)- {0, 1/. 
One-way hash functions also satisfy several additional properties, the salient 
properties being [MOV96] : 
• The mapping operation x' = h(x), {0, 1 }  * � {0, 1 r, lS computationally
efficient.
• It is computationally infeasible to find two different pre-images x and y such
that h(?:) = h(y); such a function is said to be collision resistant.
• Given some output of the hash function x', where the pre-image is unknown,
it is computationally infeasible to find a pre-image x such that h(x) = x'; such
a function is said to be non-invertible.
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Some practical examples for strong one-way hash functions include MD5 
[Riv92] ,  RIPEMD-1 60 [DBP96], and SHA-1 [FIP95] .  
2.2.3 Complexity Theory 
The efficiency of many cryptographic schemes is measured based upon the 
complexity of mathematical operations; in particular, the bitwise complexity of 
modular addition, multiplication, and exponentiation. Table 2. 1 summarises these 
complexities, where n is prime. These figures are representative only, as the precise 
complexity of operations are dependant upon the algorithm employed1 , hence the 
table may be used as a guide for comparison. 
Operation Modulo n 
Addition 
Subtraction 
Multiplication 
Division 
Exponentiation ( e < n) 
Square Roots 
Complexity 
O(log n) 
O(log n) 
O(log2 n)
O(log2 n)
O(log e 1og2 n)
O(log3 n)
Table 2.1 Bitwise Complexity 
2.3 The Building Blocks of Electronic Cash 
Many cryptographic tools are used as basic building blocks for a variety of complex 
security protocols. In each instance one or more security services are furnished in 
order to realise some practical protocol. For example, the anonymity of physical 
cash must be reproduced using privacy protecting protocols that ensure customer 
traceability of their spending habits is not revealed. The tools and protocols used to 
build cash schemes with these properties are described within the sub-sections that 
follow. This is accomplished by commencing with some original protocols that lay 
the foundations for not only electronic cash, but a multitude of security protocols. 
These original protocols are then expanded upon as an audit trail is traced of the 
successive innovations that have evolved into one prominent electronic cash scheme. 
Whilst the list of inventions described is not exhaustive, the list provides a 
representative sample of the advances achieved. 
1 Techniques such as Montgomery and Barrett reductions, can improve the complexity of these operations over 
the classical algorithms; for a detailed treatment see [MOV96]. 
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2.3.1 Public Key Cryptography and the Digital Signature 
The inventors of public key cryptography, Diffie and Hellman, introduced a key 
exchange protocol that provided a new direction (as their paper is entitled) for the 
field of cryptography [DH76] . Their revolutionary idea was to employ two different 
cryptographic keys to solve the problem of key distribution; one was kept private for 
decryption and one publicly known for encryption. This was in stark contrast to all 
previous schemes, which were based upon a symmetric key paradigm. 
Shortly after the advent of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, Rivest Shamir and 
Adleman proposed the first practical implementation of public key cryptography 
[RSA78]. The scheme enabled the digital signing and encryption of messages, 
where the security is based upon the difficulty of factoring large numbers, (or one 
may attack the RSA problem). The RSA protocols are the mostly widely used 
signature and encryption (generally for secret key encipherment under hybrid 
schemes) primitives and to this present day its strength in security largely remains 
uncompromised. 
There are a number of interesting properties associated with RSA, in 
particular its homomorphic, or multiplicative property. As will be observed, the 
homomorphic property is quite useful in the field of batch cryptography. In fact, 
similar multiplicative properties are also relevant to discrete log based schemes such 
as Schnorr [Sch9 1 ]  and ElGamal [Elg84] . 
2.3.2 The Schnorr Signature Scheme 
In [Sch91 ]  Schnorr introduced an alternative signature scheme that exhibited some 
advances over the RSA scheme. These were largely associated with efficiency; in 
particular, modular exponentiation is conducted under a smaller exponent q that 
forms a subgroup of the much larger group z;. More precisely, arithmetic operations 
are conducted in Gq, a subgroup of z;, giving more efficient operations. 
The original Schnorr signature scheme [Sch9 1 ]  employs public and private 
keys h and x respectively, where 0 < x < q, and the public key h is computed using an 
inverse discrete logarithm, h = g-x mod p. Both an identification and signature
scheme were outlined. The identification scheme relied upon an interactive 
challenge that allowed a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret value x, refer 
Figure 2.2. 
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Verifier Prover 
a 
Choose c ER Zq c 
r r =  cx + w mod q 
Check gr = a he mod p 
Figure 2.2 Schnorr Identification Protocol 
The signature protocol is non-interactive. To sign a message m with the 
private key x the steps in Figure 2.3 are performed. Note that if the public key h is 
not computed as an inverse discrete logarithm (g-x mod p ), then the value r is to be 
computed as r = w - ex mod q. 
Verifier 
(c, r) 
Check c = h( m 11 g h) 
Figure 2.3 Schnorr Signature Protocol 
Sign er 
w ER Zq 
a = gw modp 
c = h(m 11 a) 
r =  w - cx mod q 
To verify the signature (c, r), compute a' = gr he mod p and check that c = 
h(m 11 a). This evaluates correctly due to, 
a' = g he =  gw - xe gxe = gw (modp). 
Observe that in the above signature scheme there is no proof that the issuing 
body has knowledge of the signing key, for instance the signature and message could 
be replayed by some eavesdropping entity. 
Before proceeding further with the more elaborate protocols, it must be noted 
that in the remainder of this thesis all arithmetic is performed in z;. Hence the 
notation a = gw implicitly denotes a = gw mod p. Operations conducted on values 
used as exponents are performed modulo q and shall be explicitly shown. Prime 
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order subgroups using smaller exponents are a well known construct for conducting 
more efficient exponentiations. 
2.3.3 Blind Signatures 
Combining the basic signature and identification protocols of the original Schnorr 
schemes (Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.2), a signing entity is able to sign a message and 
prove knowledge of the corresponding secret key under the same interactive moves. 
Chaum and Pedersen [CP92] outline the approach, this is illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
Verifier 
a, b, z 
Choose e ER Zq e 
r 
Figure 2.4 Interactive Signature Scheme 
Sign er 
w ER Zq 
a = gw 
b = mw 
r =  ex + w mod q 
With respect to the original Schnorr scheme, the secret key is x and public 
key is (p, q, g, h). The message m is initially signed z = mx, then a random value w 
ER Zq chosen to compute a = gw and b = mw, refer to Figure 2.4. The additional 
values z and b are now included to assist in confirming knowledge of the signature 
key, (i.e. the association of a and b, by way of the common exponentiation w, is used 
to confirm that the provably known secret key x is used to sign the message m). The 
verifier selects a random challenge e E Zq, returns this and the signer computes the 
response r = ex + w mod q as per the original method. The verifier accepts the 
signature cr(m) = (z, a, b, r) on m as valid by confirming that the following holds,
g = a hc and mr = b zc. 
Since g = a he demonstrates knowledge of the signing key x and mr = b zc 
confirms the message is also signed by the same key, it follows that z = mx is a valid 
signature on m, or rather logg h = logm z (= x) is a proof that confirms the secret key 
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is provably known by the signer and used to sign the message. This can be seen by 
evaluating further, 
Given that the message and signature obtained by the verifier is visible to the 
signer, some additional transformations must be accommodated to create a blind 
signature scheme. Moreover, Chaum and Pedersen illustrate that by retaining this 
interaction a blind signature protocol can be created. 
Chaum and Pedersen [CP92] also outline an approach for converting the 
above interactive signature (Figure 2.4) into a blind signature scheme; (the blinded 
variant of the RSA signature scheme is also due to Chaum [Cha82], which is 
denoted by the introduction of a blinding factor that is later divided out of the 
recieved signature). This is achieved by deriving a new message and signature that 
is unknown to the signer, whilst retaining all mathematical relationships after the 
transformation, refer Figure 2.5 .  
By extension of the interactive scheme, the verifier must transform the 
message to be signed m' into a message m, transform the tuple (z, a, b) to (z', a ', b) 
and derive new values for the challenge c and response r,  respectively c '  and r'. 
Noting that values denoted with a prime, such as m', are not visible to the signing 
party, a simplification (removal of redundant exponentiation u on the second part of 
a', b ', and z) of the blinded signature scheme is now described more formally. 
The verifier commences by choosing a random blinding invariant t E R  z; and 
derives a new message m =  m't, forwarding this to the signer. The signer applies the 
signing key to the message z = mX, chooses random w E R  Zq, computes a =  gw and b 
= mw, returning (z, a, b) to the verifier. The verifier now must determine new values 
by choosing blinding invariants u, v ER Zq and computing a' =  au gv, b' = blltu m'v,
and z' = z11t; (note that the inverse of the blinding invariant t is applied to b and z).
The computed challenge c' = h(m' 1 1 z' 1 1 a' 1 1 b) must also remain blinded, so a new 
challenge c = c'/u mod q is computed and forwarded to the signer. The signer 
responds with r = ex +  w mod q and the verifier accepts the signature (z, a, b, r) on 
the visible message m when gr = a he and mr = b zc holds. 
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Verifier 
* 
Choose t ER Zq 
m = m't 
Choose u, v ER Zq 
a' = au gv 
b' = blltu m'v
, _ litz - z 
c' = h(m' l l z' l l  a' l l b) 
c = c'/u mod q 
Check: 
Compute: 
m 
a, b, z 
c 
r 
r' = ru + v mod q 
Figure 2.5 Blind Signature Scheme 
Sign er 
w ER Zq 
a = gw 
b = mw 
r =  ex + w mod q 
On completion of the protocol the signer has the visible elements m and (z, a, 
b, r), which constitute a signature relationship when gr = a he and mr = b ze, and a 
blinded version m' with corresponding signature cr(m) = (z', a', b ', r). It can be seen 
that if both parties follow the protocol then cr(m) is a correct signature on m' when 
gr' = a' he' mod p and m'r' = b'  z'e' mod p hold true. 
As Chaum and Pedersen point out, the above protocol enables the verifier to 
obtain a signature on any message chosen [CP92] . Below it is shown how one may 
place a restriction on the type of message being signed, a principal feature when one 
wishes to model coins of a particular form in an electronic cash system. One 
specific form of restriction is the demand that the verifier prove knowledge of a 
certain representation that the message possesses. 
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2.3.4 Representation Problem 
The representation problem, introduced by Chaum et al. [CEG87], underpins the 
protocols of Brands' cash system [Bra93] .  Simply put, the representation problem 
is, given a value h and the pair (gi, gz), find a pair (xi ,  x2) such that h = gix1 g/2• In
fact any number of g values can be used in the general problem, and it can be seen 
that the representation problem is a generalisation of the discrete log problem which 
is the case of a single g value. 
With respect of the payment protocol of the Brands ' cash system [Bra93],  the 
customer must prove knowledge of B's representation; this is achieved by revealing 
partial knowledge of (xi ,  xz), proving that the customer did in fact take part in 
withdrawing the coins. Additionally, under the restrictive blind signature technique 
(see the next section) the customer must know a representation of A with respect to 
(gi, g2). The following protocol [Bra93],  refer to Figure 2.6, illustrates how a prover 
is able to demonstrate knowledge of a representation (x� ,  x2) of h with respect to (gi , 
g2); this is the case of two values. 
Verifier 
z 
Choose c ER Zq c 
Figure 2.6 Representation Problem 
Sign er 
WI , wz ER Zq 
z = gwi gwz
ri = cxi + WI mod q
rz = cxz + wz mod q
With public key (g�, g2, p, q, h), the prover selects at random WI, wz ER Zq, 
computes z = gw1 gw2, and forwards this to the verifier. The verifier responds with
the generated random challenge c E R  Zq, and the prover computes responses ri = cxi
+ WI mod q and rz = cxz + wz mod q, returning these to the verifier.
The verifier accepts that the prover knows a representation of h with respect 
to gi and g2, when z he = g1 g2 holds. It is straightforward to see that the proof for
the representation problem is similar to a Schnorr proof for the case of two 
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generators (g1, g2). Furthermore breaking the representation problem is 
computationally as difficult as breaking the discrete log problem [Bra93a] ,  see 
definition 2.3.  
2.3.5 Restrictive Blind Signatures 
The notion of the restrictive blind signature [Bra93] extends Chaum's  and 
Pedersen's  blind signature protocol [CP92] .  The term restrictive is evident in the 
protocol as the customer is restricted to a specific form when blinding coins (the 
coins represent the messages to be signed), in particular he must encode his identity. 
In the case of [Bra93] ,  the customer must know the representation (u1 ,  uz) of A with 
respect to (g1 , gz). This restriction, on the blinding of the internal structure of coins, 
will enforce the ability to reveal the identity of a customer if there is an attempt to 
double spend the coin. Of course if a restricted form is not adhered to, the customer 
does not end up with a valid signature on the blinded coins. 
The notion of the restrictive signature is a little more explicit under the 
Brands' cash system, as the user does not actually have the opportunity to present a 
blinded message for signing as in the blind signature scheme shown in Figure 2.5. 
On the contrary, it is the signer who constructs the portion of the coin determined by 
the restricted form. This is the value m = g1 u1 g2 u2 to be signed, which is then blindly 
transformed by the customer. 
The verifier initially presents the identity I = g1f.l to the s1gner and
demonstrates knowledge of the secret key �· The signer then uses the verifier's 
identity to construct the message to be signed; here lies the restriction on the 
message being signed, being only of the form g1 f.l g2, where � is unknown to the 
bank. The remainder of the protocol is similar to its unrestricted form (see Figure 
2.  7), however the verifier now blinds the message after receiving it; in fact this may 
be done prior using the public key (g1 , g2, p, q, h). 
Once again the receiver computes r' = ru + v mod q, obtaining the message 
m' blindly signed with corresponding signature (z', a', b', r'), which may be
independently verified by other parties. 
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Verifier 
Choose s, u, v ER Zq 
m'= ms 
a '=  au gv 
b '=  bsu m� 
z' = � 
c' = h(m' l l z' l l  a' l l  b) 
c = c'/u mod q 
Check: 
Compute: 
r' = ru + v mod q 
I 
z, a, b 
c 
r 
Figure 2. 7 Restrictive Blind Signature Scheme 
2.3.6 Elementary Signature of Knowledge 
Sign er 
r = cx + w mod q 
Before moving on to how these previous ideas can be used to build an electronic 
cash scheme the notion of a signature of knowledge is examined. These form the 
basis of some new signature schemes developed in chapter 4. 
A signature of knowledge [CS97] is a non-interactive protocol in which a 
signer is able to prove knowledge of the secret, whilst the proof also serves to 
provide a signature. In essence, this is the combination of the signature and 
identification features of the Schnorr protocol (recall that in Figure 2.3 there was no 
interaction). 
The pair (c, r) is a signature of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of h to 
the base g (demonstrates knowledge of the value x) on m (and is a signature on m) if 
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the challenge is c = h(m 11 h 11 g 11 gr h). The signature of knowledge (c, r) is created 
on message m with the private key x, with the following steps: 
1 .  Choose w ER Zn 
3 .  r = w - xc mod q 
To verify the signature of knowledge the verifier checks that c = h(m 11 h 11 g 1 1  
g he). This evaluates correctly due to gr he = gw + xc g-xc = gw. A signature of
knowledge may be viewed as essentially the Schnorr signature scheme with 
additional parameters used to create the challenge c, satisfying both the signatory 
and a proof of knowledge criteria. 
The signature of knowledge has found more general applications in group 
signatures. In this sense they have a more formal definition. 
Definition 2.5. An (t + 1 )  tuple (c, s � ,  . . .  , st) E {O, l }t x Zn satisfoing
where c[i] is the ith leftmost bit of c, is a signature of knowledge of the discrete
logarithm of y E G to the base g on a message m, with respect to security parameter 
t, denoted SKLOGt [a I Y  = g
a](m).
The signer computes r� , . . .  , r11 ER Zn, determines the challenge bits c[i] from 
c = h(m, y, g, g1, • • •  , grn) and derives the values s1 , • • •  , s2 by setting
{ 'i if c[ i] = 0 s -i 1j - x (mod n) otherwise.
The idea of using challenge bits is to imitate2 several rounds of an interactive
challenge, consistent with a zero-knowledge protocol [CS97] . 
2.4 Untraceable Off-line Cash 
With an understanding of the cash tools attention is now drawn to the Brands 
untraceable off-line cash model [Bra93] .  The scheme is presented in detail as it 
serves as a basis for cash schemes presented in chapter 7 .  It is also worthy to note 
2 Of course the use of the hash function is able to remove the need for interaction. 
27 
that the model also forms the basis of many other cash schemes published in the 
literature [CFT98, E094, NMV97, JY96a] . 
The key design goals of the Brands' scheme are efficiency, provability and 
extendibility, and the ability to deploy within a wallet [Bra93a] .  The scheme is 
single-term, representing a significant advance over the multi-term approach of the 
cut-and-choose paradigm. The protocols extend the basic blind signature scheme in 
[CP92] applying the representation problem and introducing the notion of the 
restrictive blind signature. Whilst an attack has been identified with versions of the 
protocol that employ a customer identity represented with two or more generator 
values [CFMY96], for example I =  g1u1 g2u2, a revised protocol based upon the single 
representation I = gr f-1, where J.l is the customer secret, appears to be secure from 
attack [CFMY96] . 
The setup consists of the bank selecting two large primes p and q, such that q 
l P - 1 ,  selecting the generator triplet (g, gr , g2) ER Gq, where Gq is a subgroup of the 
multiplicative group z;. The bank also chooses secret key x, computes h = gx mod p, 
and publishes the public key (g, gr , g2, p, q, h), retaining x as the private key. 
Customers who register their identity le = grf-1, where J.l ER Zq, with the bank may 
withdraw cash. 
2.4.1 Withdrawal 
During withdrawal the customer obtains a blind signature on the pair (A, B); more 
precisely the signature is only applied to A whilst the value B is introduced, and 
linked to the signature through the transformation h(A, B, z', a', b'), so that no 
information is revealed about u unless the same coin is spent twice. The signature 
on (A, B) consists of the tuple (z, a, b, r) when g = he a and Ar = ze b hold. 
To commence withdrawal the bank first must be satisfied with the 
customer's  identity. The bank then generates random value w ER Zq and sends z = 
Ig2, a = gw, b = Ig2w to the customer, refer Figure 2.8 .  The customer chooses 
blinding invariants s ER z;, and u, v ER Zq, and transforms the numbers A =  (Ig2Y, z' 
= :1, a' = au gv, b' = bsu Av. The customer also chooses representation values xr, x2 E R  
Zq and generates the second part of the coin B = g1x1 g2x2• The blinded challenge c' = 
h(A, B, z', a', b') is then determined, forwarding c = c'lu mod q to the bank. The bank 
responds to the challenge with r = ex + w mod q, and the customer accepts the 
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signature on the pair (A, B) if both g = he a and Ar = ze b hold. The blinded coin is
identified by the triple A, B, cr(A, B) = (z', a', b', r}, where r' = ru + v mod q.
Customer 
Choose s, u, v ER Zq 
A =  (It£zt 
B = gtXj g{2 
a '=  au gv 
b' = bs u Av 
z' = �
c' = h(A B z' a' b"' 
' ' ' ' } 
c = c ' / u mod q 
Verify Signature: 
gr = a  he 
(lt£zY = b ze
Evaluate: 
r' = ru + v mod q
z, a, b
c 
r 
Figure 2.8 Untraceable Cash Withdrawal 
2.4.2 Payment 
Bank 
Choose w ER Zq 
Calculate 
z = Ut£zY 
a = gw 
b = (lt£zt 
r =  ex + w mod q 
The customer may present the triple A, B cr(A, B) = (z', a ', b', r} to a merchant in the 
payment transaction. During the three move protocol, refer Figure 2.9, the merchant 
confirms that the coin bears the bank's signature and that the customer presenting 
the coin knows a representation of the pair (A, B) with respect to (g1, gz). 
Verification of the bank's signature is straightforward and is a check that both g' =
he a' and Ar' = z' e b' hold. Confirming the coin's representation in (g1 , g2) establishes
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that the customer presenting the coin took part in the coin withdrawal and ensures 
that the identity is also embedded. Upon receiving the coin the merchant, identified 
by Im, issues a challenge d =  h(A, B, Im, date-time) to the customer, the customer then 
computes and returns the responses r1 = d!JS + x1 and r2 = ds + x2• Although the 
customer includes the secret identity 1-1 within the response, the customer is safe in 
doing so as long as the same coin is not used more than once. Using the responses 
the bank then determines if the representation check g1 r1 g{2 = Ad B is satisfied. 
Customer 
r1 = d!JS + XI mod q 
r2 = ds + x2 mod q 
2.4.3 Deposit 
(A, B), cr(A, B) 
d 
Merchant 
Check A ::F- 1  
d = h(A,  B, Im, date-time) 
Verify Signature: 
gr' = a ,  hh(A, B, z', a', b) 
Ar' = b'  z'h(A, B, z', a', b) 
Check Representation: 
g{I g{2 = Ad B 
Figure 2.9 Untraceable Cash Payment 
To deposit the coin the merchant forwards the payment transcript A, B, cr(A, B), Im, 
date-time, and the pair (r1 ,  r2) to the bank. The bank performs a similar verification 
and representation check, to the merchant, when validating the coin structure. When 
a duplicate of the A part of the coin is detected in the repository, either the merchant 
is attempting to deposit the same coin twice or the customer may be double 
spending. A unique merchant challenge is sufficient to determine that it is in fact the 
customer who is attempting to defraud the system. In such a case the bank will have 
two payment transcripts and sufficient information to reveal the identity of the 
customer. Consider the transcript portions from two individual payments: d, (r1 , r2) 
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and d', (r'r ,  r2). The customer identity may be revealed by first evaluating the secret 
key ).! and then calculating I. 
(n - r'1)l(rz - r2) = (d� - d'�) I (ds - d's)
= � ( d - d) I s ( d - d) 
= ll ( d - d) I ( d - d) 
= ).! 
The bank is then able to compute the customer identity I =  g1J..l. Furthermore, 
obtaining ).! is proof that the customer has double spent as the bank did not have 
prior knowledge of the customer's secret key. 
2.5 A Brief Survey of Electronic Cash 
In addition to the tools outlined thus far, a number of other notable cash schemes 
have been devised, contributing various properties and techniques from which cash 
schemes may be built. These fundamental constructions are briefly surveyed in this 
section with a comparison of the key properties that each implementing scheme 
offers. 
2.5.1 Untraceable Electronic Cash 
The first electronic cash scheme that offered untraceable coins and the ability to 
conduct payments off-line was presented by Chaum et. al. in [CFN88]. The 
capability to reveal the customer identity when double spending occurs is also made 
possible by ensuring that the customer encodes the identity within the withdrawn 
coin. These properties are realised through the use of the RSA blind signature 
scheme [Cha82] , and cut-and-choose technologies [Rab77] . 
The RSA blind signature scheme enables the customer to hide the contents of 
the message being signed by choosing a random blinding element r ER Zn and 
computing a blinded coin B = re h(x) (mod n), using the bank's public key (e, n) .
The coin is signed by the bank returning Bd (mod n) to the customer, who may 
extract the coin C$ = Bd I r. The key feature of the protocol was use of the cut-and­
choose protocol to ensure with high probability that the customer has embedded the 
identity within the withdrawn coin. 
The cut-and-choose protocol is based upon the customer preparing k blinded 
coin candidates for the bank to sign. The bank will then select randomly half the 
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candidates and request additional information that enables the contents to be viewed. 
If the bank confirms that all candidate coins do indeed contain a customer identity, it 
is assumed with high probability that the remaining candidates also contain the 
customer's identity. The bank finally signs the product of the remaining k/2 blinded 
candidates, and the customer obtains a coin by dividing out the blinding factor r. 
The specifics of the cash scheme are simplified by letting u represent the customer's  
identity, helping to illustrate the basics of the cut-and-choose protocol, see Figure 
2. 1 0.
Customer 
for i = 1 to k do: 
Choose Xi, ai ER Zn 
Bi = re h(xi 1 1 ai EB u) mod n 
'V"i in {h . . .  jkl2 } :
select xi 
C$ = Slr mod n 
X! • • •  XkJ2 
s 
Bank 
Choose k/2 candidates: 
j! . . . jk/2 
S = B· mod n ITk/2 d i=l l 
Figure 2.10 Cut-and-Choose Protocol 
During payment the customer forwards the coin C$ to the merchant who 
challenges with a binary string of length k/2.  Where the challenge bit of the binary 
string is equal to 1 ,  the customer responds with some information regarding the 
internals of the coin - communicating partial information regarding the customer 
identity. During deposit if a double spent coin is detected then the bank is able to 
reveal the identity of the customer by evaluating two sets of binary string payment 
transcripts. 
Clearly such a cash scheme bears a computational and communications 
overhead with k/2 coin elements propagating through the various protocols to 
withdraw and spend one coin. Subsequent cash systems [009 1 ,  Pai92, E094, 
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Oka95, CFT98] have improved upon this protocol by withdrawing coins that may be 
divided into smaller financial amounts. 
2.5.2 Universal Electronic Cash 
The ability to subdivide a coin enables a customer to withdraw a large amount of 
cash during one withdrawal exchange, for many subsequent payments. The concept 
$1 0 .00 
$2.50 $2.50 $2.50 
Figure 2.11 Divisible Coin 
restrictions apply to these divisibility trees: 
is based upon a binary tree structure 
where the root node represents the 
total value of the coin, and each child 
node represents half the value of its 
parent, see Figure 2 . 1 1 .  The customer 
is able to spend nodes of a tree as long 
as the total worth of the coin is not 
exceeded. More specifically, three 
1 .  The value of a node n is equal to the total value of nodes that are children of 
node n. 
2 .  When a node n i s  spent then all descendants of  n and all ancestors of  the n 
cannot be used; this is referred to as the route node rule. 
3 .  No node can be used more than once; this is referred to as the same node 
rule. 
Okamoto and Ohta introduced a cash scheme that provided this divisibility 
property whilst still maintaining other key properties of electronic cash, these were 
off-line payments, untraceable payments, and detection of double spending [009 1 ] .  
Their scheme also relied upon the cut-and-choose technique to ensure the customer 
encoded their identity within the coin, however this interaction was moved to an 
initial account set-up stage that provided the customer with a licence. The reasoning 
behind this was that customers are expected to perform the account set-up 
infrequently when compared to a coin withdrawal, hence an efficiency gain may be 
achieved. Furthermore, multiple payments may be made with the same coin until its 
total worth is consumed, this is in contrast to a one-withdrawal one-payment model. 
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Due to the use of the same license for withdrawals however, the overall scheme was 
vulnerable to linked withdrawals. 
2.5.3 Single-Term Off-Line Coins 
In separate papers Brands [Bra93]  and Ferguson [Fer93]  demonstrated how one may 
be able to withdraw electronic cash without the use of the cut-and-choose method. 
Their schemes were single-term, requiring only one execution of the protocol to 
encode the customers identity within the coin during withdrawal. Their models 
represented a significant advance in improving the efficiency of cash systems, and 
all present day schemes rely upon a similar single-term construction. Their works 
appear to be extensions of the blind signature techniques presented by Chaum et. al. 
in [CP92] ,  however the intricacies of each scheme differ considerably. 
As already discussed, Brands devised a restrictive blind signature to 
guarantee that the customer's identity was encoded within the withdrawn coin. 
Ferguson adopted a randomised blind signature technique to achieve a similar goal, 
where the bank is convinced that the coin to be signed is randomly prepared whilst 
still containing the customer identity. Of the two schemes Brands' possessed an 
efficiency advantage and was provably secure. 
2.5.4 Divisible Electronic Cash 
The first cash scheme attempting to combine both the single-term and divisible 
techniques was dealt with in [E094]. The scheme applied Brands' protocol by 
adding a divisible coin to the withdrawal, however the on-line computation required 
during payment was linear in complexity with the divisibility precision. In [Oka95],  
Okamoto presented a divisible electronic cash scheme that was single-term and 
behaving more efficiently than its predecessors; having logarithmic computational 
complexity with the divisibility precision. 
Okamoto's scheme [Oka95] employed a bit commitment scheme, in lieu of 
the cut-and-choose, during the opening protocol for a customer to obtain a licence. 
Although costly, it was envisaged that such a protocol would again be performed 
infrequently, perhaps only once during account establishment, so that the licence 
may be used over a large number of coin withdrawals. 
During the opening protocol the customer essentially proves to the bank that 
a number N is the product of two large primes P and Q, without revealing these to 
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the banlc This procedure exhibits most of the computational expense of the 
protocol. Later, it is the factoring of N that enables the bank to reveal the identity of 
a double spender as the identity (x, y) is known to the bank, where x = gP (mod n) 
and y = gQ (mod n) . When the bank is convinced, the customer then receives two
RSA blind signatures on numbers related to N, providing him with a licence (N, L1 , 
L2). During withdrawal the customer creates a coin h(N 11 b ER ZR), blinds this and 
receives an RSA blind signature on the coin. 
When the customer wishes to conduct a payment, the coin authentication and 
denomination revelation stage of the payment are executed. Coin authentication 
demonstrates to the merchant that the coin is correctly signed by the bank, and that 
the licence (N, L1 , Lz) is valid. Denomination revelation entails the customer 
releasing information regarding the node to be spent. The merchant confirms that 
the node is of a correct form so that when double spending occurs the value N may 
be factored and the customer's identity revealed. 
In the paper, Okamoto remarked that an outstanding problem of the scheme 
is the realisation of unlinked withdrawals; to achieve this the opening protocol 
would need to be performed once for each divisible coin to be withdrawn. Given 
that the opening protocol takes around 4,000 multi-exponentiations, the 
computational complexity to achieve this would be prohibitive. 
2.5.5 Easy Come Easy Go Cash 
In [CFT98], Chan, Frankel and Tsiounis advanced the efficiency of Okamoto 's basic 
scheme by reducing the computational expense required during the opening stage. A 
number of other contributions were made, but the key advantage was an efficient 
protocol to obtain an electronic licence during withdrawal, thus making unlinked 
withdrawals a practical option. 
The scheme applied aspects of Brands single-term scheme [Bra93] and 
Okamoto's divisible coin techniques [Oka95].  The major difference to Okamoto's 
scheme is that a licence is not obtained during the account establishment stage, 
rather this is moved to withdrawal and performed more efficiently. The expensive 
opening protocol which proves that N is a product of two primes is avoided, and now 
the value N = PQ is generated randomly each time the customer wishes to withdraw. 
During this exchange a modified Brands withdrawal provides coin authentication in 
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a clever way that ensures that the value N is indeed a composite of two prime 
numbers, P and Q. The resulting scheme is presently the most efficient, and satisfies 
several key properties: 
• Anonymity, 
• Tracing of double spenders, 
• Off-Line, 
• Single-Term, 
• Divisible Coin, and 
• Unlinked Withdrawals. 
2.5.6 Cash Models 
There is an extensive library of electronic cash schemes in the literature. Many of 
these schemes apply the tools presented above and a number of other novel 
techniques [Bra93 ,  CFN88, CFT98, E094, Fer93, Oka95, 009 1 ,  Pai92].  A subset 
of the schemes has been briefly discussed so that the notable electronic cash 
techniques and properties are described. The survey conducted here is summarised 
in Table 2.2. The reviewed cash schemes are presented in chronological order, 
where each scheme is tabulated with their associated cash properties, tools and 
techniques. 
Of the diversified schemes 'Easy Come - Easy Go Cash' furnishes the 
greatest number of desirable cash properties and is considered the most efficient 
scheme presently devised [CFT98] .  Later in chapter seven several new techniques 
for devising anonymous electronic cash systems are introduced, in particular batch 
cryptography is employed as an alternative primitive whilst providing an 
improvement in efficiency. 
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./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Table 2.2 Electronic Cash Models 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter introduced several key concepts peculiar to electronic cash providing a 
foundation for the terminology, number theoretic conventions, and properties 
associated with electronic cash. The tools and techniques that have been used as 
primitives to build electronic cash systems are then described. This is intended to 
facilitate containment of many of the concepts presented in the chapters that follow. 
Commencing with several cryptographic problems such as the RSA and 
discrete log problems, various innovations are described. This includes public key 
cryptography, digital signatures, blind digital signatures, and restrictive blind digital 
signatures. These tools are presented in an order that portrays the way in which one 
particular cash scheme, Untraceable Electronic Cash [Bra93], has evolved. The 
Brands cash scheme is then reviewed in detail, as this forms the basis of the cash 
scheme presented in chapter seven. This chapter concludes with a new survey of 
several other well known cash models, contrasting the properties, tools, and 
techniques that may be applied to build anonymous electronic cash systems. 
37 
38  
Chapter Three 
Batch Cryptography 
"A reasonable probability is the only certainty." 
� Edgar Watson Howe, 
Country Town Sayings, 
1 9 1 1 .  
3. Batch Cryptography 
The previous chapter described several tools that are applied to satisfy the key 
characteristics vital in providing electronic cash and electronic payment services. 
One of the more prominent characteristics is efficiency, both in a computational and 
storage sense. Batch cryptography is an efficiency mechanism which electronic cash 
schemes are yet to exploit and hence provides the research opportunity to identify 
where and if such schemes may be applied to devise new and efficient cash 
protocols. 
This chapter exammes the current primitives for performing batch 
cryptography, exploring the origins of the various schemes and concluding with the 
present day techniques. Several definitions are formalised, so that the two general 
classifications of batch cryptography may be reviewed: batch signature algorithms 
and batch verification algorithms. The first scheme presented, a batch signature 
scheme, involves the first introduction of these novel techniques; Fiat's Batch RSA 
[Fia89] . This is then followed by a detailed treatment of the major work in this field, 
this relates to batch verification algorithms that utilise homomorphic properties. 
With the various techniques reviewed a new classification is provided, this is 
a tabulated summary of the observed properties. These schemes are then further 
assessed in terms of their efficiency, and it is revealed that some batch schemes may 
actually be less efficient than the original scheme it is intended to improve upon. 
Furthermore, it is observed that some non-repudiation issues are prevalent to several 
of the proposed batch verification techniques; these and other security issues are 
more formally addressed in chapter five. And finally, an electronic cash scheme is 
briefly inspected, noting that this has touched upon the use of batch cryptography in 
electronic cash. 
3.1 Historical Perspective 
The concept of batch cryptography for improved efficiency was first introduced by 
Fiat in [Fia89], later refined in [Fia97], as an approach for amortising private key 
operations for RSA. The scheme outlined was applicable to signature and 
decryption operations under RSA, noting that the concept may also be applied to 
Shamir's secure pseudo-random sequence generator [Sha83] . In the context of an 
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RSA signature, his idea was to batch a number of messages together for signing, 
perform one full-scale modular exponentiation to sign the messages simultaneously, 
and then split apart the batch into individually signed messages. This was 
achievable largely due to the multiplicative, or homomorphic, property of RSA and 
the observation by made Chaum that different relatively-prime roots may be split 
apart [CFN88].  
Subsequent works involving batch cryptography, by Bell er and Y acobi, was 
to apply Fiat's technique to the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme [BY92, 
YB97] . In their paper they demonstrated a practical application for the use of batch 
cryptography that was able to realise an efficiency gain in the order of 6 to 17  times 
over the original Diffie-Hellman scheme. The key agreement schedule relied upon a 
star topology, with a key distribution centre used to create several secret keys. The 
suggested topology is applicable to mobile phone communications where number of 
mobile phone units contact a central base station. The batch key agreement scheme 
could then be used to process requests simultaneously, creating several secret keys 
for encrypting communications over the radio link between mobile phones and one 
base station. 
Two additional hatching techniques were introduced by Naccache et al. at 
Eurocrypt '94 [NMRV94], an interactive and a probabilistic version. Their approach 
was to enable batch verification of multiple DSA signatures. The scheme involved a 
signature collection protocol that created several DSA signatures. Later, the verifier 
is able to verify all signatures at once by checking that a batch criterion holds, the 
operation being as efficient as a single DSA verification. Lim and Lee [LL94] 
pointed out that in fact the interactive batch version was not secure and that both the 
verifier and signer could create signatures that would still satisfy the batch 
verification. However, Ham subsequently proposed a method that preserved the 
security of the interactive version of the protocol [Har95],  and later outlining a non­
interactive version ofDSA batch verification [Har98a] . 
Further work concerning batch verification, in this case non-interactive 
versions, has been proposed by Yen and Laih [YL95].  The verification techniques 
shown enable batch verification of the Schnorr, Brickell-McCurley, and RSA 
signature schemes where they employ the same signature key. In addition, they 
also outline how Fiat's batch RSA, which performs a batch signature using different 
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signing keys, may be extended to batch verify signatures. The principal once again 
is based upon the homomorphic properties of the respective scheme. It is also noted 
that to remain probabilistically secure from attack, the verifier must choose a secret 
exponent value and apply this during batch verification. This value, prevents the 
signer from attempting to introduce false signatures that would otherwise satisfy the 
batch verification criterion, (the properties of this exponents test are discussed in 
more detail in section 3 .4.4). 
Most recently at Eurocrypt '98, Bellare, Garay, and Rabin outline several 
techniques for conducting batch verification with high confidence that false 
signatures have not been mixed into the batch [BGR98] . The straightforward case is 
the small exponents test, as outlined by Naccache et al. [NMVR94], and Yen and 
Laih [YL95], with the more sophisticated techniques for larger batch instances. In 
their paper they also discuss the case where no small exponent test is applied, and 
call this screening. They highlight that screening enables the signer to mix false 
signatures into the batch, however proving that only the signer has the ability to do 
this. 
The key motivation for batch cryptography is to improve the efficiency of 
cryptographic transformations. The central idea in achieving this is the capacity to 
conduct some operation, such as signature verification, on two or more messages 
simultaneously. This may be achieved when several messages are batched together 
for a single cryptographic operation, whilst preserving the security properties of the 
operation performed. The following sections discuss in more detail some of the 
predominant techniques that have been devised, this involves its use in signature and 
verification techniques. This is then followed by a description of an electronic cash 
scheme that has applied batch cryptography, in a limited form, as part of its 
protocols. 
3.2 Definitions and Properties 
There are several terms specific to batch cryptography which will be defined 
formally here. Given a message m and a signing key K, a single message signature 
pair is (m, S), where S is the signature on m. A batch instance is defined as a set of 
message signature pairs. 
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Definition 3.1 .  A batch instance X =  {(cJ, t1), (c2, t2), . . .  , (en, t,J) is a set of claimed 
message-signature pairs (ci, tJ,for i = I  to n. 
Using the approach of verifying signatures independently verification of t 
signatures takes time linear. Batch verification of t signatures test the correctness of 
these signatures simultaneously, in some probabilistic manner, so that it is faster 
than performing each test independenty t times. 
Definition 3.2. A batch verifier is a probabilistic algorithm V which takes as input 
a batch instance X =  {(m1, SJ), (m2, s2), . . .  , (mn, s,J), a security parameter k, and 
outputs I if all inputs are correct otherwise 0. If at least one input in X is incorrect 
then the probability that I is the output is no greater than 2-k. 
Screening is a weaker form of batch verification where the signer is able to 
repudiate the signed message, however is guaranteed at some point to have signed 
the original message. This means that although the batch instance may be incorrect 
if, and only if, all messages of the batch instance had been signed at some point by 
the signer then the signer may prepare an incorrect batch instance (based on the 
correct batch instance) that will be accepted. 
Definition 3.3. A batch screening algorithm V is a probabilistic algorithm that 
takes as input a batch instance X =  {(mJ, SJ), (m2, s2), . . .  , (mn, s,J), and outputs I if 
all inputs are correct. If at least one input in X is incorrect, the algorithm will still 
output I if the signer is guaranteed to have signed all original messages at some 
point and the incorrect instance is derived from the correct instance. If some 
message mi of the input instance X was never signed by the signer, then the 
algorithm outputs 0. 
Batch signature generation is a similar notion to batch verification however 
in this case a batch instance X is generated from the signing procedure. 
Definition 3.4. A batch signature algorithm S is an algorithm that accepts as input 
a sequence of messages instances {mJ, m2, . . .  , mn}, a signing key K, and outputs a 
sequence of signatures {s1, SJ, . . .  , sn}, such that each pair (mi, sJ of the batch 
instance {(m1, SJ), (m2, s2), . . .  , (mn, s,J) may be verified independently. 
Batch signatures may be categorised further depending on the form of the 
generated signatures. These signatures may be identical to ordinary signatures, such 
43 
as RSA and DSA signatures, or these may be modified requiring a slightly modified 
verification procedure. 
3.3 Fiat's Batch RSA 
Amos Fiat invented batch cryptography when he outlined a technique to batch sign 
several messages using RSA [Fia89] ; the technique works for the case of RSA 
signing and decryption. The basic approach involved the initial combining, or 
hatching, of messages where they may be signed under one full exponentiation. The 
scheme outlined was dependent upon the signing entity using several public 
exponents which are relatively prime to each other, hence several messages are 
effectively signed by several different private keys. Once signed, recovery of signed 
messages is possible using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which takes advantage 
of the relatively prime characteristic - a feature first observed by Chaum [CFN88] . 
These recovered signed messages are identical to ordinary signatures and so may be 
forwarded to different recipients and verified in the usual manner. The key benefit 
of this approach is that it is more efficient to sign a batch of n messages once, and 
then factor these into individual messages compared to the signing of each message 
separately, which requires n exponentiations. 
3.3.1 Straightforward Case: Two Messages 
To clarify the Batch RSA approach, the following three step procedure outlines the 
straightforward case of signing two messages (m1 ,  m2) with two relatively prime 
exponents (e1 ,  e2). 
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1 .  Compute the product of all public keys E = e1e2 mod <!>(n) then combine the 
messages into one batch for signing by first computing the smaller 
exponentiations m/1ei' and then multiplying: M= m1 E!e1 x m2 Ele2 (mod n ). 
2. Sign the batch of messages using one full-scale modular exponentiation, S = 
M11E (mod n). This produces m1 11e1 x m/e2, noting that raising to the power 
Elei in step one and then signing with l iE produces the desired 1 /ei, however 
the signatures still remain as a batch. 
3 .  Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem find the unique solution X modulo 
(I17=I ei = E), which is possible as exponents are relatively prime. Split the
signed batch into individual signatures, by solving for m211e2 and then m1 11e1 :
• Find X such that X= 0 (mod e1) and X= 1 (mod ez).
• mzllez = sY I (m! XleJ x mz).
After the final step the signatures may then be forwarded to recipients as 
distinct messages for individual verification under normal RSA verification 
procedures. This basic approach may be applied to any number of messages using a 
binary tree structure. However due to the increasing complexity of step one, where 
an increasing exponent size is used for the preparatory exponentiation, an efficiency 
limit is quickly reached for a larger batch size. The following example clarifies the 
approach taken to obtain two signatures m 1 113 and m2115•
Example 3.1 .  Two messages, m1 and m2, are to be signed with l/e1 and I!e2 
respectively, where the exponents e1 and e2 are relatively prime. Let e1 = 3 and e2 = 
5. First compute the product of the public exponent keys E = e 1 e2 mod ifl(n) = 15,
then combine the messages into one batch, 
M =  m/513 x m/515 = m/ x m/ (mod n). 
Next sign the set of messages S = M1115 (mod n). The final step is to factor the result
into individual signatures. Using the Chinese remainder theorem solve X =  0 (mod 
3) and X =  I (mod 5) -f X =  6. Since If = m1 613 x m2 615 = m/ x m2 x m/15 (mod n) 
then we can find m/15 and m/13 by dividing out, 
45 
3.3.2 Binary Tree Approach 
To extend the elementary approach for a batch instance t > 2, a binary tree structure 
is used during the product build-up phase (step 1 )  and a product break-up phase (step 
3). In this situation the individual messages are assigned to the leaf nodes during the 
product build up phase, the root of the tree is then signed and the tree is then 
recursively divided until the individual signatures are obtained. Using an example of 
four messages (t = 4) the procedure is now illustrated. 
Figure 3.1 Labeling Arcs with Exponents 
The objective is to obtain four signatures mte; (mod n), for i =  1 to 4. The 
exponents ei, relatively prime to each other and to <j>(n), are initially chosen as the 
first t primes, as this will provide the best results. The first step of the product build­
up phase is to construct a tree where the leaf nodes designate the messages to be 
signed and the adjoining arc contains an exponent. The exponents are initially 
assigned to each leaf node of the tree and then allocated to an arc, where the right arc 
aR is the product of labels associated with leaves on the right branch, and the left arc 
aL is the product of labels associated with leaves on the left branch. This continues 
until intermediate exponents have been assigned to each arc of the tree, refer to 
Figure 3 . 1 .  The messages are now allocated to the leaf nodes, and the internal nodes 
calculated by recursively computing the product LaR x Rar. The root of the binary 
tree represents the product M =  TI:=I m/1e; mod n. 
The messages may now be signed in batch manner by first computing the 
product of all exponents E = TI:=I ei, and then extracting the Jth root M11E = TI:=I mt; 
mod n. The final stage involves the break-up phase to obtain to individual 
• lie· .c: • 1 signatures mi ', 10r z = to t. 
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The break-up phase again is a recursive operation. Commencing with the 
root node dividing this into its two products, and concluding with the leaf nodes 
representing the individual signatures. First the exponent X must be evaluated using 
the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Nodes under the left sub-branch of the root node 
may be represented by 0, 1 ,  . . .  , r, and the right sub-branch as r + 1 ,  r + 2, . . .  , t: 
X= 0 (mod e1), X= 0 (mod e2), . . .  , X= 0 (mod er), 
X= 1 (mod er+l), X= 1 (mod er+2), . . .  , X= 1 (mod eb),
The root node is the first product to be divided out. Noting that during the 
tree build-up phase the left and right subproducts of the root node were calculated, 
the unique values X1 and X2 may be applied to make use of these subproducts, rather 
than recompute from scratch. Let E1 = I1�=1 ei and E2 = IT�=r+l ei, hence the left and 
right subproducts are represented by M1 = I1�=1 ml/e; and M2 = IT�=r+l ml21e; 
respectively. 
To solve for the right factor SR = rr�=r+l mFei (note that this would be a
signature if operating at the parent of leaf nodes), raise M1 to the power X1 , raise M2 
to the power x2 and divide into JvtliE)X_ Solving for the left factor SL = rr�=l mFei is
given by dividing Jvfl!E) by SR, as in the straightforward case. This can been seen to
work out due to the following. 
ITb lie; _ ' .<l!E)X 1 (M1X1 • M2X2)i=1+l mi - JVl ' 
It is clear to see that the division of each node of the binary tree is the same 
as the straightforward case of two message, as such recursively applying this 
procedure the leaf nodes, and final signatures, will be reclaimed. 
Indeed the objective of the batch procedure is to improve the efficiency over 
the conventional technique. Fiat noted that there is an upper bound on the number of 
messages in the batch for which an efficiency is gained. Illustrating that a batch size 
b can be computed at a cost of 1 .5n/b + O(log2 b) multiplications, plus two modular 
divisions. Thus the scheme remains efficient for several tens of messages, 
suggesting the scheme to be efficient for n/log2 n messages, i.e. about 1 0 messages
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where the modulus is 1 024 bits long. This is due to the preparation steps involving 
larger exponentiations for an increasing batch size. 
3.4 Homomorphic Verification Techniques 
A central observation regarding Fiat's original scheme [Fia89], is that the combining 
of messages fundamentally relies upon the multiplicative properties of RSA to 
prepare a batch of messages for digital signing/decryption. This property is referred 
to as the homomorphic property and was first observed by Davida [Dav82], where 
the following adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack was devised on RSA encryption. 
An attacker wishes to decrypt an intercepted ciphertext c = me mod n. The 
attacker conceals c by choosing r e Z� and computing c' = ere mod n. The concealed 
ciphertext is then presented to A who computes m' = c' mod n, returning this to the 
attacker. The attacker may then deduce m by dividing out the random value r, m = 
m'/r mod n; this works due to: 
m' = c'd (mod n) 
_ cd (re)d (mod n) 
_ m r (mod n). 
In practice the attack may be thwarted by ensuring that the message contains 
some internal structure, this enables A to detect a false ciphertext. 
3.4.1 Common Exponent 
To the point, the homomorphic property of RSA exhibits a relationship where 
separate ciphertext messages ci, raised under a common public key exponent e, may 
be multiplied modulo n yielding ciphertexts c'. The same result c' may be attained if 
each message were multiplied prior to the application of the common exponent: c' = 
m1e m2e = (m1 m2t = c1c2 (mod n). This homomorphic property remains consistent 
for both RSA encryption and signature protocols. The following is a general 
relationship with respect to a signature operation on messages mi, yielding signatures 
si, for b messages: 
m1d X m/ X . . .  X m/ =: (m1 X m2 X . . .  X mb)d =: S! X S2 X . . .  X Sb =: S (mod n). 
It follows then, that a signature on b messages can be computed from the 
product S = IT�=I (mi mod n, and the combined messages may be retrieved by 
calculating M= IT�= I (m/)e. 
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As mentioned previously, in Fiat's scheme one may retrieve the individual 
signatures of the signed batch, due to the relative prime restriction on the chosen 
exponents. In contrast to this product (homomorphic) break-up, more recent 
schemes have used the relationship for batch verification of individually signed 
messages [Har98b, YL95].  This is achieved by combining messages after they have 
been individually signed under the same private key exponene. To verify one 
computes S = IT�=I si, to combine several individual signatures si, hence checking
that the following holds: 
b ( b ) e  
IT m. = IT s .  mod n .i=l l i=l l (1) 
The above RSA verification, which is in fact called screening (see section 
3 .4.3), is conducted with a common exponent and proposed by [Har98b, BGR98], 
similar batch verifiers have been illustrated for discrete logarithm based signature 
protocols, such as Schnorr and DSA [BGR98, Har98a, YL95] .  In these cases it is 
the base that is the common element. 
To perform the batch verification IT�=I mi = (I1�=1 si)e (mod n), the verifier
needs to combine the original messages and their respective signatures. For a batch 
size of b, this will result in 2(b - 1 )  modular multiplications to prepare the batch. 
During verification the public verification key e is also applied, requiring 1 modular 
exponentiation. The total computation required is 2(b - 1 )  modular multiplications 
and one modular exponentiation. It is suggested that in order to strengthen the 
security of this type of verification a little more effort is involved [YL95];  typically 
requiring two multiexponentiations, to accommodate a security parameter wi, and
one modular exponentiation. 
Fiat suggested his scheme to be efficient for n/log2 n messages, i.e. about 1 0  
messages where the modulus is 1 024 bits long. This is due to the preparation steps 
involving larger exponentiations for a larger batch size. It will now be shown that 
in some cases batch verification or screening may perform worse than the naive 
approach of verifying each signature individually. 
3 Note that the restriction of relative prime numbers is no longer required to split up the batch. 
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3.4.2 Common Base 
Yen and Laih [YL95] presented an improved signature verification technique for 
common base schemes, Schnorr and Brickell-McCurley, also detailing how the batch 
verification may also be applied to RSA (common exponent) and Fiat's batch RSA 
(distinct exponents). In all cases, modular exponentiation is made more efficient by 
avoiding the naive approach of computing individual exponentiations. 
Recalling that the signature (c, r) on message m may be verified by 
computing a =  sl he mod p, and checking that c = h(m 1 1 a). Batch verification of b 
Schnorr signatures (mi, ai, ri), for i = 1 to b is thus performed with common base (g, 
h), see Table 3 . 1 .  
Given: g a generator of the group G of order q, and (at ,  rt), (az, rz), . . .  , (ab, rb) 
with ci, ri E Zq, and ai E G. Also a security parameter !. 
Check: That Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , b} : ai = g; he;. 
1 .  Pick wr , . . .  , wb E {0, 1 }  1 at random. 
3 .  If A = gR he mod p then accept, else reject. 
Table 3.1 Batch Verifier of Schnorr Signatures 
The introduction of the exponent wi, is used to prevent an attack where the 
signer is able to mix in false signatures into the batch, that would otherwise satisfy 
the batch verification criterion. It is pointed out in chapter five however, that this 
verifier can be broken. 
3.4.3 Weak Verification: Screening 
In [BGR98], the verification of formula ( 1 )  is referred to as screening which is a 
weaker form of signature verification. Screening is a mechanism that checks that the 
signing entity must have at least signed the messages of a batch at some point, even 
though the individual elements screened may not represent valid signatures. This 
notion is clear when we see that two signatures s1 and s2 could be substituted with 
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2s1 and s2/2 and the verification would still succeed. Bellare et al. prove4 that the
original signatures in fact must have been prepared by the correct signer [BGR98], in 
order that false signatures could subsequently be evaluated, (they also point out that 
a good application is for checking public key certificates signed by the same 
certification authority). A consequence of this is that the signatures may be 
repudiated by the signer, unless all signatures and messages are maintained as a 
batch. Hence, the scheme could not be used for signing a batch of messages that 
may be individually verified by different parties, as in Fiat's scheme. In chapter 4 a 
new technique is demonstrated that is able to preserve this individual verification 
property. 
Coron and Naccache [CN99] pointed out an example where screening would 
fail, noting that the attack is based on Davida's homomorphic attack [Dav82] .  This 
occurs where duplicate messages of a particular form are found within the batch, 
enabling a message that was never signed to be accepted. The following example 
illustrates this attack for e = 3 .  
Take two messages m1 =F m2, where the signature for m1 i s  s1 = h(mtt mod n,
in this example m2 will never be signed. An attacker, not necessarily the signer, is 
able to construct the batch instance {(mt ,  s t '), (m2, s2), (m3, s3), (m4, s4) } ,  where s1 ' = 
s1h(m2) mod n, s2 = S3 = S4 = 1 ,  and m2 = m3 = m4. Screening of these signatures will 
not detect the false signature s2. The proof for this is quite straightforward: 
h(mt)  h(m2) h(m3) h(m4) = (I1i=I si)e (mod n) 
- s13 h(m2)3 (mod n) 
- h(mt)  h(m2) h(m2) h(m2) (mod n).
The attack may be prevented by ensuring that each pair (mi, si) occurs only 
once within the batch. A modified version of screening is suggested that contains an 
initial pruning step to remove these duplicate messages [BGR] . 
The general problem of screening was first addressed by Yen and Laih 
[YL95] where they remark that a batch verification of the form IT�= I ai = gzr; h"ic;,
(i.e. all wi = 1 are known to the signer), enables the signer to mix in false signatures 
and still pass the Schnorr batch verification criterion. They demonstrated that by 
4 This is actually only proven when using the Full Domain Hash (FDH), which is the case where a hash function 
maps its input onto the full domain of Z�, i.e. uniformly into the range { I  . . .  N} [BR96].
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simply raising the individual elements of a homomorphic batch to some security 
parameter wi, secretly chosen by the verifier, more confidence of the correctness of 
verification is established. Strong batch verification for Schnorr is then given by: 
(2) 
They suggest that the security parameter wi need only be a small exponent, 
though large enough to ensure the probability of cheating is impractical. 
3.4.4 Strong Verification 
Verification of b signatures that guarantees that each signature is of the correct form 
may be referred to as strong verification, as apposed to the weak verification that 
screening offers. Yen and Laih ensured that a strong verification took place by 
introducing a small exponent [YL95] . In fact, Naccache et al. are the first to have 
used a small exponent for strengthening batch verification [NMRV94] . The general 
problem of probabilistic batch verifiers, is treated in more detail in [BGR98], where 
several verifiers are evaluated according to efficiency. They propose three 
alternative batch verifiers for discrete logarithm based exponentiation with a 
common base. These are the random subset test, small exponents test, and bucket 
test; these are now described in the context of a general discrete log exponentiation 
gx = y modp. 
3.4.4. 1 Random Subset Test 
The random subset test involves the selection of a subset of the signatures for batch 
verification. The motivation being that in order to mix in a false signature, two 
signatures need to be altered. By randomly selecting a subset of the signatures, it is 
hoped that false pairs are split up, causing the verification to fail. It is shown that a 
single random subset test will yield a success probability of T1 , which is clearly 
insufficient. Hence to attain a probability of T30, the atomic test needs to be 
repeated 30  times. This is quite expensive and one might assume that such a verifier 
is impractical when compared to individual verification of b signatures. However it 
is shown when the batch size is around 1 00 or more, the random subset test is able to 
yield improvements. To be perform this test, the following atomic steps are repeated 
t times, where t indicates the desired security: 
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1 .  for i =  1 to b, choose ri E R  {0, 1 } ,  
3 .  if gx = rr:=l y( mod p accept.
3.4.4.2 Small Exponent Test 
The small exponents test is essentially the same technique proposed by Yen and Laih 
[YL95] and Naccache et al. [NMRV94] (which involves the selection of b random t­
bit strings as the small exponents). For completeness the algorithm for this verifier 
is given in Table 3 .2. 
Given: g a generator of the group G of order q, and (x� ,  Y1), (x2, y2), . . .  , (xb, Yb) 
with xi E Zq and Yi E G. Also a security parameter t. 
Check: That Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , b} : Yi = gx;.
1 .  For i =  1 to b, choose ri ER {0, 1 } '
2 .  Compute X= 2::=1 X;� mod q.
3 .  If gx = rr:=t y( mod p then accept, else reject.
Table 3.2 Small Exponent Test 
The failure probability of the small exponents test, using a t-bit exponent, is 
suggested to be bounded by 2-t in [YL95]  and [BGR98] . The analysis of Yen and
Laih [YL95] suggests that the signer is required to guess at least two small 
exponents ri such that ra x Ya + rb x Yb = ra x la + rb x y'b (mod q), to mix two false 
signatures y'i into the batch. They generalise, that in order to mix n false signatures 
the failure probability will be max{q-1 , T15xn} .  If ri is chosen randomly in { 1 ,  2, . . .  ,
21 5} then a cheater has a maximum probability of T30 for successfully passing batch
verification with two false signatures. 
The formal analysis ofBellare et al. prove that this is the case [BGR98]. This 
will be recapitulated. Suppose that the batch instance {(xi. yi)} ,  for i = 1 to n, is 
incorrect. Let Yi = ff';, and ai = Xi - x'i· Suppose that the incorrect batch instance
contains one incorrect signature identified by i. Without loss of generality suppose 
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that i = 1 .  This means that ai * 0. Suppose that small exponents ri have been chosen 
that allows the test to pass, then the following is true 
Now since g is a generator of G, then we have r1a1 + r2a2 + . . .  + rnan = 0 mod q, 
which may be rewritten as, 
(3) 
Hence the small exponent r1 to be chosen to allow the test to pass will only have one 
solution, which is in the range {0 . . .  q} . Since r1 is selected randomly from {O, l } t, 
then the probability that equation (3) is satisfied is at most Tt. Given that in practice 
t < q, then a probability of Tt for successfully passing the batch verification is 
optimistic. 
3.4.4.3 Bucket Test 
The third verifier proposed appears a little more complicated; however, the method 
is essentially a combination of the random subset and small exponents test, where 
signatures are randomly grouped into subsets called buckets. The specific grouping 
technique is similar to the tossing of i balls into j buckets, some buckets will have 0 
balls, some exactly 1 ,  and others will perhaps receive 2 or more balls. With 
messages grouped into buckets, verification is now performed on all buckets as if 
they each represent a separate signature instance. Steps one and two involve the 
tossing of balls into buckets to randomly group signatures, whilst step three 
combines the signatures of that bucket into one instance. The final step, is to run the 
small exponents test over the batch of signatures now represented by buckets 1 to 2m. 
To achieve acceptable security the above algorithm is to be run tl(m - 1 )  
times, where m �  log(b + l ql) - loglog(b + l q l). 
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Given: g a generator of the group G of order q, and (x1 , YI), (x2, y2), . . .  , (xb, Yb) 
with xi E Zq and Yi E G. Also a security parameter t. 
Check: That Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , b} : Yi = gxi.
1 .  For i =  1 to b, choose ri ER {0, 2m} 
3. forj = 1 to 2"\ let Cj = "· xi mod q ,  and dj = IJ. Yi modpL..JzeBj zeBj 
4.  Set t =  m, and run small exponents test on signatures (ci, di), for i =  1 to 2m.
Table 3.3 Bucket Test 
Again the key objective is to improve upon the efficiency of performing the 
individual verification for each signature. With a modulus of 1 ,024 bits and failure 
probability 2-60 the efficiencies of the algorithms are summarised in Table 3 .4. The
table shows the number of modular multiplications (by 1 ,000) required for verifiers 
in batch sizes 5 through to 5,000 [BGR98] .  
5 10 50 100 200 500 1,000 
Individual 1 2 1 0  20 40 1 00 200 
Random Subset 1 2  12.5 13 .5  15  1 8  27 42 
Small Exponents 0.4 0.6 1 .8 3 .2 6.2 1 5 .2 30.2 
Bucket 4.3 4.4 5 5 .7 7 . 1  1 0.7 1 6.5 
Table 3.4 Verifier Modular Multiplications (by 1,000) 
3.4.5 An Existing Attack on Interactive DSA Verification 
5,000 
1 ,000 
1 62 
1 50 
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In [LL94] ,  Lim and Lee outlined how two attacks could succeed on the interactive 
version of the DSA scheme proposed by Naccache et al. [NMRV94]5• The DSA
parameters consist of large primes p and q, where q divides p - 1 ,  and a generator g 
in Zp of order q. The secret key is x E Zq and the corresponding public key is y = gx 
mod p. The interactive scheme consisted of a signature collection protocol and the 
use of a batch verification criterion. Figure 3 .2 illustrates how t signatures are 
generated interactively on t messages. 
5 The interactive version was outlined during the pre-proceedings of the conference [NMRV]. 
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Sign er 
Choose ki E Zq and compute 
'A =  l; modp, for i =  1 to t. 
Verifier 
for i =  1 to t 
choose bi ER {0, 1 V 
SI , Sz, . • •  , St 
Collect signatures . . .  
Figure 3.2 Signature Collection Protocol 
When the signatures are created, the verification of the t signatures IS 
achieved by using the following batch verification criterion, 
If the equation holds the verifier replaces ('Ai, si, bi, mi) with (ri = 'Ai mod q, si, mi 1 1 
Their attack proceeds as follows, where each operation is performed for i = 1 
. . .  t. The verifier prepares (mi 1 1 bi), randomly picks ui, vi ER Zq, and computes 'A = 
gu; yv; mod p and si = vi-I 'Ai mod q. The verifier is able to deduce the signatures St-I 
and St that satisfy the batch verification criterion by solving the congruence 
equations: 
-1 -1 ""'! ""t-2 -1 b ) s t-I h(mt-I 11 bt-I )  + s r h(mt 11 bt) = L...;=I u; - L...;=I s; h(m; l l  ; mod q 
s-f_I At- I + s-J At = Vt- I + Vt mod q. 
Ham repairs this interactive protocol in [Har95];  however it is shown in 
chapter five how the repaired scheme is still vulnerable to certain types of 
weaknesses. 
3.4.6 Classification 
The batch verification and signature generation algorithms discussed are now 
summarised in Table 3.5,  these are classified according to the strength of batch 
operation performed and mode of operation supported. The modes may be viewed 
as common base, common exponent, and dual mode where both the base and 
exponent may vary. It can be seen from the table that most of the schemes are 
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verification algorithms. Furthermore, several of the schemes attempt to make use of 
a randomiser, or rather a small exponent test, to help improve the probability of 
detecting false signatures within the batch. The actual worth of such a test is more 
formally discussed in chapter five where it is shown that in some instances no 
benefit is provided at all. 
./ ./ 
./ ./ 
./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ ./ 
./ ./ 
./ ./ 
./ 
./ ./ 
* Claimed strong verifiers may be attacked or provide screening only, see chapter 5. 
Table 3.5 Batch Signature and Verification Techniques 
3.5 Efficiency 
To assess the efficiency of some hatching techniques RSA is used as an example, 
contrasting the original signature verification with several batch enhanced versions. 
The special case is then considered when batch verification becomes less efficient 
than the original verification scheme it is intended to improve upon. Several other 
issues regarding the efficiency and security properties of batch verification are also 
pointed out. 
Recall that the original RSA scheme requires one modular exponentiation for 
each signature to be verified, exhibiting complexity O(n) for an increasing number 
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of messages. It will now be shown that in some cases batch verification or screening 
may perform worse than the naive approach of verifying each signature individually. 
3.5.1 Inefficient Batch Verifiers 
In [Ham98b ] ,  Ham proposed a method for batch verification of RSA signatures. If 
the RSA modulus is n, and the private exponent d then the signature on the message 
m is s = md mod n. In practice a hash function and some padding are used as a 
preprocessing stage for the signing operation. The details are not relevant for this 
discussion but it is noted that for security purposes it is necessary that m takes values 
over the full domain of numbers modulo n after preprocessing. In order to verify a 
set of b signatures s1 , s2, . . .  , sb on messages m1 , m2, . . .  , mb with Ham's method the 
verifier checks the following equation, where e is the RSA public exponent. 
b ( b ) e  I1 m. = IJ s .  mod n . i=l l i=l l (4) 
As discussed, in [BGR98] such a verification may be considered a form of 
weak verification and referred to as screening. This form of verification may be 
considered acceptable under certain circumstances for the gain in efficiency. 
This technique may not be as efficient as claimed in all situations. In 
particular, in a commonly used RSA profile the scheme is actually less efficient than 
verifying signatures independently. Furthermore, if the non-repudiation property of 
digital signatures is required then the scheme may not be the best way to achieve 
efficiency gains. 
3.5. 1 . 1  Efficiency 
A common use of RSA allows the public exponent to be chosen to have the value e 
= 3 [Mov96]. Note that recent attacks on RSA with small exponents apply only to 
its use for encryption and not for signatures. A recent benchmark for timings of 
RSA signatures [Wie98] uses e = 3 as the best choice of public exponent. It is first 
pointed out that in this case Ham's scheme is less efficient than simply verifying the 
individual signatures. The reason is that when e = 3 individual signature verification 
requires only one modular squaring and one modular multiplication. 
To perform the batch verification the verifier needs to combine the original 
messages and their respective signatures. Using equation (4), one modular squaring 
and one modular multiplication are required, due to the exponent e = 3, while in 
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addition two modular multiplications are required for every additional signature after 
the first. For some batch size b, Ham's scheme requires 2b - 1 modular 
multiplications and one modular squaring are needed in total. (Strong batch 
verification requires a little more effort; this will involve two multi-exponentiations, 
accommodating small test exponents, and one modular exponentiation). 
Comparatively, to verify N signatures individually requires N squarings and N 
multiplications. Bearing in mind that a modular squaring is somewhat cheaper than 
a modular exponentiation [MOV96, p.586] it follows that Ham's scheme is actually 
the more expensive in this common use of RSA signatures. Additionally, as the 
batch size increases the effort required to verify the batch increases by two modular 
multiplications per additional message. 
More generally it can be seen that Ham's claim that his verification method is 
'almost constant' is somewhat misleading, since even in the case that e is chosen 
much larger than 3 ,  the two extra multiplications required per message are not 
negligible. 
3.5. 1.2 Non-repudiation 
Ham [Har98b] already pointed out that an attacker can substitute two signatures s1 
and s2 with 2s1 and s2/2 and the verification equation ( 1 )  will still hold. In fact the 
first b - 1 values of Si may be chosen randomly and sb chosen so that equation ( 1 )  is
satisfied. This means that even though the verification equation succeeds, none of 
the si values need be a correct signature. As discussed, it has been proven by Bellare 
et al. [BGR98] that in this case it must be that the individual signatures were 
originally formed by the signer. 
A consequence of this observation is that if the signatures are to be used to 
provide non-repudiation, in order to settle a later dispute, then all signatures must be 
stored together as a batch. When one considers that this is the criterion to satisfy 
non-repudiation then the messages could equally have been signed by simply 
concatenating them and signing them all together after hashing. In this case both 
signing and verification of any sized batch takes almost constant time. Of course 
this may not always be possible, but in many cases would be a better solution. 
59 
3.5.2 Summary Of Costs 
The expense of the RSA variants is now compared for the cost of verifying N 
signatures. In Table 3 .6, the operations are exponentiation (Exp), multi­
exponentiation (MultiExp), multiplication (Mult), and squaring (Sqr). For each 
operation Op, Opx indicates that Op is performed X times. Where applicable the 
exponent is denoted as e. For example, Mult2N_2 + ExpNe indicates that 2N - 2 
multiplications and N exponentiations with the exponent e are performed. Included 
for comparison (last row) is the efficiency of the new batch signature scheme 
introduced in chapter four, which may also be used for batch verification. Strong 
verification refers to the RSA batch verifier proposed by Yen and Laih [YL95].  
Naive Verification 
Naive Verification (e = 3) 
Screening 
Screening (e = 3) 
Strong Verification 6 
New Scheme 
Cost 
ExpNe 
MultN + SqrN 
Mult2N-2 + ExpNe 
Mult2N _ 1 + Sqr1 
MultiExp2w/2 + Expt 
Exp1e 
Table 3.6 Summary of Costs (RSA) 
3.6 Relevance to Electronic Cash 
Whilst the work in this thesis is inspired by the application of batch cryptography in 
general, it is worthy to note that the practice of batch cryptography in electronic cash 
has been briefly touched upon before. In [Fer93a] Ferguson devised an electronic 
cash scheme that utilised the multiplicative properties of RSA in a manner consistent 
with the concepts of Batch cryptography. This protocol illustrates possibly the first 
instance of batch cryptography applied to electronic cash. 
Ferguson and Brands introduced the first single term electronic cash systems 
[Fer93, Bra93] during Eurocrypt '93.  Later that same year, Ferguson also presented 
an extension to his basic scheme that had the property that the same coin could be 
spent more than once [Fer93a] .  The scheme was referred to as an n-spendable coin, 
where a coin could be spent n times without the customer's identity being revealed, 
6 For random selection of w in { 1 . . .  n} on average this would be w/2 
60 
however spending the coin (n + 1 )  times reveals the identity. The philosophy was to 
use a polynomial, degree set to desired spendability, to hide the customer's identity 
within the coin. 
3.6.1 Payment 
Briefly, setup consists of the bank's public and private RSA keys (v, n), v-1 , and 
several one-way functions hi. All arithmetic is performed modulo n unless otherwise
stated. A valid coin is represented in the cash system by two signatures as (Cu A0)11v
and (Ck1 A 1) 1 1v. On completion of the withdrawal protocol, the customer receives n
+ 1 signatures on n + 1 coins (C u Ao) 11v, (C k1 A 1) 11v, (C kz A2)11v, . . .  , (C k" An)11v.
Ferguson noted that the signatures may be stored as batches in a similar fashion to 
Fiat's Batch RSA technique [Fia89] . The intention was not a computational saving 
but rather a saving in storage space. Using an example of batch size of 4, he
demonstrated that a reduction of 50% could be achieved. 
During payment the customer may spend one or several coins at a time. 
When spending each coin, verification of the (n + 1 )  signatures must take place. 
This is performed simultaneously and is not too dissimilar to a batch verification, 
this is shown in Figure 3 .3 . 
Customer 
X 
r � U + :r.';=I ki xi (mod v)
R � ( cu Ao)uv IT�= I (( Cki Ai)uv) xi r, R 
Merchant 
C � he( c)
Ao � ho(ao)
Ai � hi(ai), for i =  1 to n
RV = erA ITn A�i0 i=l l 
Figure 3.3 N-Spendable Coin Payment 
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The customer initiates payment by forwarding c, ao, a 1 , . . .  , an to the 
merchant. The merchant generates and returns the random challenge x ER z:. The 
customer possesses (n + 1)  signatures which he combines into one signatory result R 
and forwards this to the merchant, along with the response r. The response is 
computed using the customer's secret identity U, secret value k (used during 
withdrawal to later prove ownership of coins), and the merchant's challenge raised 
to the exponent i for each coin. The merchant then verifiers the (n + 1)  signatures 
simultaneously by checking that the following equation holds, 
RV = er Ao rr;=l Ati (mod n). 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter several techniques used in batch cryptography have been described. 
Commencing with its invention by Fiat in 1 989  [Fia89], the various techniques that 
have applied simultaneous crytographic operations to improve efficiency are 
detailed. It is shown that batch cryptography may be applied to public key 
cryptosystems that involve encryption, decryption, digital signatures and digital 
signature verification. Furthermore, three modes of operation are supported 
including common base, common exponent, and dual mode of operation. 
The key objective of batch cryptography is to improve efficiency of 
operations; this is typically achieved by amortising the expensive operation over a 
range of inputs. It was shown that under certain circumstances some proposed batch 
verification schemes actually operate less efficiently than the original signature 
scheme it is intended to improve upon. And, some outstanding issues associated 
with several batch verifiers proposed in the literature have been highlighted. In the 
context of digital signatures, strong verification provides the same security as 
individually verifying each signature independently, while screening is a new 
primitive that provides a weaker defintion. 
This work is inspired and initiated by observing the potential that exists for 
efficiency gains in applications such as electronic cash. In retrospect, the realisation 
that Ferguson had also touched upon the use of batch cryptography also serves to 
indicate that such a potential applicability may well exist. 
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The history of batch cryptography is comparatively brief in contrast to 
conventional cryptographic techniques and since Fiat's original scheme the key 
techniques have concentrated on mutliplicative properties for improved signature 
verification. In the chapters that follow several new and modified hatching 
procedures are illustrated and it is shown how they may be applied in a commercial 
sense. This furthers the applicability of batch cryptography, not only in electronic 
commerce and electronic cash but also for other general processing environments. 
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Chapter Four 
Digital Batch Signature Paradigms 
"The theory of probabilities is at the bottom nothing but 
common sense reduced to calculus." 
� Laplace, 
Theorie analytique des probabilites, 
1 820. 
4. Digital Batch Signature Paradigms 
Chapter three reviewed the literature on batch cryptography, illustrating that several 
key techniques exist for both signature generation and verification. These 
techniques invariably rely upon the homomorphic properties of the original scheme 
they are based upon to perform some operation simultaneously. This then allows an 
efficiency gain to be realised by spreading the expense of the computationally 
intensive operation over a range of inputs. This chapter introduces a new batch 
signature that operates under an alternative signing paradigm, specifically using a 
hash function combiner. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the new signature 
schemes are able to improve upon the efficiency of other techniques described in the 
literature, and their relevance to a variety of security related applications is 
discussed. 
The following sub-section discusses several approaches to developing a 
batch signature scheme, noting that most batch techniques previously devised have 
concentrated on signature verification. This is followed by a narrative of how a 
naive batch signature scheme may be developed, and how this may then be extended 
to provide a batch signature algorithm that improves upon the existing signature 
techniques .  The new scheme is contrasted with two previous batch signature 
generators, demonstrating an improvement in efficiency and overcoming batch size 
limitations. An analysis of the security is then conducted with proofs of its security 
given. Some potential applications of the new batch signature scheme are also 
proposed. This includes a perspective on group signatures and how they may be 
extended using both a batch signature and a batch verifier. 
4.1 Overview 
Electronic commerce is already presenting many new marketing opportunities for 
commercial organizations. Whilst the notion of electronic commerce pre-existed its 
usage over the Internet, today electronic commerce and the Internet are often 
considered as natural allies. A key requirement for the practical acceptance and 
wide usage of all forms of electronic commerce is the efficiency of any proposed 
security mechanism employed. A major factor contributing to high computational 
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load is the expense of digital signature schemes, which typically require modular 
exponentiation. 
Digital signatures are normally considered an essential mechanism for 
electronic commerce applications due to the need for non-repudiation and because 
they can provide authorisation in a distributed environment. The additional costs 
due to digital signatures are specifically addressed here by introducing a new 
signature generation scheme that is able to sign many messages for almost the 
expense of one signature operation at the server, or signing entity. 
Batch cryptography is applied, demonstrating an efficient means to generate 
signatures simultaneously on a number of messages. The scheme produces signed 
messages that may then be forwarded to unrelated recipients for independent 
verification. The approach for signing can be used together with any existing 
signature scheme with appendix. Signatures in schemes employing an appendix 
must be accompanied by the message from which they are generated, rather than 
allowing the message to be extracted from the signature itself [MOV96] . A batch 
signature consists of an ordinary signature which depends on every message in the 
batch, and a batch residue which varies with every message. 
First some naive batch signature techniques are described and then a more 
practical variation using a binary tree is outlined. 
4.2 Paradigms 
Existing hatching techniques largely rely upon homomorphic properties to combine 
several messages into a single unit of work. This has been shown to work for both 
signature generation [Fia89, BY92] and signature verification [YL95, Har95, 
BGR98]. In general the approach is more suitable to verification, since signature 
generation requires the introduction of some additional property, for instance 
factorisation of the roots is required in Batch RSA. An alternative way to enable 
batch signature generation may be to supply some residue result as a component of 
the signature, rather than attempting to split up the into individual roots. Hence each 
recipient would receive a distinct signature that differs in the supplied residue. In 
order to achieve this, the messages must be first combined. Three potential ways of 
accomplishing this are through multiplication, exponentiation, or the use of hash 
functions; these approaches are now explored. 
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4.2.1 Modular Multiplication 
It has already been shown that t signatures may be combined through multiplication 
for verification. And as long as certain properties hold the correctness of the 
signatures can be determined. A natural aim would be to achieve a similar result for 
signature generation, however it will shown that there is a drawback in that due to 
the bi-jective property of multiplication it is quite easy for an attacker to forge 
signatures. The following illustrates these concepts when signing the set of 
messages m1 , . . .  , mb. 
Using RSA as an example, the messages are combined and then signed using 
one operation, S = (I1�=1 h(mi))d mod n. The signature for each message mi is then 
represented by the pair (S, 11i), where 11i = {h(mj) I j = 1 to b, j * i} is called the 
residue. Verification of an individual signature is checked by ensuring that the 
following is true: 
(5) 
The problem with equation (5) is that an attacker is able to select any 
message m/ and choose a residue 11'i = {h(mj)} such that, 
(IT , r. )h(m'i ) = (IT . lj)h(mJ . rj ElY. 1 1 1i ElY.; 
In this way an attacker is able to generate a signature on a message of his choice. 
Hence, an observation to this predicament is the requirement to prevent the simple 
evaluation, 
One way to prevent this reversible feature is to introduce a one-way operation such 
as modular exponentiation or a hash function. 
4.2.2 Modular Exponentiation 
Modular exponentiation can be used to combine messages rather than modular 
multiplication. The additional expense when signing is the cost of one 
exponentiation, amortised over the number messages signed. At verification, 
assuming that the exponents are of similar size, two modular exponentiations are 
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required rather than the single one. In general terms, the batch signature technique is 
now described. 
For some security parameter t, the signer first chooses w E R  {0, l } t and then
computes S = ((h(mr) 11 h(m2) 11 . . .  11 h(mb)r)d mod n. The messages are essentially
concatenated together and then the modular exponentiation using w is performed;
acting as one-way transformation of the number represented by (h(m1), h(m2), • • . , 
h(mb)). The signature for each message mi then becomes the triple (S, w, �i), where
�i = {h(mj) I j = 1 to b, j ::f:. i} . Verification of the above claimed signature is
confirmed by first calculating h(mi) and then checking that the following holds,
((h(mr) ll . . .  l lh(mi)l l  . . .  l lh(mb)r = se (mod n). (6) 
For an attacker to succeed in this instance they must overcome the one­
wayness of modular exponentiation. 
An alternative way to form the batch, is to combine the messages using a 
strong one-way hash function, (see definition 2 .4). The approach enables one 
signature operation to be performed for improved efficiency, in a manner that 
preserves the property that independent parties may individually verify the signature 
on some message mi.
With modular exponentiation as the general notion m mind, it is
straightforward to develop a naive hatching technique for signing messages 
simultaneously using a hash function. 
4.2.3 Naive Approach using a Hash Function Combiner 
A batch signature scheme enables a signer to sign n messages simultaneously where 
each message may be independently forwarded to different recipients for 
verification. A strong one-way hash function may be employed to combine a set of 
messages with computational ease when compared to modular exponentiation. In 
the following RSA example, let 'A and y denote two hash functions, these may be the 
same in practice however some restrictions do apply to the combining function 'A 
(see security analysis), and let 'A�=I y(mi) represent 'A( y(mr) 11 y(m2) 11 . . .  11 y(mi)), for i
= 1 to n. 
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1 .  The signer generates the batch signature S on a set of n messages 
simultaneously by first computing the concatenated hash of all messages and 
then applying the signature key d. 
M =  "-�=I y(mi)
S = lvf mod n 
2 .  Transmit to entity i the batch signature S, a residue 11i, and message mi. The
batch residue is the set of all message digests excluding the one to be verified 
by user i, 11i = {y(mj) i j  = 1 to n, j i:- i} . The signature on the message mi is
the pair (S, 11i).
3 .  To verify the signature S on message mi, first compute y(mi) and insert the
result into its correct position (denoted by i) to obtain M' = "-�=I y(mi), and
then apply the public verification key ( e, n ), as in the usual case.
M' = "-�=I y(mi)
Check M' =? SC mod n
During verification, an entity need only perform one additional hash 
transformation on message mi, before inserting this into its correct position. It is
now shown that if the combining function h is well chosen then the naive batch
signature scheme is as secure as the original signature scheme it extends. 
4.2.4 Security Analysis of Naive Scheme 
Use is made of a collision resistant hash function, denoted h. It is assumed that the
definition of h incorporates any padding and randomisation such as specified in well
known signature preparation algorithms [PKC93, BR96] . 
The objective of an attacker is to forge a signature. Two generalised attacks 
include existential forgery and selective forgery [MOV96] . An existential forgery 
attack is one in which the attacker is able to derive a signature on any message 
whatsoever, even though this message may be completely meaningless. A selective 
forgery attack is one in which the attacker can choose which message he wants to 
forge. Selective forgery can be seen as a special, and harder, case of existential 
forgery. Although it may be considered that selective forgery attacks are of most 
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concern, it is generally accepted that a secure signature scheme must prevent 
existential forgery also. 
The first observation is that if existential forgery is possible on the batch 
signature scheme then it is possible on the basic signature scheme. For if S is a 
batch signature for messages (mr ,  m2, . . .  , mN), then it is also a basic signature on the 
single message h(mr) 1 1  h(m2) 1 1 . . .  1 1  h(mN). However, one needs to be careful how to 
interpret this observation because a priori one forgery for the basic scheme may 
correspond to many forgeries for the batch scheme. For example, given a batch 
signature S, an attacker who could change one message but leave h(mr) 1 1  h(m2) 11 . . .  1 1 
h(mN) unchanged could forge a batch signature without introducing any forgery for 
the basic scheme. Indeed, such attacks are possible if the combining function is not 
chosen well for the batch signature. However, in this case it can be shown this is not 
possible. Recall that a function is called collision resistant if is computationally 
infeasible to find two pre-images x and y such that h(x) = h(y). If the combining 
function H, is chosen well for the batch signature, then it is demonstrated that the 
scheme is as secure as the basic signature scheme. 
Lemma 4.1. Denote by HN the function on N messages defined by HN(m1,m2, . . .  ,mN) 
= (h(mi) 1 1  h(m2) 1 1  . . .  1 1  h(mN)). Jfh is collision resistant then so is HN. 
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that HN is not collision resistant. It is shown that a 
collision for HN gives a collision for h. So let (mr ,  m2, . . .  , mN) and (m'r ,  m'2, . . .  , m'N) 
be two different message sets with 
HN(mr ,  m2, . . .  , mN) = HN (m'r ,  m'2, . . .  , m'N). 
Then h(mi) = h(m'i) for all i ,  1 ::;; i ::;; n, and so a collision is found for h, since mi =1:- m'i 
for some i. 
Note further that a collision for HN(.) = HN'(.) when N =1:- N '  similarly implies
a collision for H. Therefore it can be seen that existence of a collision for any two 
message sets for the batch signature implies a collision for two messages for the 
basic signature. The strongest attack which a signature scheme is expected to resist 
is an adaptive chosen signature attack. In this attack the attacker can choose a 
sequence of messages to be signed by the owner of the private key, and the next 
message in the sequence can be chosen depending on the signature of the previous 
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message. Finally, if a signature on a new message is found then the attack is 
successful. Using Lemma 4. 1 ,  it is now straightforward to show the following. 
Theorem 4.1. If the basic signature scheme is secure against an adaptive chosen 
signature existential forgery attack then so is the batch signature. 
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that an efficient adaptive chosen signature 
algorithm exists which results in an existential forgery for the batch signature. This 
same attack can be used to mount an adaptive chosen signature attack on the basic 
signature. In the first phase of this attack, the signing oracle is presented with a 
sequence of messages to sign, where each message is chosen adaptively after seeing 
the signature on the previous one. The efficient algorithm to forge the basic signature 
scheme will present HN(B) to the basic signature oracle whenever the algorithm to 
forge the batch signature presents B to the batch signature oracle. Note that in fact 
the chosen signatures obtained are identical. The forgery finally obtained by the 
algorithm for the batch signature is a message B' = (m'1 , m2, . . .  , m'N) which is 
different from any of the other messages signed during the attack. This is also the 
basic signature on the message HN(B'') which is a new basic signature forgery unless 
HN(B'J = HN(B'') where HN(B'') is a message used earlier in the attack. But since B ';e  
B "this is a collision for HN which is not possible by Lemma 4. 1 .  
Where h has been chosen appropriately, the basic RSA signatures scheme 
have been shown to resist adaptive chosen message attacks using the random oracle 
model developed by Bellare and Rogaway [BR96]. In accepting this model one can 
be confident that the generated batch signatures are secure. 
4.2.5 Residue Reduction 
Whilst this approach achieves a computational saving, a drawback is the increase in 
communications overhead and the size of the message, which increases by O(n) due 
to the signature residue. 
Solutions exist to reduce the signature residue such as one-way accumulators 
[BM93] . One particular method is to adopt a binary tree structure where the 
messages are assigned to the leaves of the tree. With this new instrument in mind a 
more efficient scheme is described and its efficiency contrasted with other well 
known batch signature schemes. 
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This new approach is now described using RSA, producing a signature on n 
messages simultaneously. The technique is also applicable to other signature 
schemes that employ a similar hash function; for example, variations may be 
developed for DSA [DSS9 1 ]  and Schnorr [Sch9 1 ] , these are shown in chapters six 
and seven. 
4.3 Tree Structured Digital Signatures 
Use is made of a binary tree construction to limit the size of the batch residue in a 
similar fashion to its use by Merkle [Mer89,  Mer82] for tree authentication. It is 
also interesting to note that a tree structure is applied in Fiat's batch RSA signature 
scheme [Fia89] .  However, tree authentication has not been proposed for use in quite 
this way before. Employing such a tree structure, with messages representing the 
leaves of the tree, it is possible to marshal an arbitrary number of messages into one 
batch for signing. The subsequently signed batch, and a unique batch residue, are 
then forwarded as independent signatures to different recipients for individual 
verification of their particular message. 
Signature verification consists of recalculating the input to the ordinary 
signature using the message and batch residue, and then verifying the ordinary 
signature. Because calculation of the batch residue, and its verification, only use 
hash calculations, the generation of the batch signature is almost as efficient as 
generation of a single ordinary signature. However, batch signatures are longer than 
ordinary signatures because of the need to accommodate a batch residue. 
The previous chapter observed that there have been several previous batch 
schemes which detail a procedure to either verify or sign a number of messages 
[Fia97, Har94, Har95 ,  Har98a, Har98b, YB92, YL95, BGR98].  Whilst these 
techniques produce certain distinct efficiencies, each specific scheme possesses 
some restriction, by way of batch size limitations, verification only, or no support for 
heterogeneous signature generation for different recipients. The scheme proposed 
here addresses some unresolved issues of these batch signature techniques. This 
includes, an improved signature size, the ability to sign in batch for independent 
recipients, and no batch size limitations. 
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4.3.1 Proposed Batch Signature Generation Scheme 
The new method proposed may be used with trees that accommodate an arbitrary 
number of child nodes. It is not clear a priori that binary trees are always the best 
choice. However, it is demonstrated below that if one wishes to minimise the length 
of the residue then binary trees are indeed the optimal choice. Following on, only 
the binary tree approach shall be considered. 
As stated before, the method can be used with any signature scheme with 
appendix. This includes all the most popular signature schemes such as RSA and 
ElGamal type signatures including the DSS (either in its original form or an elliptic 
curve variant). First it is recalled that any signature scheme with appendix can be 
defined by three functions Gen(), Sign(), and Ver(). These are the key generation, 
signing, and verification algorithms respectively: 
Gen: 1 k � (SK, PK), 
Sign: M x Pri � Sig, 
Ver: M x  Sig x Pub � {0, 1 } .  
The key generation function Gen takes an input parameter k that defines the 
required security level, and outputs a secret key SK with corresponding public key 
PK. The function Sign takes any message from message space M, a private key from 
key space Pri, and outputs a signature in the space Sig. If SKA is the private key of 
entity A and m is any input message, then let us denote Sign(m, SKA) by SigA(m). 
The function Ver takes a claimed signature on a specific message, and using the 
public key from key space Pub outputs 1 if the verification succeeds otherwise 0. If 
m is an input message, s is the input signature corresponding to m, and P KA is the 
public key of entity A, then Ver(s, m, PKA) will be denoted by VerA(m, s). Hence a 
message is signed via SigA(m) � s, and the signature on m is verified by checking 
VerA(m, s) = 1 .  
The new scheme requires two collision resistant hash functions ha and h13. In 
fact, to minimise assumptions, let ha be defined as ha(x) = h(OIIx) and h13(x) = h(l llx) 
for any collision resistant function h. This means that finding any x and y with ha(x) 
= h13(y) gives a collision for h. 
In order to generate the batch signature of a set of messages, the hash of each 
message is placed at a leaf node of the tree. Each parent node is formed by 
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concatenating each of its child nodes and hashing the result. Finally the root node of 
the tree is signed using the ordinary signature scheme on which the batch signature is 
based. In order to prevent messages representing the internal nodes from having 
valid signatures, even though they would be random messages, use is made of the 
function ha to hash the leaves and the different function hf3 to hash the internal 
nodes. 
hu(m1 ) hu(m2) ha.(m3) ha.(m4) 
Figure 4.1 Batch Tree Structure 
Now, to form the batch signature of any individual message, consider the 
unique path from the node representing the message to the root of the tree, found by 
taking the parent node of each node traversed. The batch residue for that message 
consists of the sibling nodes of all nodes in this path, together with their direction, 
which is a single bit denoted L or R. An example with six messages is shown in 
Figure 4. 1 .  In this example the residue of message m1 consists of three nodes: 
{ha(m2), R}, {hf3(ha(m3) 1 1 ha(m4)), R}, and {hf3(ha(ms) 1 1  ha(m6)), R}; while the 
residue for message ms consists of the two nodes {ha(m6), R} and {hf3(hf3(L00) 1 1 
hf3(Ror)), L } .  
A more formal treatment of the signature generation and verification 
processes are now given. Suppose that the number of messages to be signed is 2k + r
for some r < 2k. Then the tree to be used will have 2k - r nodes of depth k and 2r
nodes of depth k + 1 .  It will be justified below that this is the best choice of tree
with reasonable assumptions. The Kraft inequality [CT9 1 ]  can be used to show that 
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such a tree exists and in fact this is the tree that will be built by the Huffman code 
[CT9 1 ]  with 2k + r symbols if all symbols are equally likely.
The signer must assign the hash of each message (arbitrarily) to a leaf node. 
Then all the internal nodes are assigned their values so that a node with left and right 
child nodes L1 and R2 respectively, has value hf3(L1 1 1 R2). All the required hashes can 
be calculated in a single tree build-up phase. Once the value of the root M has been 
found it can be signed to form the batch signature by user A as S = SigA(M). 
If the node for message mi has depth di then its residue consists of the values 
r1 , r2, . . .  , rd; which can be found using Algorithm 4. 1 .  This algorithm traverses the 
unique path from the leaf node representing the message to the root node of the tree 
identifying the sibling nodes of all nodes in this path. These sibling nodes, together 
with their direction, form the residue. The direction of a node N is denoted by dir(N) 
and the sibling node of N is denoted sib(N). 
c := ha(mi)
forj := 1 to di 
do 
rj := sib( c) 
if dir(c) = L then c := hf3(c 11 rj ) 
else c := hf3(rj 11 c) 
od 
Algorithm 4.1 Calculation of Residue 
Note that the formation of a specific batch residue is merely a selection 
process after the tree build-up phase. The batch signature for message mi is then the 
following sequence, 
S, r1 , dir(r1), r2, dir(r2), . . .  , rd;, dir(rd; ). 
Verification of a claimed signature T, s 1 , t1 , s2, t2, . . .  , sd, td of user A with 
public key KA consists of first reconstructing the root node c, see Algorithm 4.2. 
This algorithm reconstructs the root node by traversing the unique path from the leaf 
node representing the message to the root node of the tree. At each intermediate 
node the siblings are hashed together, using the supplied residue, to form the node. 
Then using the verification procedure for the ordinary signature, Ver(T, c, KA) is 
evaluated to give the result of the verification of the batch signature. 
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c := ha(mi) 
forj := 1 to d 
do 
if dir(lj) = R then c := h13(c 11 Sj) 
else c := h13(sj 11 c) 
od 
Algorithm 4.2 Tree Reconstruction 
4.3.2 Contrast of Schemes 
As well as work on batch verification, there have been two main previous 
approaches to batch signature generation. These are Fiat's batch RSA approach 
[Fia89, Fia97] and various works on general batch exponentiation, particularly by 
M'Raihi and Naccache [MN96]. These schemes were touched upon in the previous 
chapter but shall now be explored further in sufficient detail to compare their 
performance and properties with the new proposed technique. 
4.3.2.1  Fiat's Batch RSA 
As noted in chapter three, Fiat's paper [Fia89] appears to be the first to introduce the 
notion of batched operations in cryptography. In his paper, Fiat applied the idea to 
the generation of RSA signatures [RSA 78]. The fundamental philosophy is to 
spread the computational complexity of one full-strength operation over many input 
messages, this is in lieu of incurring a full exponentiation for each message 
individually. 
Fiat's scheme required that the signer have several private exponents which 
are prime with respect to each other, and also relies on multiplication to form a batch 
of messages for signing. The batch signing process produces a number of 
individually signed messages that may then be forwarded to individual recipients in 
the usual manner. Summarising the protocol, there are essentially three stages in the 
batch signature generation procedure, (recall that the scheme may also be used for 
batch RSA decryption). 
1 .  The messages to be signed are combined usmg a senes of small 
exponentiations, defined by a tree structure formed from the public 
exponents. 
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2. The combined message set 1s signed with one full length modular 
exponentiation, producing a signature on individual messages with a 
different signature key for each message. 
3 .  The message set is split up, again using the tree structure, to form the 
individual signatures. 
After the final step, the signed (distinct) messages may then be forwarded to 
recipients for individual verification under normal RSA verification procedures. 
This basic approach may be applied to any number of messages using a binary tree 
construction, (see chapter three for a detailed explanation of the scheme). 
Batch Size Total Length of Effective Modulus 
Exponents in Stage 1 Per Message 
5 3 1  2 1 1 
1 0  1 1 8 1 14 
20 400 71  
50  1 ,734 55 
75 3 , 1 94 56 
1 00 4,872 59 
200 1 3,035 70 
500 45,243 92 
Table 4.1 Computational Lower Bounds 
It is shown by Fiat that when the number of bits I nl in the RSA modulus 
increases, the number of multiplications required per message increases as O(log2 
1nl). However, in practice the modulus size is likely to be fixed, and it is of more 
interest here how the performance varies with different size batches. To compare the 
new scheme a theoretical lower bound on the computation required by Fiat's 
scheme, as the batch size varies, is now calculated. This bound is sufficient to 
demonstrate the computational advantage of the new scheme. Before continuing the 
comparison, a little more detail on the first step of Fiat's scheme is required. A 
binary tree is constructed where each message mi, and corresponding exponent ei, are 
assigned to a leaf node (see appendix II for basic definitions and terminology of 
binary trees). Each arc ai connecting the leaf node to its parent node is assigned the 
exponent value of its opposite leaf node (i.e. interchange exponents). In a similar 
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fashion, each arc ai associated with internal nodes is assigned the exponent Ei, where 
Ei is the product of all exponents assigned to arcs on the opposite branch. 
Performance is best when the public exponents are taken to be the first b 
primes, where b is the batch size, as is assumed hereafter. As stated by Fiat, the 
number of multiplications required in the first stage is minimised by choosing the 
tree to minimise W = L�=I di log ei, where di is the depth of the leaf node of ei. First
let T = L�=I log ei then the set {(log ei) + T I 1 � i � b} is a probability distribution
and the tree defines a prefix free code on any memoryless source with b symbols 
having this probability distribution. Then by Shannon's Noiseless Coding Theorem 
[ CT9 1 ]  the entropy, H, of that source is a bound on the average codeword length 
(which is the average value of di), and hence TH is a lower bound on W. 
Table 4. 1 ,  shows how this estimate of the effective modulus size varies when 
the size ofthe RSA modulus used is 1 024 bits as a lower bound on computation. The 
middle column shows that total length of all exponents used in stage 1 ,  while the 
final column shows the effective size modulus per message signed. It is interesting 
to note that the scheme is most efficient when the number of messages is around 7 5 ,  
and in this case the total effort i s  roughly equivalent to 4 full signature calculations. 
Note that in Table 4 . 1  only the first and second stages (i.e. excluding the split-up 
phase) of Fiat's scheme are included, so the effort shown is a conservative estimate. 
The effort in the third stage will usually be less than that of the first stage, and is 
shown by Fiat to be asymptotically (with 1nl) the same as the first stage 1 ;  whilst it is 
more difficult to give a useful lower bound on the effort for the third stage, this is 
not necessary for the comparison and as such will be ignored. 
The main points to note in comparison with Fiat's method and the proposed 
new method are the following: 
• The new scheme is considerably more efficient for fixed parameter sizes in
the signature, and the efficiency continues to grow as the batch size
mcreases.
• The new scheme is applicable to all signature schemes with appendix, while
Fiat's is applicable only to RSA.
• The new scheme has a small expansion (logarithmic in the number of
messages) over the original signature size, while Fiat's has no expansion.
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Fiat's scheme, however, reqmres that verifiers know which verification 
exponent to use. 
• Both schemes allow signatures to be verified independently. 
• Both schemes are provably as secure as the original signature scheme with 
reasonable assumptions. 
Now attention is drawn to another batch signature generation algorithm, used 
for discrete log based signature schemes. 
4.3.2.2 Batch Exponentiation Techniques 
Because exponentiation is a fundamental computational process for most public key 
cryptosystems, there has been intense research in optimising exponentiation 
algorithms. Both M'Raihi and Naccache [MN96], and also Naccache et al. 
[NMRV94], have proposed methods to produce batch random exponentiations. 
Similar algorithms appear to have been proposed previously by Tsuruoka [Tsu93] .  
These techniques can be used in ElGamal type signatures, such as the Digital 
Signature Standard (DSS) [DSS91 ] ,  and as suggested by the authors are particularly 
useful for low powered devices. 
Batch Size Storage (Bytes) Multiplications per 
computation 
2 3 1 6  141  
3 652 1 03 
4 1 ,324 84.5 
12  3 ,844 57.83 
36 1 1 ,404 48.94 
1 08 34,084 45.98 
Table 4.2 Performance with 160 bit exponent 
A major gain can be obtained from a straightforward parallel square and 
multiply algorithm [MN96] which allows all squarings, the main computational 
effort, to be shared amongst any number of exponentiations. A number of more 
sophisticated techniques allow further substantial savings to be made. Some tables 
showing typical performance are in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, where an optimal 
choice of subset for computation is shown [MN96] . These tables illustrate that for 
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batches of Schnorr signatures of size around 1 00, savmgs of over 80% of 
computations can be made. 
Batch Size Storage (Bytes) Multiplications per 
computation 
2 448 449 
3 960 323 
4 1 ,984 255 
5 4,032 2 1 6.6 
60 47,680 122.7 
200 1 58,784 1 1 6.8 
Table 4.3 Performance with 512 bit exponent 
The main points to note, in comparison with batch exponentiation and the 
proposed method, are the following: 
• The new scheme is considerably more efficient for fixed parameter sizes in
the signature, and the efficiency continues to grow as the batch size
mcreases.
• The new scheme is applicable to all signature schemes with appendix, while
batch exponentiation is applicable only to those requiring random
exponentiations to the same common base, particularly ElGamal type
signatures.
• The new scheme has a small expansiOn (logarithmic in the number of
messages) over the original scheme, while batch exponentiation can be used
without changing the existing signatures at all.
• Both schemes allow signatures to be verified independently.
• Both schemes are provably as secure as the original signature scheme (with
reasonable assumptions in the new case).
4.3.3 Analysis of Batch Signature Scheme 
In the subsections that follow, the security and efficiency issues associated with the 
new scheme are considered. This also includes a treatment of other forms of tree 
structures such as 2-3 trees. 
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4.3.3 . 1  Security Analysis 
As long as it is assumed that the hash function h used in the construction of the 
signature is collision resistant then the following result can be easily proved. 
Lemma 4.2. If the ordinary signature scheme used as the basis for the batch 
signature is secure against existential forgery with an adaptive chosen signature 
attack then so is the batch signature scheme. 
Proof. Observe that a forgery of a new tree root implies an existential forgery for 
the ordinary signature by theorem 4. 1 .  So the only possible forgeries must leave the 
root unchanged. However, if either of the depth one nodes are changed then this 
implies a collision for h13 so the depth one nodes must be unchanged. By induction it 
follows that the nodes at all levels must be unchanged. Finally the tree cannot be 
truncated to change an internal node into a leaf because, for this to be a valid forgery 
there must be values x and y with ha(x) = h13(y) which is again a collision for h. 
There are variants of both RSA [BP96] and ElGamal [PS96] signatures 
which are known to be secure against adaptive chosen signature attacks in the widely 
accepted random oracle model. It follows then that practical implementations of the 
batch signature are provably secure in this sense. 
4.3.3.2 Efficiency Analysis 
To judge the efficiencies of the batch signature technique several costs must be 
considered. These are the computational costs, along with communications and 
storage requirements of the generated batch signature. It is initially shown that 
binary trees are the best choice, based on the assumption that the most important 
issue is to minimise the average size of the batch residue. Note that adding more 
child nodes to every node results in a longer average batch residue but reduces the 
number of hashes required for both signer and receiver. It is expected that in most 
applications a few extra hash values will be less important than an increased 
signature size, but if this is not the case then non-binary trees could be considered. 
Lemma 4.3. Use of a binary tree minimises the average size of the batch residue. 
Proof. Suppose some node has c > 2 children. Consider the effect of reducing the 
number of children to c - 1 ,  and replacing the final node with two children of the 
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node c - 1 .  The residue of these two children is unchanged by this procedure, while
the residue of the other nodes has reduced by exactly one hash. Thus overall the 
average residue size has reduced. By induction this process can be continued until 
only binary nodes remain. 
The proof is illustrated in the example of a single node which is the parent of 
three leaf nodes. Each leaf node must include the other two in its residue so for this 
subtree each node carries a residue of two hash values. By replacing this subtree 
with a binary subtree (see Figure 4.2) the single node only requires one hash in its 
residue while the other two nodes still require only two, and thus the average size of 
the residue is reduced. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  ..,. 
Figure 4.2 Reduction of Residue with Binary Tree 
Given that a binary tree will be used there are still many different trees 
possible. It seems likely that in most applications it will be desirable to minimise the
average size of the batch residue. This is the same as minimising the average depth 
of the leaves of the tree. This can be achieved by using the Huffman construction 
mentioned in section 4.3 . 1 ,  which makes the tree as balanced as possible. Recall 
that the residue consists of hash values, whose length is denoted l hl, and the direction 
which is a single bit denoting right or left. Then as stated before, there are 2k - r leaf
nodes of depth k and 2r leaf nodes of depth k + 1 .  Since the depth of the leaf node 
determines exactly the number of nodes in the residue the following result can be 
easily derived. Note in particular that the size of the residue increases only as O(log 
n) for n signed messages.
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Lemma 4.4. The average size of the batch residue is (k + --/:!-) x (I hi + 1) . 2 + r 
Proof. As stated before, there are 2k - r leaf nodes of depth k and 2r leaf nodes of 
depth k + 1 .  Since the depth of the leaf node determines exactly the number of 
nodes in the residue the average size of the residue is (k(2k - r�+ 2r(k + 1) Jx (l h l  + 1) = (k +  k2r ) x (l hl + 1) . 2 + r 2 + r 
It is interesting to note that there may be situations in which it is desirable to 
minimise the batch residue size for certain signatures at the cost of increasing this 
for others. In this event batch signatures may still be used but an alternative tree can 
be built. A simple way to do this would be to use the Huffman algorithm again, but 
instead of assigning all messages with the same probability as before, one or more 
messages may be assigned a high probability, and the others smaller probabilities. 
Of course this will increase the average residue size, but will have little effect on 
computation. 
With regard to computational efficiency the main observation is that for the 
signer only one ordinary signature generation is required no matter how large the 
batch is, this means that one modular exponentiation is amortised over the range of 
messages signed. The only additional computation required is dictated by the hash 
transformations for tree building. It can be seen that to sign up to 2k messages no 
more than 2k+I hashes are required, or 2 hashes per signed message. For all known 
signature schemes a hash computation can be regarded as trivial in comparison to the 
modular exponentiation of signature generation. Therefore, it is claimed that for the 
signer the computational cost can be regarded as almost constant in the number of 
messages signed for any reasonable batch size. 
For signature verification the extra computation required is one hash for 
every node in the batch residue. As remarked above, this number is not more than 
the base 2 logarithm of the size of the batch. Even for quite large batch sizes this is 
a minor additional cost compared with the effort of signature verification. Even for 
RSA verification with small exponents, batch sizes up to a thousand will not cause a 
major increase in verification time. 
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4.3.4 Use of Internal Nodes 
One may suspect that further gains may be obtained by assigning messages to the 
internal nodes prior to signing. On the contrary however, an increase in the overall 
length of the signature is realised by such an approach. Using an example of seven 
messages the average residue length is analysed, with messages assigned to leaf 
nodes only and then to both the internal nodes and leaf nodes. 
Figure 4.3 Analysis of Leaf Nodes 
Considering leaf mode assignments only (Figure 4.3), messages situated at 
depth k + 1 ,  require 3 residue nodes whilst messages at depth k require 2 nodes
(where k = 2 and r = 3). According to Lemma 4.4 the average bit length of the
residue will be, 
(k + k2r ) x (I hi + 1) .2 + r  
For the example given this means that on average 2 �  residue nodes are required.
7 
For the case where internal nodes are used, messages are assigned to nodes 
commencing with the root node working towards the leaves, building a balanced 
binary tree of minimum height. Once all messages have been assigned then each 
internal node is computed by hashing the concatenation of its two children together 
with the message situated at the internal node, refer Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 Analysis of Internal Nodes 
To determine the average residue length, it is first noted that all messages 
except the message at the root (which requires 2 nodes) require a residue of length 4. 
For example node Lo requires its two children (the message situated at the node is 
the message to be verified hence does not form part of the residue), the node R1 , and 
a hash of the message situated at the root node to rebuild the binary tree. A leaf 
node Ni requires all nodes not in its path, see Algorithm 4. 1 ,  and the messages 
situated at nodes in the unique path from the root to the leaf node Ni. The average 
length of the residue in the example given is 3 � x (I h i  + 1 ), which is greater than 
7 
leaf node only. 
From the above analysis it can be seen that overall average length of the 
residue is minimised by the binary tree approach where messages are assigned to the 
leaf nodes only. In general, the average length of the residue for nodes at depths k -
1 ,  k, and k + 1 is given by, 
2(k + k 
3r 
k-I ) x (l hl + 1) . 2 + 2r + 2  
This represents approximately 90% of all messages. Consider the example of an 
unbalanced binary tree with 9 nodes. Let k = 2 and r = 1 ,  then the average length of 
the residue for nodes at depths k - 1 ,  k, and k + 1 will be 4 � . 
8 
For messages at depth di < k - 1 the average length of the residue will be 2di 
x (I hi + 1 ). Including the root node, which will always require two nodes, this 
accounts for the remaining allocated messages. Although the depth of the binary 
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tree constructed in this way will be less by one level, compared to the leaf node 
technique the average residue length will still be greater. This is due to the 
requirement that each internal node must include an additional hash value for its 
assigned message. 
4.4 Some Suggested Applications 
This chapter presents a new batch signature generation scheme that uses an efficient 
tree construction to minimise the batch signature size. The scheme is able to 
produce multiple signatures simultaneously over a range of input messages, in a 
manner that allows each message to be independently verified by unrelated 
recipients. It is demonstrated that the signing effort required is significantly 
improved, with batches of hundreds, or even thousands of messages, being quite 
practical. In addition, it is shown that security is equivalent to the ordinary digital 
signature scheme employed. 
An important feature of the proposed new scheme is that the signature 
scheme allows for independent verification of each signed message while there is no 
restriction for batch verification of multiple messages. This provides many 
opportunities for applications in electronic commerce where signed authorisations 
are currently viewed as a necessary computational burden. Two example 
applications are for signatures of servers in payment schemes and batch processing 
of electronic coins. Another example application involves a group signature scheme 
together with a homomorphic verifier. In particular, the group signature provides an 
additional primitive for electronic cash schemes, for instance multiple banks may 
form a group and are able to arbitrarily sign coins such that each coin may be 
verified by merchants using the same public key of the group [LR98] . 
4.4.1 Electronic Commerce Transactions 
Many electronic commerce payment schemes, such as SET [Set97], include a 
payment authorisation server (the payment gateway in SET) in their architecture, 
whose job is to authorise payments for multiple merchants. These servers are likely 
to receive large numbers of requests almost simultaneously. Use of batch signature 
generation would have a significant effect in reducing delay and minimising the 
duplication of server machines. In addition, merchants and certificate authorities 
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may be considered a central processing bottleneck where payments and certificate 
requests may be received simultaneously. To illustrate the potential applicability 
some typical SET transactions, such as payment and authorisation, will be briefly 
described [Set97] with how a batch signature may be applied. 
Customer (C) Merchant (M) Payment Gateway (G) 
Initiate-Request � 1) 
Initiate-Response � 2) SigM(init-response) 
Purchase-Request � 3) Verc(purchase-request) 
Si gM( auth-request) 4) � VerM(Auth-request) 
Enc(auth-request, k1) 
Env0(k1) 
Env·1 (k2) 5) � Sig0(Auth-response) 
Dec(auth-response, k2) 
Ver0( auth-response) 
Purchase-Response � 6) SigM(purchase-response) 
Figure 4.5 Electronic Commerce Payment and Authorisation 
Referring to Figure 4.5 above, when the merchant receives the purchase 
request the signature and integrity of the message is verified at step 3 .  The merchant 
will then obtain authorisation for the purchase by forming the Auth-Request message 
(step 4), and forwarding this, together with the customer's payment instructions, 
onto the payment gateway. The message is signed by the merchant, the contents 
encrypted using a random session key, and the session key is encrypted using the 
public encryption key of the payment gateway. The payment gateway returns an 
encrypted, signed response message, Auth-Response, indicating whether the credit 
card transaction is authorised. The message origin and integrity is verified by the 
merchant and the contents decrypted, step 5 .  In completion, the Purchase-Response 
message is formed and signed by the merchant. (At a later time the merchant would 
perform funds capture using a capture transaction, this is not shown in Figure 4.5). 
If multiple transaction instances are present at a server at any point in time, it 
is straightforward to see that an opportunity exists to sign in batch. For example, the 
purchase response message at the merchant and the authorisation response message 
at the bank may be received simultaneously for signing. With the additional latent 
response time from the payment gateway during authorisation, it is possible that 
many payment requests may have been received by the merchant. In all these 
examples a batch approach would prove more productive than individually signing 
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each transaction. Since the payment gateway would emerge as a more critical 
processing bottleneck, and would expect to see a greater number of transactions 
arriving simultaneously for authorisation in an electronic commerce environment, 
there is a significant advantage in moving to a batch model. 
4.4.2 Group Signatures 
There are other ways in which signature schemes may be augmented to provide more 
efficient signing and verification procedures. For example group signatures typically 
require a bit challenge exchange that involves that some general modular 
exponentiation to be performed many times. Under some security assumptions these 
operations may be performed simultaneously with a homomorphic verification 
technique, providing a 50% computational saving. Furthermore, the general 
signature scheme may be extended by applying the signing algorithm already 
discussed. This capability will be briefly outlined here using the Camenisch and 
Stadler group signature scheme [CS97] . 
4.4.2.1 Camenisch and Stadler Group Signature Scheme 
Group signature schemes, originally introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [CH9 1 ] ,  
permit enrolled members of  group to sign a message on behalf of  the group. The 
signed message may be verified by anyone by using the advertised public key of the 
group, and this is achieved whilst retaining the anonymity of the group member 
signing the message. A special entity called the group manager of the group is 
however, able to revoke the anonymity and identify the group member who signed 
the message. Group signature schemes can be found in many security applications 
and most recently they are finding relevance to electronic cash [LR98].  
Only the signing and verification procedures will be described here, but first 
the original scheme must be outlined and then the extended version. Using the 
signature of knowledge primitive, described in chapter 2, some additional definitions 
are required. This will be for a signature of knowledge for a double discrete 
logarithm and the root of a discrete logarithm, typically denoted SKLOGLOG1 [a I y 
= g(aa)](m) and SKROOTLOG1 [a I y = g(a•)](m) respectively.
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Definition 4.1. A signature of knowledge of a double discrete logarithm of y to the 
bases g and a, on message m, with security parameter l is an (l + 1 )  tuple (c, s1 , • • •  , 
Sz) E {0, 1 } 1 xZ1 satisfying the following, 
_ { ga'' if c[i] = 0 c - h(m, y, g, e, Pt, . . .  , Pt), where P; = , ya ' otherwise. 
Definition 4.2. A signature of knowledge of an e-th root of the discrete logarithm of 
y to the base g, on message m, with security parameter l is an (l + 1 )  tuple ( c, s1 , • • •  , 
St) E { 0, 1 }  l xz:l Satisfying the following, 
_ _ 
{ g<sf ) if c[i] = 0 c - h(m, y, g, e, Pt, . . .  , Pt), where P; - , y<s, ) otherwise. 
The setup of the scheme involves the initial selection of security parameter l 
by the group manager and publishing the public key (n, e, G, g, a, A, v): 
• RSA public and private keys are (n, e) and d respectively, where n = pq, p = 
2P + 1 ,  q = 2Q + 1 ,  such that (p, q, P, Q) are all prime. 
• a cyclic group G = (g) of order n in which computing discrete logarithms is 
infeasible, ( G may be a subgroup of z;., for large prime p' where n I p' - 1 ) . 
• a E z: of large multiplicative (unknown) order modulo both prime factors of 
n, and 
• an upper bound A on the length of the secret keys and a constant v > 1 .  
A group member obtains their membership certificate (y + 1 )d mod n, by 
choosing x ER { 0, . . .  , i· - 1 } ,  computing y = ax mod n and membership key z = g. 
The pair (y, z) is forwarded to the group manager whilst proving knowledge of x. 
When convinced the group manager returns the membership certificate (ax + It 
Signing Procedure. To sign a message m the group member chooses r ER Z11, 
computes g' = g, z' = g'Y, and solves Vt = SKLOGLOGt[a I z' = g'(aa)](m) and V2 = 
SKROOTL0Gt[f3 I z'g' = g'cl3e)], where f3 � (aa + l )d is the membership certificate; 
this is more clearly seen in the following steps: 
1 .  g' = g, where r ER Zn. 
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3 .  Choose wi E R  {2"- . . .  2"+Jl - 1 } where 2"- - 1 � IZ;11 and /-! >  0,  for i =  1 to I.
4. Compute c = h(m, z', g', a, g' (aw1\ • • •  , g' (aw1)) •
5 .  Set Vr = (c, r r ,  . . .  , rt), where ri = wi if c[i] = 0 ,  else ri = wi - x.
6. Choose wi ER z:, for i = 1 to I.
7. Set Vz = (c, rr , . . .  , n), where ri = Wi if c[i] = 0, else ri = wi + x mod n.
The signature on the message m is the tuple {g', z', Vr , Vz} ,  note also that the
operations in step 4 requires 21 modular exponentiations. 
Verification Procedure. To verify the signature on m, confirm that V1 is a valid 
signature of knowledge of a double discrete logarithm and that V2 is a valid signature 
of knowledge of the e-th root of the discrete logarithm. For V1 this involves the 
calculation c = h(m, z', g', a, Pr , . . . , Pt), where Vi I Pi = g' ari if c[i] = 0, else z' ari, note
that this requires 21 modular exponentiations to compute the P/s. This evaluates 
correctly due to, 
P _ , ari _ (g'Y\ari _ (g'Y\awi - X  _ (g' ax) awi - X  _ 1 aWi i - Z  - J - J - - g .
A similar procedure is performed to check V2• The signer is a valid group 
member because V1 confirms that z' is of the form g' aa, this proves the signer knows
some value a =  x. Now, since z'g' -+ g' aa+l , then V2 proves that the signer has a
membership certificate (a a + 1/ for the secret value a = x.
4.4.2.2 Group Signature Scheme: Extended 
The following procedures demonstrate how to sign an arbitrary number of message 
(mr ,  . . .  , mn), using the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Stadler [CS97f. 
The following two points should be noted regarding the modified scheme: 
1 .  tree structure used to prepare multiple messages for signing, and 
2. bit challenges are verified using a homomorphic batch verifier. 
7 An attack is shown to apply to this original scheme [Tra99], however this does not affect the batch extension. 
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Note that the order of g is known to both the verifier and signer, however the 
order of a is not known by the verifier, as such only the exponents of g may be 
added. 
Signing Procedure. To sign a set of messages m1 , . . .  , mn the group member 
chooses randomly r ER Zn, computes g' = gr, z' = g' Y, and solves for V1 = 
SKLOGLOGt[a I z' = g' (aa)] (m1 , . . .  , mn) and V2 = SKROOTLOGt[f3 1 z'g' = g• <13�] :  
1 .  g' = g, where r E R  Zn. 
3 .  Assign messages mi to leaf nodes of  a binary tree and construct T. 
4. Choose Wi E R  {2"' . . .  2"-+ 1-l - 1 }  where 2"' - 1 ;::: IZ�I and ll > 0, for i = 1 to /. 
I'awi modn 5 .  Compute c = h(T, z', g', a, g' i=! mod p ). 
6 .  Set vl = (c, n ,  . . .  ' n), where ri = Wj if c[i] = 0, else ri = Wj - X. 
7. Choose Wi ER Z�, for i =  1 to /. 
8 .  Set V2 = (c, n ,  . . .  , n), where ri = wi if c[i] = 0,  else ri = wi + x mod n .  
9 .  Vi I construct l:li using Algorithm 4. 1 .  
The signature on each message mi is the unique tuple {g', z', V1 , V2, l:li} . Note 
also that the operations in step 5 requires l + 1 modular exponentiations and l 
modular additions, a computational saving of around 50%. 
Verification Procedure. To verify the signature on mi, confirm that V1 is a valid 
signature of knowledge of a double discrete logarithm and that V2 is a valid signature 
of knowledge of the e-th root of the discrete logarithm. For V1 this involves the 
reconstruction of T using Algorithm 4.2, and calculation of 
� 1 a" modn ""'a'� mod n 
C = h(T z' g' a g.L..;=I,c[iJ=O X z .L..;=I,c[ IJ=I ) ' ' ' ' ' 
this requires l modular exponentiations, l modular additions and 1 multi­
exponentiation, again a savings of around 50%. This evaluates correctly due to, 
"V' all modn "'VI a'� mod n 
g'.L.,i=I,c[i]=O X Z .L..;=I,c[i]=I 
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= 
"1 aw; modn " 1 a'i modn 
g'L,I=l,c[;]=O X (g'Y )L,I=l,c[l]=l 
""'' aw; modn x " 1 aw;-x modn 
g>L,i=I,c[;]=O X g{._a )L.i=I,c[i]=I 
"' aw; modn "'1 aw; modn 
g>L.ti=I,c[i]=O X g>L,I=l,c[l]=l 
""' aw1 modn 
g'L.i=I 
A similar procedure is performed using (ri = wi + x mod n) to check V2• The
signer is a valid group member because V1 confirms that z' is of the form g'a
a
, this
proves the signer knows some value a = x. And, since zg' � g'a
a+ 1 , then V2 proves
that the signer has a membership certificate (aa + l )d for the secret value a =  x. This
demonstrates that signer must know the secret a, and that the group manager has 
signed this secret in the form of (aa + 1{
4.4.3 Relevance to Electronic Cash 
Anonymous electronic cash schemes are understood to be computationally 
expensive for all parties involved. However, the worst computational burden is 
carried by the bank, which needs to sign each coin withdrawn for every customer. It 
should be remembered that all practical off-line anonymous cash schemes use single 
term coins which can be spent only once. Batch signature generation allows for 
multiple coins to be signed together. This will allow for linking of the batch of 
coins, thereby weakening the anonymity, in return for a major saving in 
computational costs at the bank. The application of this technique is explored 
further in chapters six and seven, where it is shown that large savings can be made 
by the bank during withdrawal and some significant savings to both the merchant 
and bank during payment and deposit respectively. 
Group signature schemes are also finding a relevant place in anonymous 
electronic cash with banks forming groups to sign electronic coins [LR98, Tra99].  It 
is suggested that this approach in general, from a law enforcement or financial 
institutions point of view, is a more practical framework given that a service such as 
owner tracing is furnished rather than total anonymity. 
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4.5 Summary 
In chapter two a foundation for cryptography is provided showing how the primitives 
may be exercised to devise electronic cash schemes. It was also noted that the 
efficiency of these schemes is critical to any developed cash protocol. The previous 
chapter elaborated on batch cryptography and how this can be used to improve the 
efficiency of security related applications. In this chapter some new techniques were 
explored, in particular a batch signature scheme is developed that uses a binary tree 
structure. The efficiency of the resulting signature scheme is shown to be an 
improvement over other batch signature schemes, whilst maintaining a logarithmic 
increases in the signature size with respect to the number of messages signed. The 
security of the scheme is proven to be secure as the original scheme it is based upon, 
and is consistent with the security assumptions of Merkle's authentication tree. 
Some suggested applications are finally described, such as in electronic 
payment and electronic cash, illustrating the potential that exists for applying such 
techniques to commercial environments. In particular, strong relevance to electronic 
cash is hinted at for both conventional and group signatures. Together with 
homomorphic verification techniques these ideas are further explored in chapters six 
and seven as some new electronic cash systems are developed. However, before 
these applications are considered in detail, several new weaknesses and attacks are 
explored that relate to homomorphic verification techniques. 
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Chapter Five 
Attacking Verifiers of Signatures 
"The desire for order is the only order in the world" 
� Georges Duhamel, 
The Pasquier Chronicles, 
1 933 .  
5. Attacking Verifiers of Signatures 
Modular exponentiation is a fundamental operation for most practical digital 
signature schemes. The computational expense of both signing and verifying 
signatures is mainly due to the modular exponentiation required. Several techniques 
have been proposed in the literature to reduce this expense, including use of small 
exponents and multi -exponentiation techniques [YLL94] . Of course, an alternative 
way to realize a computational reduction is through the application of batch 
cryptography. 
Batch cryptography is relevant in settings where many signatures (or other 
cryptographic primitives) need to be generated and/or verified together. Modem 
electronic commerce applications represent a prime example, as typically many 
customers interact with the same merchant or banking server. The previous chapter 
has shown how some new batch signature schemes are able to generate several 
signed messages at once. Although several other techniques have been developed to 
improve signature generation [Fia89, MN96], the majority of the recent work in the 
area has focused on the batch verification of signatures. These techniques all exploit 
the homomorphic properties of modular exponentiation in various groups to 
combine a set of exponentiations into one equation whose computational effort is 
effectively divided amongst all the individual exponentiations normally required. 
In addition to the RSA batch verification techniques, several extensions have 
been discussed to discrete logarithm, or common base, signature schemes. In 
particular, Ham [Har98a], Bellare et al. [BGR98], and Naccache et al. [NMVR94] 
show how to batch verify multiple DSA-type signatures. In this chapter several new 
attacks and weaknesses on these and other published schemes are described. A 
general weakness is explained which applies to almost all known batch verifiers for 
discrete logarithm based signature schemes. The general attack eminates from an 
observation made by Bellare et al. [BGR98], regarding prime order groups, and it is 
shown that the consequences are more serious than suggested. It is shown how the 
general attack can be eliminated given extra properties about the underlying group 
structure. Finally a general batch verifier for exponentiation in any cyclic group is 
described. 
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In the remainder of this first section a more detailed overview of hatching 
will be revisited, however the focus will be on hatching modular exponentiations 
rather than a digital signature abstraction. This will assist in highlighting the central 
observation and allow the results to be explained. 
5.1 Background to Central Observation 
Chapter three noted that the idea of batch cryptography was originally introduced by 
Fiat [Fia89]. His scheme amortized the private key operations for RSA and so was 
designed to assist in the signing and decryption operations. The idea was to batch a 
number of messages together, perform one full-scale modular exponentiation to sign 
the messages simultaneously, and then split apart the batch into individually signed 
messages. This is achievable due to the homomorphic property of RSA and the 
observation by Chaum that different relatively-prime roots may be split apart 
[CFN88]. 
Hatching verification for DSA signatures was introduced by Naccache, 
M'Raihi, Raphaeli and Vaudenay [NMRV94]. Their scheme is designed to verify 
several DSA signatures at once by checking that a batch criterion holds, and this 
proves to be much more efficient than sequential verification of individual DSA 
signatures. An earlier version of the paper of Naccache et al. also included an 
additional batch verifier that required interaction between signer and verifier 
[NMRV] . Lim and Lee [LL94] showed that this interactive version was not secure 
since both the verifier and signer could create signature batches that satisfy the test. 
Ham subsequently proposed a new method for DSA signatures requiring interaction 
between the signer and verifier [Har95] that was able to avoid Lim and Lee's attack, 
he later proposed a non-interactive version [Har98a] . It is shown that both these 
schemes [NMRV94, Har95] are still vulnerable to attacks, whilst the scheme in 
[Har98a] has several explicit attacks. 
Early work concerning non-interactive batch verification was also published 
by Yen and Laih [YL95] .  Their verification techniques are proposed for batch 
verification of a modification of the Schnorr or Brickell-McCurley signature 
schemes as well as for RSA. Yen and Laih also note that to remain secure from 
attack, the verifier must choose random exponent values and apply these during 
batch verification. These values prevent the signer from attempting to introduce false 
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signatures that would otherwise satisfy the batch verification criterion. However, it 
will be shown that the properties of this test are less useful than they first appear, as 
several weaknesses and attacks are outlined on all the verifiers shown in their paper. 
Recently, Bellare, Garay, and Rabin [BGR98] described several techniques 
for conducting batch verification of exponentiation with high confidence that false 
values have not been mixed into the batch. The technique, which they refer to as the 
small exponents test, is very similar to the algorithms of Naccache et al. [NMRV94] 
and Yen and Laih [YL95], while their more sophisticated bucket test turns out to be 
more efficient for larger batch instances. The weaknesses identified here are also 
shown to apply to the batch verifiers illustrated by Bellare et al. 
This chapter illustrates flaws in a number of published batch verifiers; in 
some cases they are broken whilst in others they do not provide the strength of 
verification claimed. There are several explicit attacks and weaknesses, whilst a 
general attack is developed based on observations made by Bellare et al. [BGR98] . 
Through stronger assumptions on the group structure however, it is shown how these 
schemes may be repaired. 
5.1.1 Batch Verification of Exponentiation 
First it is necessary to recall how batch verification works by providing a 
generalisation. Since exponentiation is the basic operation that is of interest here, 
the Bellare et al. paper is followed concentrating on batch verification of 
exponentiation in a group. 
Considering the situation where there are n elements YI. y2, . . .  , Yn, all in a 
multiplicative group G, and n exponents x1 , x2, • • •  , Xn, all integers up to some size. A 
fixed element g E G is known. Batch verification of exponentiation involves a 
check that Yi = gx; for each i without having to make this explicit calculation n times, 
refer to definition 3 .2. In the case that the xi values are indeed the discrete 
logarithms of the respective Yi values, the batch is correct. A good batch verification 
algorithm should identify, at least with high probability, whenever one or more of 
the xi values is not the discrete logarithm of the respective Yi values; in this case the 
batch will be rejected. 
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All the known batch verification techniques are based on the multiplicative 
property of the group. Specifically, if the batch is correct then the following 
equation will hold, 
n ""n 
IT Y; = gL,i=l
x, .
i=l 
(7) 
It is straighforward to check that the converse is false: if equation (7) holds 
then it need not be the case that the batch is correct. For example, adding a constant 
to one xi value and subtracting the same constant from a different Xi value does not 
change equation (7) but invalidates the batch. Another example is where the correct 
xi values are randomly permuted. 
Given: g a generator of the group G of order q, and (x1 .  YI), (xz, yz), . . .  , Cxn, Yn) 
with xi e Zq and Yi e G. Also a security parameter l.
Check: That Vi e { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : Yi = g';.
1 .  Pick s1 , . . .  , Sn E {0, 1 } 1 at random.
3 .  If gx = y then accept, else reject.
Table 5.1 Small Exponents Test for Batch Verification of Exponentiation 
Various authors [NMRV94, YL95] have observed this and suggested that to 
turn equation (7) into a useful batch verifier, some form of randomisation should be 
introduced. This is done by multiplying the xi values by small random values, which 
must also be introduced as small exponents for the Yi values. An attacker who
wishes to have an incorrect batch accepted has to anticipate which random values 
will be used. This central idea was explored in chapter three and was called the 
small exponents test [BGR98] . The algorithm for this is shown again in Table 5 . 1 .  
Bellare et al. prove that the small exponents test is a good batch verifier with error 
bounded by 2-1 as long as q, the order of the group G, is prime. It can be seen that
the algorithm uses one full exponentiation in G plus n multiplications to obtain x and 
finally the cost of the n small exponentiations to find y. Bellare et al. use a multi­
exponentiation algorithm to show that the total cost is l + n( l + l/2) multiplications 
in addition to the full exponentiation. 
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The small exponents test will be the key example from this point forward as 
several attacks and weaknesses are explored. It should be recalled that Bellare et al. 
also propose a variation which they call the bucket test which can be more efficient 
for large batches. The bucket test repeatedly partitions the batch randomly into 
'buckets ' and operates the small exponent test on these buckets. The general results 
here also apply to the bucket test, the differences are discussed further in section 
5 .3 .2. 
A critical assumption in the small exponents test is that the Yi values lie in the 
group of prime order, G. This rules out the case where G is the multiplicative group 
z: for a composite n, as used in RSA and related algorithms. Nevertheless, Bellare 
et al. showed that there is a simpler form of verification, which they called 
screening, that applies to RSA signatures. Recalling from the definition given in 
chapter three, screening shows that the signatures must have, at some time, been 
formed by the true owner of the private key even though none of the individual 
claimed signatures might actually be correct. Screening is sufficient in applications 
where it is not necessary to possess the signatures, but only to know that the 
messages were signed; one example is the batch verification of certificates. 
5.1.2 Central Observation 
As mentioned above, it is a requirement in the proof of correctness of the small 
exponents test that all operations are performed within a group G of prime order. 
Bellare et al. suggest that in practice this is not really a restriction as this setting is 
commonplace in many modem cryptographic schemes. 
They observe that when the order is non-prime the small exponents test will 
not work. For an example they use z;, which has non-prime order p - 1 .  Let g be a 
generator of z;, and suppose y = gx mod p. Under these assumptions the small 
exponents test will not detect the invalid batch instance with two pairs (x, -y mod p) 
and (x, y) when the test exponent for the first pair is even. This will occur with 
probability Yz. Notice that if y lies in some prime order subgroup G then -y cannot 
lie in G. 
Whilst some new attacks and weaknesses are also introduced here, the key 
theme of this chapter revolves around the requirement of working in a prime order 
group, this can be summarised in two significant observations. 
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1 .  Several authors have ignored this requirement. An explicit attack is given 
that shows that their proposed batch verification schemes do not work as 
suggested. 
2. Even when this requirement is stated, it  is not usually possible to check that 
it actually holds in a batch presented for verification. This makes most 
applications, including some proposed by Bellare et al. [BGR], inappropriate 
unless additional properties hold. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section it 
is shown that the claimed strong RSA batch verifiers proposed by Yen and Laih 
[YL95] actually provide only the weaker screening form, and an explicit attack on 
the batch DSA verifiers of Ham [Har98a] is shown. In the following section a 
general attack is outlined that is applicable to verifiers of signatures in batches. It is 
illustrated how this may be applied to the small exponents test for batch verification 
in several published algorithms [BGR, NMRV94, YL95] . Finally it is demonstrated 
how this general attack may be avoided by careful choice of the prime modulus used 
and a generalised small exponents test for any cyclic group is proposed. 
5.2 Specific Attacks on Batch Verifiers 
In this section, two batch verification schemes are examined which do not operate in 
prime order groups. The first works with a composite modulus, while the second 
performs a modular reduction before verification, which destroys the group 
structure. It is shown that in both cases the verification does not provide the 
assurances claimed. 
5.2.1 Yen and Laih's RSA Batch Verification 
Yen and Laih [YL95] proposed a variation of ElGamal signatures suitable for batch 
signature verification. In their paper they suggest an RSA batch verifier and use this 
to compare with the proposed ElGamal-type batch signature. The RSA batch 
verification technique will be considered initially, later the security of their proposed 
ElGamal variant will be assessed. They have essentially proposed to use the small 
exponents test in the RSA multiplicative group. Specifically, suppose that S1 , • • •  , Sn 
are claimed RSA signatures [RSA78] on messages m � ,  . . .  , mn, where these messages 
have been pre-processed by any chosen hashing and redundancy functions. If the 
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signatures are correct then Si = mf mod N, where d is the RSA private exponent and 
N the modulus. Small exponents s1 , • • •  , s11 are chosen randomly of length l (as 
pointed out previously the paper suggests that a length of /-bits is sufficient to obtain 
failure probability of T1). The RSA batch verification is then to test if the following 
equation holds, where e is the RSA public exponent, 
(8) 
Notice that this test is not as efficient as the small exponents test described in 
Table 5 . 1  because it is not possible for the verifier to add the small exponents on the 
left hand side modulo the group order. This is because the base is not common as 
each signature Si is different, (even if the base was common, this would still not be 
possible because the order <j>(N) is also unknown to a verifier). In practice a small 
value of e is often used which severely limits the benefit of batch verification (this 
was discussed in chapter three). Regardless of the test's efficiency it is incorrect to 
assume that the verifier provides more than screening; this means that use of the 
small exponents is redundant since Bellare et al. showed that equation (8) provides 
screening with all si = 1 ,  at least in the case of full domain hashing. 
The simplest attack is to replace some Si values by -Si and to replace some mi 
values by -mi, (all modulo N). Then the test will succeed with probability � 
depending on the parity of the si values chosen. This attack can be launched by any 
party. This attack can be more sophisticated where the signer can choose an element 
a of small order t = ord(a) in the multiplicative group z*N, of course t should be 
smaller than 2', (so that the probabilities of success are greater than 2-1). Any Si 
value can then be replaced by aSi mod N and the test will succeed with probability 
l it. Note that it is easy to find such an a, where 2 < t < 2', if the factorisation of cp(N) 
is known. The case t = 2 can always be found as it is the element N - 1 .  This 
generalised attack is now illustrated with the following example. 
Example 5.1. Let N = pq = 55465219, where p = 7927 and q = 6997. The signer 
chooses public key e = 5 such that gcd(e, r/J(n) = 55450296) = 1, and computes the 
private key d = 44360237 such that ed = 1 (mod t/J). Suppose the signer chooses 
element a =  55465218 of order t = 2. Let the message to be signed be m =  10, then 
the corresponding signature is S = me =  21 771958 (mod N). 
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Since 55465218 x 21 771958 = 33693261 (mod N), then the pair (10, 21 771958) and 
(Jl, 0 could be replaced with (10, 33693261) and (Ji, lj, and the verification will
pass with probability 1/t. 
Suppose the small exponent s = 2 is chosen, and since (aS/ = S the verification
would succeed. The batch verification may be seen as, 
If the small exponent s = 3 is chosen then the verification will fail, 
From the above example it is straightforward to extend the results for any 
selection of the small exponent and confirm that the failure probability will be lit. 
A similar attack may also be applied to the batch verifier Yen and Laih 
suggest for signatures generated using Fiat's Batch RSA. Specifically they suggest 
the following batch verification [YL95], 
n n 
IT s:, xe, = IT m:' modN . 
i=l i=l 
(9)
Once again, the results above may be applied to the verification criterion shown in 
equation (9) and the probability of failure will be l it. 
5.2.2 Harn's DSA Batch Verification 
Batch verification of DSA was first considered by Naccache et al. [NMRV94]. In 
order to have access to the required group elements for the small exponents test they 
consider a DSA signature variant in which reduction of one of the two signature 
components is delayed until after batch verification, (moreover, the reduction mod q 
destroys the group structure and their proof will longer apply). A similar application 
of the small exponents test was suggested by Bellare et al. [BGR98].  Both these 
algorithms will be considered in the next section where the general attack is given. 
However, first some explicit attacks on Ham's DSA batch verification are presented. 
Ham [Har98a] proposed an algorithm which is essentially a direct 
application of equation (7) to variants of DSA signatures. Specifically he considers 
the following signature algorithm. Primes p and q are chosen with q I p - 1 and a 
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generator of the group G of order q is published. A user's private key is a number x 
in Zq and the corresponding public key is y = gx mod p. A signature of a message m 
(again pre-processed by hashing) is a pair (r, s) where both r and s lie in Zq. A 
claimed signature pair is correct if the following verification equation holds, 
r = (gsr -
I mod q ymr -
I mod q modp) mod q. 
Now suppose that m1,  . . .  , m11 is a batch of messages with corresponding set 
of claimed signatures (r1 , s 1), . . .  , (r11, s11). Applying the multiplicative property, the 
following equation holds, which is also the proposed batch verification test, 
n "" s.r,-1 modq '\'" m.r,-1 modq IT li mod q = (gL.Ji=l I I YL.Ji=l I I mod p) mod q . 
i=l 
(10) 
The first observation is that this test can provide no more than screening. For 
suppose that a batch of correct signatures is known. Keep ri values the same and 
then choose the n - 1 values s'1 ,  . . .  , s'11_1 randomly and finally solve the equation 
n n 
""' ' -1 d ""' -1 d L.Js ; r; mo q = L...s;r; mo q ,  
i=l i=l 
to obtain the value s'11• Then the batch satisfies the test but none of the signatures are 
correct. In fact, all the remaining DSA variants hinted at in the paper [Ham98a] 
provide screening at best, again these are based on the same substitution. 
Now it is shown that the situation is compromised even further by an 
explicit attack. With high probability it is possible for an attacker, who is not the 
signer, to find signatures for any chosen message set. There is only one assumption 
in that the attacker has any known signature for this scheme: this gives values A, B 
and C, where A =  (gB ye mod p) mod q. Now suppose that the attacker has chosen 
two messages for signing, say m1 and m2 (the attack is easily generalised to any 
number of messages). The attack works by making the verification equation (1  0) the 
same as for the known signature. This is done in two steps. 
1 04 
1 .  Solve for n and rz to satisfy the following 
r1 rz = A  mod q, 
m1 r1-1 + mz rz-1 = C mod q. 
2. And, solve for s1 and s2 to satisfy 
-1 -1 B d s1 r1 + sz rz = mo q. 
The simultaneous equations m step 1 can be reduced to the quadratic
equation (m2/A)r/ - Cr1 + m1 mod q which can be solved by completion of the
square as long as the discriminant C - 4m1m2/A is a quadratic residue modulo q. On
the assumption that m1 and m2 are random (since they are the result of hashing) this 
will be the case with probability Y2. Step 2 can then be completed by choosing s1 
randomly and solving for s2• To illustrate the attack in operation a numerical 
example with small values will now be shown. 
Example 5.2. The system parameters are p = 23, q = 11  and g = 2. Suppose that 
Alice has private key x = 9 so the corresponding public key is y = 6. A signature on 
the message m = 5 is assumed to be known. If Alice chooses k = 7 then the 
signature pair is (2, 2). The verification equation checks that 2 = (2168 mod 23) mod
11. Since A = (gB ye mod p) mod q, then the attacker has values A = 2, B = 1, and C
= 8. 
Step 1 is to solve for r1 and r2, when r1 r2 = 2 mod 11 and m1 r1-1 + m2 r/ = 8 mod
11 . This succeeds for (m2/A)r/ - Cr1 + m1 mod q as long as the discriminant L1 = C:
- 4m1m2/A is a quadratic residue modulo 11. This is the case if the discriminant is a 
square, and hence a solution will exist for r1, 
� 2 4mlm2C ±  C - --
A 
'i = _ __,_ __ --=..:;_ 
2 -m_2 
A 
If the values m1 = 3 and m2 = 4 are chosen, then L1 = 7 which is a quadratic non­
residue and so there is no solution. However, ifmi = 5 and m2 = 6 then L1 = 4 and a 
solution can be found. Solvingfor r1 using the equation 3r/ + 3ri + 5 mod 11 = 0 
we obtain r1 = 9 or r1 = 1 and the corresponding values are r2 = 10 or r2 = 2.
Suppose we use the values r1 = 9 and r2 = 10, in step 2 we solve for SJ and s2, when 
s1 r/1 + s2 r2-1 = B mod q. First choose SI = 1 and then set s2 = 4 = (B - s1r1-1)r2
mod q. The pair of forged signatures for m1 and m2, which will pass the batch 
verification, is the batch instance (9, 1) and (1 0, 4). 
The attack can be generalised for any number of messages to be forged. In 
step 1 all but two of the ri values can be chosen randomly and then the remaining 
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two found by solving a quadratic equation as described above. Step 2 proceeds as 
above with all but one of the ri values chosen at random. It is interesting to note that 
this attack will not work if random small exponents are added to the verification 
equation. However, since there is no security proof it would be dangerous to rely on 
such a test. 
5.2.3 Batch Verification of Original DSA 
It is also briefly noted that the same general attack may be launched on the original 
DSS algorithm if any attempt is made to convert this to a batch verification scheme. 
If proposed, the verification criterion would look like, 
n 'V" nz.s�1 modq 'V" rs�1 modq fi 'i mod q = (gL..'=1 ' ' yL..'=1 ' ' mod p) mod q . 
i=1 
Now, a similar attack on Ham's scheme would also work here. In this case the 
solution is found using the simultaneous equations, 
r1 rz = A mod q, 
m1s1 -1 + mzsz-1 = B mod q, 
r1s1 -1 + rzsz-1 = C mod q. 
Again, when the discriminant � =  CZ - 4As1 -1s2-1 is a quadratic residue modulo q, a 
solution will exist for rz, 
� 2 -1 -1 C ±  C - 4As1 s2 
'2 = -1 2s2 
Fundamentally the ability to construct congurent simultaneous equations 
enables this attack to proceed. As such, this weakness becomes an important 
consideration in the development of any batch verification schemes. 
5.3 General Attack on the Small Exponents Test 
In this section it is demonstrated that the small exponents test described in Table 5 . 1  
is much less useful than it at first appears. It is shown that most of the proposed 
applications for the test are in fact, not appropriate at all. 
5.3.1 Attacking Batch Verification of DSA 
In order to explain the weakness the batch DSA verification proposed by Bellare et 
al. [BGR] is described. Note that this application was not included in the shortened 
version of the paper published at Eurocrypt '98  [BGR98] . As previously suggested 
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by Naccache et al. [NMRV94] the verification algorithm is not applied to the 
original DSA signature scheme but to a slightly altered version. 
The setting is again in a subgroup G of Z� of prime order q where a user's
private key is x E Zq, with public key y = gx E G. The signature of a pre-processed
message m is a triple (A., s, m) which satisfies the following verification equation, 
where r = A  mod q, 
The difference in the original DSA form is that A is replaced by r, and the 
verification equation is reduced modulo q. This means that the original DSA 
signature is only twice the size of q instead of the size of q plus the size of p in the 
revised version. Since typical sizes of p and q would be 1 024 and 160 bits 
respectively, this is a significant extra overhead which may be worthwhile for the 
computational gains of batch verification. Note that the modified version can easily 
be converted into an original DSA version at any time by replacing A with r. Bellare 
et al. applied the small exponents test to a batch of modified DSA signatures as 
shown in Table 5 .2. 
Given: Public parameters p, q, g a public key y, and a batch of claimed 
signatures: (A.� ,  s1 , m1), . . .  , (An, sn, mn) with si E Zq and Ai E G. Also a security
parameter l. 
Check: That Vi E { 1 ' . . .  ' n} : Aj = grn;s;
t modq yr;s;
t modq mod p . 
1 F . - 1 - -l d d b - -l "1 d . or z - , . . .  , n set ai - Si mi mo q an i si "'i mo q.
2. Pick w1 , . . .  , Wn E {0, 1 } 1 at random.
3 .  Compute A = "� a,.w,. mod q, B = " :' b,.w,. mod q, and R = IJ� J..ti ..L.tz=l .L.tz=l z=l 
4. If l ys = R then accept, else reject.
Table 5.2 Small Exponents Test for Batch Verification of Modified DSA 
The main observation of the algorithm is now clarified: at no time in the 
algorithm is it checked that the Ai values are actually within the group G as they are 
expected to be. Once this is observed it is straightforward to develop an attack. 
Similar to the attack on Yen-Laih's algorithm in section 5 .2 . 1 ,  the idea of the attack 
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is to replace one or more Ai values by -Ai and the signatures will be accepted with 
probability Yz.  Because the bi values in the test depend on A the attacking signer 
needs to choose A first and then find s. Specifically the signer proceeds as follows to 
run the attack with one or more values of the messages mi. 
1 .  Choose values ki randomly in Zq and set Li = li mod p. 
2. Set Ai = -Li modp, calculate r = Ai mod q and Si = k-1 (m + xr) mod q. 
3 .  Present (Ai, si, mi) to the verifier as a correct batch instance. 
In this case the verifier will find that 
gms-
1 
moctq y's-
1 
moctq mod p = gk mod p = L , 
and since L2 =A2 mod p this will go undetected if si is even which will occur with 
probability Yz. 
As with the attack on Yen-Laih, this attack can be generalised further by 
replacing A = aL mod p for an element a with any order t where t I p - 1 and t ::;; i. 
Again the simplest attack is to choose a which has order t = 2, although there will 
usually be many such t values that can be chosen. Then the signature will be 
accepted with probability 1/t. 
It is necessary to emphasise that this does not invalidate the theorem proven 
by Bellare et al. regarding the security of small exponents test since it is an 
assumption in Table 5 . 1  that the Yi values are in the group G. Furthermore, strictly 
the application is correct as long as the Ai values (Table 5.2) are in G, but the key 
argument presented here is that this is not a reasonable assumption that can be made 
in practice. 
5.3.2 Other Schemes Susceptible to the Attack 
Several other published schemes make essentially the same unjustified assumption. 
These include the earlier schemes of Naccache et al. [NMRV94] as well as the 
ElGamal variant proposed by Yen and Laih [YL95] . 
The N accache et al. scheme is attacked is the same way that the Bellare et al. 
scheme may be attacked. This is by substituting Ai values with -Ai, and following the 
steps shown in the previous section. 
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The ElGamal variant proposed by Yen and Laih [YL95], see Table 3 . 1 ,  may 
be thwarted using a technique based upon similar principles. An individual 
signature on m is generated by computing a =  gw (where w ER Zq), c = h(m 1 1  a), and
r = w + ex mod q. The signature (c, r) on message m may be verified by computing
a = g he mod p and checking that c = h(m 1 1  a).
Given: g a generator of the group G of order q, and (a1 , r1 ), (az, rz), . . .  , (an, rn)
with ci, ri E Zq, and ai E G. Also a security parameter l. 
Check: That Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : ai = gr; he;. 
1 .  Pick s1 , . . • , Sn E {0, 1 } 1 at random.
3 .  If A = gR he mod p then accept, else reject.
Table 5.3 EIGamal Variant 
In this case the scheme is attacked by substituting values ai with -ai, and 
using -ai to compute new values for ci, and hence ri. The specific steps are shown 
below. 
1 .  Choose values si randomly in Zq and set ai = gs; mod p.
2. Set l3i = -ai mod p, calculate Ci = h(mi 1 1 13D and ri = si +  CiX mod q.
3 .  Present (mi, l)i, ri) to the verifier as part of a correct batch instance.
Again the attack will work because the verifier will confirm that ci = h(mi 1 1 13i), and 
since a2 = 132 mod p verification will succeed with the false signature l3i when Si is
even; this will occur with probability of Yz. 
The alternative bucket test of Bellare et al. [BGR98] is also vulnerable to the 
same attack, since it basically consists of a series of small exponent tests run on 
random partitions of the batch. However, in many instances it will detect the attack 
with much higher probability than the small exponents test. The bucket test uses an 
additional parameter m and repeats lt + (m - 1 )  l times the partitioning and runs the 
small exponents test with parameter m in place of l. So a value A,i replaced by -'Ai 
will be detected with probability Y2 for every repetition, or 2-fll(m - I )l overall. This is
still much worse than the claimed probability of attack of T1• 
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An obvious way to ensure that the proof works is to check that the Yi values 
in Table 5 . 1  (which correspond to the Ai values in Table 5.2) are indeed in G, as 
required by the small exponents test. However, there does not appear to be any way 
to do this that does not totally negate the computational savings of the test. For 
example, to test directly that yl mod p = 1 would require n extra exponentiations. 
Note that it is not sufficient to check, for example, that the product of the Yi values 
are in the group G; for example -yi x -Yi + 1 will satisfy the check when this is clearly 
not part of a correct batch instance. 
The specific attack mentioned in section 5 .3 . 1  can be prevented by ensuring 
that elements aLi that are outside the group G are never moved back into the group 
G, and into a correct form, through exponentiation when the small exponent is 
applied. This could be achieved by ensuring that ( wi, p - 1 )  = 1 for all wi values in 
Table 5 .2. As long as only one Ai value has changed this will make the attack fail, as 
summarised in the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that one Ai value in Table 5.2 is of the form aA-i, where a fi! G 
and Ai E G while all other Ai values are correctly in G. Suppose also that the Wi 
values are chosen so that (wi, p - 1) = 1. Then R fi! G and so the small exponents 
test will fail. 
Unfortunately this does not provide a solution to the complete problem since 
more than one Ai value can be altered. For example, if two values of Ai have their 
signs changed then the test will pass if the two relevant si values are odd, which is 
always true if all the wi values satisfy ( wi, p - 1 )  = 1 .  This seems at first, to provide 
an insurmountable obstacle since if even values of wi are allowed then a single sign 
change will fool the test with probability Yz, while if even values are forbidden then 
two sign changes will fool the test. However, it will be shown that this problem may 
be solved with a particular choice of the modulus p. 
5.4 Repairing the Small Exponents Test 
The main problem in ensuring that the proof still holds is to avoid elements of low 
order in the 'large group' .  The element of order 2 is always present in z;, so it must 
be accepted that there may be sign changes in a batch that passes the test. In this 
section it is shown that through judicious choice of p it is possible to avoid any other 
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problems. More specifically, the idea is to avoid all elements of order t where 2 < t 
< i, in this way it is ensured that the probability of an incorrect value being accepted
will be at most 2-1•
5.4.1 Dealing with Prime Order Subgroups 
First of all it is assumed that p is chosen where p - 1 has no factors smaller than i, 
apart from 2. The modified form of the small exponents test is shown in Table 5 .4; 
the differences from that in Table 5 . 1 are small but significant. In particular there is 
no assumption that the Yi values lie in G. A consequence of this difference is that 
exponentiations are only known to be correct up to a possible multiple of - 1 .  This 
should be acceptable in most applications since it can always be corrected if a 
particular value is later found to be incorrect. 
Given: A generator g of G and (xi ,  YI), (x2, Y2), . . .  , (xn, Yn) with Xi E Zq and Yi E 
z;. Also a security parameter l. 
Check: That \:fi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : ±yi = gx; modp. 
1 .  Pick St, . . .  , Sn E {0, 1 }  1 at random.
2. Compute x = "� x .s . mod q and y = IJ� y�i ..L..z=l 1 1 z=l 1 
3 .  If gx = y then accept, else reject. 
Table 5.4 Modified small exponents test for batch verification of 
exponentiation 
The computational cost of the modified test is identical to that of Table 5 . 1 . 
Using an improved algorithm for multiexponentiation, Bellare et al. [BGR98] 
calculated the total cost of the test as l + n(l + l/2) multiplications plus the cost of 
the exponentiation. The exact cost will depend on the size of the values p, q, and l 
(in addition to the algorithms used for exponentiation and multi-exponentiation). 
Reasonable values today would be IPI = 1 024, lql = 1 60, and I ll =  60 bits.
* 
Theorem 5.1.  Suppose p is a prime and G a subgroup ofZp of prime order q. Ifp 
is chosen such that (p - 1)/2 has least odd prime factor a, such that a > i then the 
algorithm in Table 5.4 is a batch verifier which fails with probability at most 2-1•
1 1 1
The proof is basically similar to that of Bellare et al. for their small 
exponents test but there are a few extra problems to consider. Moreover, given a 
generator g of G, there exists a generator g0 of z; with g = g02r, where r = (p - 1 )/2q; 
note that one would normally compute g from g0• 
Proof. Suppose that g0 is a generator of z; and suppose, without loss of generality, 
that g = go2r. Then this can be written as Yi = gox'; for some x'i with 1 � x'i � p - 1 .  
Suppose that the test passes; then the following equation holds, 
Because g0 is a generator of z; the following is given 
2r(s1x1 + s2x2 + . . .  + SnXn) = x'1s1 + x'2s2 + . . .  + x'nsn mod (p - 1 )  
which may be re-written as the following, 
s1(x'1 - 2rx1) + s2(.x'2 - 2r.x2) + . . .  + Sn(X'n - 2rxn) mod (p - 1 )  = 0. {11) 
Suppose that for at least one value of i we have ±yi -:;t. gx;. Without loss of 
generality let us assume that i = 1 .  If it is supposed that the values of s2, • • •  , s11 have 
been chosen, then equation ( 1 1 )  is a linear equation in s1 and the number of solutions 
for s1 is either 0 or v = (p - 1 ,  2rx1 - x' 1) . Let a be the least odd prime factor of p - 1 ,  
then v can take any o f  the values in { 1 ,  2 ,  . . .  , (p - 1 )/a, (p - 1 )/2, p - 1 } , which are 
the divisors of p - 1 .  But the case of v = p - 1 means that 2rx1 = x' 1 mod (p - 1 )  so y1 
= go x'1 = go 2rx1 = gx1, which is assumed to be not true. 
The next largest case is v = (p - 1 )/2, so that we have either 2rx1 = x'1 mod (p 
- 1 )  or 2rx1 + qr = x'1 mod (p - 1 ) .  The former possibility is ruled out and the latter 
possibility means that y1 = g{1 = go2rx1+qr = -gx1 which is also assumed not to hold. 
The remaining cases do not satisfy the check so we need to show that they 
occur with small probability. The next largest case is v = (p - 1 )/a. Although in this 
case there are many solutions to equation ( 1 1 ), these solutions are evenly distributed 
in the sense that if X is any solution for s1 then X+ a is also a solution. Since a >  i, 
then there is at most one solution for s1 in the range 0 � s1 � i. For all other 
possible values of v fewer number of solutions will exist, hence a similar argument 
holds in the sense that there is at most one solution for s1 in the range 0 � s1 � i. 
Since s1 is chosen randomly the probability that equation 4 holds when ±y1 -:;t. gx1 is 
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thus at most T1• The same is true if all s1 , • • •  , sn are drawn independently and
randomly. 
Thus it has been shown that the test passes when the batch is not correct is at 
most T1•
Efficient methods to generate pnmes satisfying the conditions stated in 
theorem 5 . 1  have been described by Lim and Lee [LL97] . They suggest that to 
satisfy p - 1 = 2rq, where r and q are both prime, r should be chosen first and then 
random prime q, of the desired size, chosen until p is prime. For IPI = 1 024 only
around 7 1 0  trials for q will be required [LL97], which is a very practical 
requirement. 
5.4.2 Generalisation and Applications 
There are a number of ways that the modified small exponents test can be extended. 
A generalised form is given in Table 5 .5 ,  which applies to any cyclic group. This 
algorithm can only give assurance of the correctness of the batch up to multiplication 
by an element of order less than 2'. Therefore, in applications it will be useful to
ensure that the group order has as few small factors as possible. The following 
theorem says that the algorithm is a correct batch verifier. 
Theorem 5.2. The algorithm in Table 5.5 is a batch verifier which fails with 
probability at most 2-1.
Proof. The proof essentially involves showing that the number of solutions that 
exist are uniformly distributed in G and that the probability a correct solution is 
chosen is at most T1• Hence it is shown that an incorrect batch instance will only be
accepted with probability at most 2-1•
Let Yi = gx'; for some x'i with 1 ;::;; x'i ;::;; w. Suppose that the test passes. Then
we have 
x 2:::� x';s; modw g = g •=I •
Because g is a generator of G the following is given 
X1! SJ + . . .  + X'n Sn :::: (SI X! + . . .  + Sn Xn) mod W, 
which may be re-written as follows, 
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Sj (x '1 - XI) + . . .  + Sn (x'n - Xn) mod W = 0. (12) 
Suppose that for at least one value of i the check fails. Without loss of generality let 
us assume that i = 1 .  Now suppose that the values of s1 , • • •  , sn have been chosen. 
Then equation ( 12) is a linear equation in s1 and the maximum number of solutions 
for s1 is v = (w, x1 - x'1) .  However, these solutions are uniformly distributed since if 
X is one solution then X +  w/v is another solution. Therefore the maximum number 
of solutions in [0, i] is I vilw l. Two cases need to be distinguished. 
1 .  v � wli. In this case there is only one possible solution for s1 in [0, i] . Since 
s1 is chosen randomly this occurs only with probability T1• 
2. v > wli. In this case x - x' = k� for some integer � with �/w and � > wli. So 
y1 = gx'1 = lf3. Writing a =  g-kf3 then the order of a is w/� < i, so in this case 
ay1 = gx1 and the batch satisfies the check which is assumed not to be true. 
Thus it has been shown that if the check fails for (x1 ,  y1) then the test will pass only 
with probability 2-1 when s1 is chosen randomly for all choices of s2, . • •  , s11• 
Therefore the result also holds when all s1 , sz, . . .  , s11 are chosen randomly and 
independently. 
There are a number of useful applications of the modified small exponents 
test, this includes: 
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• DSA batch verification can be achieved by adapting the algorithm of Table 
5 .2 to verify the signature up to multiplication of each Ai by - 1 .  The 
algorithm is identical except, 
1 .  the requirement that p - 1 has no factors smaller than i apart from 2, and 
2. it is not assumed that the value Ai is in G. 
Of course the attack in section 5 .3 . 1  still holds so it is necessary to adapt the 
modified DSS algorithm so that (r, s, m) will be a correct signature if either 
or 
It seems intuitively reasonable that this extension to DSA signatures is as 
secure as the original DSA. 
• Bellare et al. [BGR98] have asked whether a batch verifier for
exponentiation can be found for z; rather than in a prime order subgroup.
The algorithm in Table 5.5 answers this question in the affirmative (up to
multiplication by - 1 )  with the condition that p - 1 has no small factors apart
from 2.
• Other groups, such as subgroups of cyclic elliptic curve groups where the co­
factor has few small factors, could also be used.
• The bucket test of Bellare et al. [BGR98] is an extension of the small
exponents test and it is immediate to extend the test in the same way. The
computational cost will be the same as that calculated for the original bucket
test.
Given: g a generator of a cyclic group G of order w and (x1 ,  YI), (x2, y2), . . .  , (xn, 
Yn) with Xi E Zw and Yi E G. Also a security parameter l.
Check: That "ii E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : ayi = gxi for some element a E G of order less
than i. 
1 .  Pick s1 , . . .  , Sn E {0, 1 } 1 at random.
2. Compute x = �� x,.s,. mod w and y = IJ�' y�' ..L...J,=I 1=! 1 
3 .  If gx = y then accept, else reject.
Table 5.5 Generalised small exponents test in any group 
5.5 The RSA Group Z*N 
The results shown above may equally apply to the RSA group z*;v. However, there 
exists some extra problems to effect the repair to the scheme. More precisely, the 
verifier must be convinced that the RSA modulus takes on a special form; whilst 
noting that the modulus form is generally kept confidential. Of course batch 
verifiers here are more valuable when the public key exponent e is chosen to be 
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much larger than e = 3 .  Furthermore, the notion of checking if elements exist in the 
group is foreign, since the order <J>(N) is unknown to the verifier. 
Given: e such that ed = 1 mod <J>(N) and (s� , mt), (s2, m2), . . .  , (sn, mn) with Si E 
z� and mi E z�. Also a security parameter /. 
Check: That "ii E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : ±si = md mod N. 
1 .  Pick Wt ,  . . .  , Wn E {0, 1 } 1 at random. 
2. Compute M= IT� m,�v, mod w and S = IT� s,�v, . z=l z=l 
3 .  IfS' = M then accept, else reject. 
Table 5.6 Small exponents test in the RSA group Z� 
As discussed in section 5 .2 . 1 ,  elements of low order may exist in the large 
group Z�. Hence the attack proceeds for the signer by choosing an element a of 
small order t, such that t < 21, and substituting one or more signatures Si with aSi; 
once more the attack will succeed with probability 1/t. A similar approach can be 
devised to repair the previous schemes, providing a strong batch verifier for RSA 
signatures. In this case the RSA modulus N = pq must be chosen with safe primes p 
and q, with p - 1 and q - 1 having no small factors other than 2, and some methods 
must be used to prove that N is of the correct form [BoyOO] . 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter several new weaknesses and attacks on batch verification techniques 
have been outlined. This has also included a general attack on batch verification, 
which affects most of the prominent schemes in the literature. It is also shown how 
this general attack may be avoided with a careful choice of the modulus and a 
weakening of the acceptance condition. These advances are then used to develop a 
new batch verifier for exponentiation in any cyclic group. 
In [BGR98] Bellare et al. concluded with several open problems. One of 
these problems was to 'devise fast batch verification algorithms for modular 
exponentiation in groups of non-prime order, and also devise such algorithms for the 
case of modular exponentiation with a fixed exponent rather than a fixed base' .  
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They suggest to 'begin looking at important special cases like z;, where p is prime 
or z*N where N is an RSA modulus ' .
The results of  this chapter have answered, in part, this issue for the case of 
z;, an approach for resolving the remaining cases is also provided. It follows that 
the repair to the general attack may be extended to the RSA group z*N, where P and 
Q are strong primes. 
With these modified assumptions to batch cryptography in mind some new 
cash schemes are now developed. The objective of this collaboration is to devise 
electronic cash protocols which are based upon an alternative paradigm for 
improving efficiency. 
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Chapter Six 
Light-Weight Electronic Coins 
"The chief cause of problems is solutions." 
� Eric Sevareid, 
Town & Country, 
1 979. 
6. Light-Weight Electronic Coins 
Chapter four demonstrated several new techniques to obtain a signature on a set of 
messages in a way that amortises the expensive operation over the input range. In 
this chapter these concepts are further developed by devising a new cash system that 
is suitable for small payments, such as in a micropayment environment. Whilst the 
computational effort for the customer is mitigated the scheme is designed to 
explicitly reduce the computational expense for both the bank and merchant. 
The proposed cash scheme is intended to provide light-weight coins for use 
in micropayment scenarios. The approach is innovative, in that each coin may be 
efficiently verified by the same or different merchant during a payment interaction. 
The scheme relies on a batch signature technique to efficiently sign and verify 
individually spent coins; coins may also be deposited in batch manner. The scheme 
outlined differs considerably from conventional micropayment schemes by servicing 
a number of cash-like properties, such as off-line payments, detection of double 
spent coins, and ability to spend at different merchants. Additionally, the scheme 
eliminates a number of processing overheads that are apparent to some existing 
micropayment schemes. The key property not provided, differentiating this scheme 
from true electronic cash, is customer anonymity; which is typically provided by a 
blind signature protocol. 
During coin withdrawal the cost of coin signing for the bank can be reduced 
by extension of the batch signing algorithms previously shown. The merchant 
however requires some additional tools to enable an efficient means to verify the 
bank's signature and ensure that the coin's structure is valid. Given that the 
merchant is required to provide coin verification and validation services for a wide 
customer audience it is important that such a procedure is efficient, particularly as 
the financial amounts being recognised may be relatively small. 
Before detailing the protocol of the new scheme the following section 
outlines the general mechanisms currently employed by a number of existing 
micropayment protocols. By viewing these techniques some comparisons can later 
be conducted. This is then followed by a description of how some batch signature 
techniques may be applied to devise a micro-payment scheme. The suggested 
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protocol, referred to as Microcash, is then described m detail, followed by a
characterisation of its security and efficiency. 
6.1 Electronic Coins for Small Payments 
Electronic commerce schemes appear to be carving three distinct markets within the 
virtual economy. This includes electronic cash, electronic payment, and electronic 
micropayment schemes. Electronic cash schemes are equipped with tangible objects 
that are analogous to real world cash, this is by way of notes and coins of some 
financial denomination. Some notable schemes are described in [Bra95 ,  CFN88,  
0091 ]  and exhibit a number of  additional properties over and above their electronic 
payment counterparts including transferability, untraceability, and divisibility. 
In the case of electronic payment, or macropayment, an approval or 
commitment is given for a financial amount. Essentially, the customer offers 
something which is akin to a signatory response of their commitment to a payment. 
Furthermore, the mechanism for extracting the payment for this commitment often 
forms part of the overall protocol. A salient list of such schemes includes [BGH95, 
EBC96, SET97], providing comprehensive signatory and commitment protocols, 
often with an associated financial collections mechanism, such as vendor specific or 
credit card accounts. Due to the associated costs of these schemes, both financial 
and computational, a lower bounds on the financial amount exists, making certain 
commercial applications impractical. As such a third breed has emerged offering a 
solution to this financial boundary, accommodating a commercial sector unreachable 
to macropayments. 
Micropayment schemes have evolved to address two problems remaining 
exposed by macropayments solutions, this is the cost of revenue collection and 
efficiency of payments. Given the frequency and financial amount associated with 
some charging mechanisms, it becomes impractical for certain schemes to deal with 
transaction processing and revenue collections of these small amounts. Basically, 
the relative financial and computational cost of performing the transaction is not 
worth the financial gain from the commitment. Secondly, payments must be created 
and verified efficiently by the customer and merchant respectively. General 
approaches to solve these problems include a roll-up of the smaller amounts into one 
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larger amount for an existing collections method, and to mitigate certain processing 
requirements to improve efficiency. 
In this chapter a new off-line cash scheme is proposed that provides an 
efficient protocol for conducting many small payments. Each coin in the scheme 
may be efficiently verified by independent merchants. With these ideas in mind, the 
following list describes the key properties of the new cash scheme: 
• Off-Line cash scheme offering efficient small payments. 
• Coins are not restricted by some form of validity period, as such there is no 
need to perform a coin return protocol for unspent coins. 
• No excessive precomputation activities, wastage of coins as found in other 
schemes. 
• Coins may not be double spent. 
• Coins may not be spent by a false identity claiming to be the withdrawing 
customer. 
• Unlike micropayment schemes, each coin may be verified independently by 
different merchants. 
• There is no requirement to check for coin replay. 
6.2 Micropayment Mechanisms 
A number of micropayment protocols have been proposed in the literature [GMA95, 
MVL97, HSW96, AMS96, RS96, Ped96, Riv97, BGH95, CTS95, Whe96] . Each 
scheme offers a unique solution that satisfies one or more requirements common to 
micropayment transactions. This includes computational efficiency, client 
responsiveness for rapid successive payments, and cost-effective commitment 
conversion. Some key mechanisms employed by these systems include hash chains, 
probabilistic inspections, and the avoidance of costly cryptographic primitives. 
6.2.1 Probabilistic Verification 
As the processing of individual transactions may be quite expensive, one efficiency 
approach is to perform processing on some random basis that yields an expected 
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result, such as lotteries or bets [Riv97, Whe96]. The idea is based upon the 
probability that a valid payment event may occur periodically. This takes place in a 
way that when a number of transactions are performed the value of the valid 
payment averages to a correct nominal amount. For example, one valid $ 1  0 payment 
over 1 ,000 payments averages to 1 �  per transaction. Here the customer forwards to 
the merchant some random payment, with a certain probability of being valid. Only 
on receipt of a valid payment does the merchant perform the normal processing. Of 
importance to such schemes is confidence that the probability of capturing the 
correct funds, over a number of transactions, is quite high. 
6.2.2 Redeemable Tokens 
Redeemable commitment tokens, such as coins, involve some precomputed activity 
conducted by some minting firm, such as a bank. The coins themselves must be 
assembled for quick and efficient verification. Some notable schemes rely on 
efficient hash operations for the verification and creation of redeemable tokens 
[AMS96, RS96, GMA95] . 
In MicroMint [RS96], an intricate hashing structure is employed to create 
redeemable coins. More precisely, a broker creates a coin which satisfies the 
property that k values all hash to the same result, i.e. a k-way collision. As such, 
verification is performed by validating that all the k values hash to some result y, 
h(x1) = h(x2) = . . .  = h(xk) = y.
In a similar fashion, Millicent [GMA95] also relies on the creation of broker 
redeemable tokens, referred to as scrip. The scrip token is comprised of two parts: a 
text scrip and a keyed hash of the scrip using a secret key. The merchant is able to 
verify a valid scrip by recomputing the hash of the scrip, with a mutually known 
secret key referred to as the scrip secret. The distribution of the secrets, however, 
requires additional cryptographic overheads if security is to be maintained. 
NetBill [CTS95] provides a comprehensive micropayment system providing 
an extensive set of security and product delivery services. The scheme uses 
symmetric cryptography to perform most operations; however there is still the need 
to perform an initial authentication using public key technology for obtaining 
authentication tickets. This initial authentication is only performed once, and its 
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impact is mitigated with a potentially large number of subsequent micropayment 
transactions that are verified using symmetric key technology. 
6.2.3 Hash Chains 
A number of independently devised schemes have an intrinsic hash chain 
construction [Ped96, RS96, HSW96, AMS96],  and some have augmented these 
capabilities [MVL97]. These systems are based upon the chained one-time 
password scheme introduced by Lamport [Lam8 1 ] .  In reference to micropayments, 
the concept is to build a series of payments Pi, for i = n down to 0, where the i1h 
payment is related to a previous payment in the form Pi = h(pi+J). 
The final, or root of the series is then signed8, and becomes the first 
commitment forwarded to the merchant. Subsequent commitments can be derived 
from the previous, and hence verified against the hash, or rather trust, chain to the 
root of the series (and the signed commitment). The efficiency gained is that only 
one signature verification is performed by the merchant on the initial exchange. 
Remaining commitments are then checked for their relationship to the previous 
iteration using a computationally efficient primitive, the hash transformation. 
A generalisation of the hash chain based schemes is presented in [JY96b], 
where random numbers form the leaves of a k-ary PayTree. The scheme outlined 
extends the functionality of PayWord in [RS96] ,  providing the ability to spend 'coin 
certificates ' with different merchants (under certain security assumptions). The 
protocol presented here also uses a tree-like construction, however the new scheme 
restricts the concept to a binary tree structure under a batch signature paradigm. 
6.2.4 Batch Cryptographic Techniques 
In chapter four a batch signature scheme is introduced using an alternative binary 
tree construction. The approach outlined did not impose the restriction that different 
relatively prime public exponents were required as in Fiat's scheme [Fia89]. 
Moreover, only one full sized exponentiation is required to sign several messages 
simultaneously. The cash scheme that follows applies the general approach of the 
binary tree to devise a new scheme suitable for small payments. 
8 In the various schemes, the signing entity may be the customer or another third party. 
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Given the frequency and repetitive nature of micropayments, it is important 
that verification of commitments or coins be done in an efficient manner. Moreover, 
many schemes generally avoid the use of exponentiation to verify coins, often at the 
expense of a weaker signatory commitment. The tree structured batch signature 
technique enables a number of small coins to be withdrawn in one execution of the 
protocol, each bearing individually a bank signature. Withdrawn coins may 
subsequently be used as small payments with the same, or with different merchants. 
In particular, when making payments, after some initial exponentiations only hash 
operations are required to verify the signature on each coin. 
6.2.4.1 Batch Tool for Signing and Verifying Coins 
Recall that in order to generate a signature for a set of messages, the hash of each 
message is placed at a leaf node of a binary tree. Each parent node is formed by 
concatenating each of its child nodes and hashing the result. This continues until the 
root node T is obtained where the final value is signed using a digital signature 
scheme. The signed root node, together with a residue then becomes the signature 
on a particular message. Whilst each message may be forwarded to different 
merchants for independent verification of the bank's signature, messages to the same 
merchant may make use of some initial operations performed. Moreover, a 
merchant interacting with a customer for several payments is able to re-use the 
modular exponentiation of signature verification for the first payment. Subsequent 
payments can be verified by the merchant by confirming the link to the root node of 
the tree and hence the bank's signature. 
A consequence of this observation is that verification at the merchant in this 
manner can be computationally reduced by only requiring the initial modular 
exponentiation for signature verification. Subsequent verifications may be 
reproduced by cheap hash operations. There are however, some collusion attacks 
possible which require some extra operations to be performed. 
6.3 Microcash 
There are several desirable properties that electronic cash schemes are suggested to 
possess. This typically includes anonymous payments, revealing the identity of a 
double spending party, the ability to conduct off-line payments, and verifiable by a 
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wide and distributed audience. In order to realise these properties in electronic cash, 
complex protocols are necessary so that devised schemes protect interested parties 
during the exchange of funds for a commercial transaction. It may be considered 
that perhaps the anonymous property of electronic cash is somewhat undesirable to 
financial institutions and law enforcement agencies. As such some newer schemes 
offer an owner tracing facility so that payments are not truly anonymous but is only 
guaranteed where no suspicious behaviour is observed. Another alternative in this 
pursuit is the removal of anonymity; this proposition may appear to be acceptable to 
customers particularly as present day credit card transactions, accounting for the 
majority of cash transactions, do not conceal the customer's financial audit trail.  
Insofar as micorpayments are concerned the notion of anonymous payments 
IS further alienated. Certainly the presently devised schemes do not provide 
anonymity, in fact further general restrictions quite often apply. Hence cash that is 
no longer anonymous is no longer required to enlist several other cash properties 
such as identity revelation when coin double spending occurs. This enables simpler 
protocol constructions. However it would be useful to preserve some other desirable 
properties of electronic cash, such as off-line payments and in particular address 
some of the restrictions posed by micropayments schemes. 
Using the tree structured batch signature, coins may be withdrawn in batch 
alleviating the computational expense at the bank. When payments are made to a 
merchant further computational relief is provided by amortising expensive 
operations over several payments to the same merchant. Using such a technique and 
eliminating the requirement for anonymity in electronic cash, the resulting scheme 
provides several cash like properties that may be suitable to many micropaying 
scenarios. 
The following section outlines the Microcash scheme, where the bank 
efficiently signs a sequence of coins using the binary tree construction outlined in 
chapter four. In order to make a micropayment, the customer must be able to 
respond to merchant requests for incremental payments, or provide a number of 
successive and timely payments. In either case, the merchant is required to make 
rapid verifications of the submitted payments and the customer must be able to 
respond with such payments quickly. The following scheme enables both the 
merchant and customer to make a series of payments in a manner comparable in 
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efficiency to micropayment schemes. This is achieved whilst providing several 
additional properties typically reserved for anonymous off-line electronic cash. 
6.3.1 Setup and Environment 
The bank may employ any signature scheme to sign Microcash coins; a suitable 
choice would be the RSA signature scheme [RSA 78] . The bank publishes its public 
key. In fact different public keys (for example using different RSA public 
exponents) should be used by the merchant and bank to represent the number of 
coins within each Microcash batch. The bank signature on a message m will be 
denoted cr(m), and there will be a corresponding verification function Ver(m, S) 
which outputs 1 ifS is a valid signature on m, or 0 otherwise. 
For a discrete log protocol, choose large primes p and q where q divides (p -
1 ), and a generator g E z;, of order q; for the purpose of Microcash p and q could be
set to 1 60 and 1 024 bits respectively. Use is also made of a suitable collision 
resistant one way function h. 
Each coin is identified by a random token ti, a proof value b, and its 
associated signature cr(ti, b) = (S, L1i). For the purposes of deposit, a batch of coins is
identified by (ti, . . .  , l_j, b) and signature cr(l_j, . . .  , l_j, b). Using algorithm 2 from
chapter four to recompute the root node, the set of coins is confirmed to be valid if 
Ver(T', S') = 1 .
The merchant confirms that the customer presenting the coins took part in the 
withdrawal protocol when the customer is able to prove knowledge of the secret 
value w with respect to the proof value b. 
6.3.2 Withdrawal Protocol 
The customer, after proving their identity to the bank over an authentication channel, 
chooses w E R  Zq, computes b = gw mod p, and chooses the random seed s. The
commitments that may then be used as cash are formed. The customer proceeds to 
compute the values t1 = h(s) and ti = h(ti_1), for i =  1 to n, where the initial seed s is
used to calculate a sequence of seed values by recursively hashing. This sequence of 
coins is akin to the chain of commitments generated by other micropayment schemes 
reliant upon hash chains but this is not a necessary requirement of Microcash; for 
instance a pseudo random number sequence generator could be used. When the 
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sequence of seed tokens have been generated the customer then forms a binary tree 
structure with the values mi = h(ti 11 b) forming the leaf nodes. These are recursively 
hashed until the root node T is formed. The root node is then forwarded to the bank 
for signing. 
The bank initially confirms that the root value T is unique. This ensures that 
each batch of coins in circulation is unique, and that double spent coins may be 
detected later during deposit. The bank then signs the batch of coins using one full 
signature operation S = cr(1), and returns the signed result to the customer. The 
public key parameters of the designated signature scheme may also be used to define 
the number of coins being withdraw. Whilst the customer may actually calculate, 
and receive a signature, on more coins within T, the invalid coins are detectable by 
the merchant during the payment. 
Customer 
Choose s, w ER Zq 
b = gw modp 
Generate set of coins: 
t1 = h(s) 
ti = h(ti _J), for i =  2 to n 
mi = h(ti 11 b), for i = 1 to n 
Compute root node T 
Verify Bank Signature: 
Ver(T, S) =? 1 
Store S, s, and b. 
T 
s 
Figure 6.1 Withdrawal Protocol 
Bank 
Check T is unique. 
S =  cr(1) 
Upon receipt of the signed tree S, the customer verifiers that the bank has 
correctly signed the sequence of coins by verifying that the coins bear the bank's 
signature. Figure 6. 1 illustrates this efficient two move protocol. Note that the bank 
effort for signing an arbitrary number of coins remains constant. 
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On completion of the withdrawal protocol the customer has at their disposal 
a sequence of Microcash coins, each one uniquely identified by (ti, b) with 
corresponding signature cr(ti, b) = (S, �i). The Microcash may now be spent 
independently, and in off-line manner, with different merchants or with the same 
merchant as required. Coins must be spent however, from the last coin identified by 
(tn, b) as the first payment. 
6.3.3 Payment Protocol 
The payment protocol consists of a proof phase that involves modular 
exponentiation, a payment phase that relies only upon efficient hash operations, and 
an infrequent periodic range check. The initial proof phase may also be used to 
forward the first payment from the customer. Fundamentally, the proof phase is 
used to confirm the bank's signature on the coins and that the presenter of the coins 
took part in the withdrawal. The range check is required to prevent a cheating 
scenario whereby two merchants collude to deposit the same coins, this is described 
under the security analysis. 
The customer initially establishes contact with the merchant, identified by Im, 
and agrees to use a service whereby a number of incremental small payments are 
required. To commence payment using Microcash coins, the customer identifies the 
highest sequenced unused pair (ti, b) as the first payment. The associated signature 
is then selected by identifying the unique residue for (S, mi), using algorithm 1 of 
chapter four. The customer forwards to the merchant the coin (ti, b), and 
corresponding signature cr(ti, b). Note that the formation of the unique signature cr(ti, 
b), may be precomputed. At the same time the customer forwards to the bank the 
commitment value y = gu mod p, for a random secret value u E R  Zq. 
The merchant proceeds to verify the bank's signature on the com, and 
confirms that the customer did in fact take part in the withdrawal protocol as part of 
the proof phase of the protocol. To verify the bank signature on a Microcash coin, 
the merchant recomputes the root value T ' using algorithm 2 and checks that the 
verification Ver(T ', cr(1)) = 1 ,  using the bank's public key. To confirm that the 
customer took part in withdrawal protocol the merchant also computes the challenge 
c = h(dt 11 Im 11 ti 11 b) using the current date-time dt. In order to demonstrate 
knowledge of the secret value w, the customer forwards to the merchant the response
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value r = w + cu mod q. This is Schnorr's protocol for proof of knowledge of a 
discrete logarithm [Sch9 1 ] .  
Customer 
Precompute: 
ti = h(ti- 1) 
mi = h(ti 1 1  b) 
Compute /1i 
Choose u ER Zq 
y = gu modp 
r =  w +  cu mod q 
ti = h(ti-1) 
mi = h(ti 1 1  b) 
Compute /1i 
c 
r 
continue (yes/no) 
(ti, b), cr(ti, b) 
- - - - - � 
t 
Merchant 
mi = h(ti ll b) 
Compute T' 
Ver(T', cr(J)) =? 1 
C = h( dt 1 1  I m 1 1  ti 1 1  b) 
Check: 
g =? ye b modp 
Payments 
mi = h(ti 11 b) 
Compute T" 
Check: � T" =? T' 
Figure 6.2 Payment Protocol 
If both the verification and knowledge check g =? ye b mod p hold during the 
proof phase, then the merchant accepts the initial payment and allows the customer 
to continue using the service. After this initial payment, subsequent payments do not 
require any exponentiations during signature verification. Rather, the merchant is 
only required to recompute T", using the signature residue of the next payment (ti, b) 
cr(ti, b). Specifically, the merchant checks that the signature residue /1i and coin (ti, 
b) can be used to recreate a root node T", such that T "  = T ', (note that T '  has been 
computed previously during the proof phase). Thus only three small exponentiations 
are required during the proof phase, whilst the subsequent payments are validated 
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usmg a number of efficient hash operations. Using this technique, the effort 
expended to verify the first coin is spread over the total number of coins spent. This 
procedure is shown in Figure 6.2. 
The customer may decide to compute the challenge for himself (in which 
case y should be included in the hash), or the merchant may wish to forward this 
value with some additional information. The customer must also ensure that the 
random challenge provided by the merchant is unique otherwise the ability for 
colluding merchants to reveal the proof value w is given. Furthermore, the response
value may be sent together with the next payment, in anticipation of a favourable 
result during the proof phase. 
Customer 
Choose u' ER Zq 
y' =  gu' modp
c'= h(dt' l l lm 1 1 ti 1 1 b l l y) 
r' = w + c'u'mod q (c', r', y), (ti, b), cr(ti, b) 
Figure 6.3 Range Challenge 
Merchant 
Check: 
c' =? h(dt' 11 lm 11 ti 11 b I I Y) 
g' =? y' c' b modp
During the course of customer payments, it is necessary for the merchant to 
obtain intermittent authentication of the range of payments made. This is achieved 
by performing, by some periodic instance (perhaps probabilistically, for example on 
average every 50 payments), a similar challenge-response used during the proof 
phase, see Figure 6.3 . The merchant must verify the range check returned by the 
customer to prevent the customer from successfully double spending; see the 
security analysis below for details of merchant collusion or customer attacks. When 
multiple range response pairs are provided during the course of a paying 
engagement, only the last pair is required for deposit and needs to be retained by the 
merchant. 
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6.3.4 Deposit Protocol 
During deposit, see Figure 6.4, the merchant is able to obtain funds for the 
Microcash spent by the customer. Furthermore, the coins spent by a customer may 
be redeemed in batch, minimising the processing overheads for the bank and 
merchant during funds capture. 
Merchant 
Select signature residue for spent coins: 
Compute 11i . .  j 
Forward payment transcripts: 
(ti, . . .  , f_j, b), cr(ti, . . .  , f_j, b), (y, c, r, y', c', r', Im, dt, dt') 
Figure 6.4 Deposit Protocol 
Bank 
For each ti do: 
mi = h(ti 11 b) 
Verify Signature: 
Compute T' 
Ver(T', cr(T)) =? 1 
Verify Merchant: 
C =? h(dt 11 lm 11 fi 11 b) 
Verify Customer: 
g =? ye b modp 
Check Range: 
c' =? h(dt' 11 Im l l ij 1 1 b l l y') 
g' =? y•c' b mod p 
For each coin to be redeemed a transcript of the payment is forwarded to the 
bank by the merchant. This includes each coin spent (ti, b), of which there may be 
multiple instances, the signature associated with the batch of coins cr(ti, . . .  , f_j, b) = 
(S, 11i . .  j), of which there is a single instance, two challenge-response values (one 
each, for the proof phase and last range check), date-time(s) and merchant identity 
associated with the batch (c, r, y, c', r', y', Im, dt, dt}. Where multiple coins are being 
deposited the merchant is not required to provide the associated signature for each 
coin. In fact, the merchant may provide one bank signature by identifying the nodes 
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from each of the batch residues (i.e. nodes of the binary tree) that are sufficient for 
the bank to verify its own signature, i.e. /::,.i . .  J· It may be the case, that the bank may
wish to perform this pruning activity and accept each signature instance from the 
merchant. 
After confirming that each coin instance (ti, b) is unique within the database,
the bank will then proceed to verify the validity of the coins. This involves checking 
four proofs. First the bank's  signature must be verified, next the bank must confirm 
that the original (authentic) customer who withdrew the coins was the entity 
involved in the payment transaction, thirdly the bank also confirms that the merchant 
depositing the coins was also involved in the payment transaction, and finally the 
range of coins spent is checked. 
In a similar fashion to the customer and merchant, the signature on the 
deposited coins is verified by the bank recomputing the root node T 1 and checking
that T 1 = � mod n holds. The bank confirms that the merchant took part in the
payment protocol, by observing that the merchant identity Im is associated with the 
challenge c. To authenticate the customer the bank confirms that the customer can 
prove knowledge of a representation of y with respect to g, i.e. the customer knows 
the secret value w. And finally, the bank confirms that the deposited range of coins
is correct by checking the range pair supplied by the merchant. This second pair is 
used to discourage customer or colluding merchants from defrauding the system. 
After a certain time, when all the coins have been recaptured, the bank will 
remove T as being in circulation, and once again will allow some customer to
withdraw coins using this batch value. 
6.4 Security 
The security of the various constructs making up Microcash are now reviewed. This 
is accomplished by first noting that the security analysis in chapter four of the batch 
signature scheme also applies here. It follows then that each coin may be verified 
individually by checking the bank signature represented as cr(ti, b). There are 
however, a number of additional protocol constructions that require a more detailed 
examination. 
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6.4.1 Range Check and a Collusion Attack 
The first challenge-response pair confirms to the merchant that the customer is the 
owner of the coins. Additionally, this authenticates the initial coin spent by the 
customer. However without some form of final authentication of the finishing point, 
the range of coins spent is not established. Considering the case that no 
authentication of the coin range takes place, there are two cheating scenarios: 
1 .  Customer spends coins t1 , • • •  , lj with merchant A. Customer then goes to 
merchant B and starts with ti, where i > j. This means the customer is 
cheating by double spending ti, . . . , lj. 
2. Customer spends coins t1 , . . .  , ti-J with merchant A. Customer then spends 
coins from ti down to lj with merchant B. Merchant B gives ti, . . .  , lj to 
merchant A, who may claim payment for t1 , • • •  , lj. 
At deposit time both cases are indistinguishable! To overcome this the 
customer must periodically provide the merchant with a range proof. During the 
course of payments a number of these range proofs may be provided, however only 
the final proof need be retained by the merchant and supplied during deposit. 
Depending on the frequency of range checking, the possibility exists for the 
customer to cheat a small amount. Considering that a cheating customer will be 
identified, and that the relative financial gain is too small, defrauding the system 
would be unattractive. This type of fraud is perhaps similar to credit card fraud 
where the perpetrator is also detectable. Given that credit card fraud appears to be 
financially manageable, the (significantly) smaller financial amounts at risk in 
Microcash are justifiable. 
6.4.2 Double Spent Coins 
When the bank detects that a coin (ti, b) has been previously deposited, the bank first 
determines whether the coin is within the committed range. Noting that the scheme 
is not anonymous, the guilty party may determined by observing whether the 
challenge differs; the same challenge implicates the customer, otherwise the 
merchant. If however, the coin is beyond the committed range, then it is either the 
customer or colluding merchants who may be guilty. Regardless of the guilty party 
in this instance, it is the second depositing merchant who does not recover the funds. 
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To a pair of colluding merchants fraud is not attractive, as detection of the 
same coin is easy and the bank will not supply the funds. A customer however may 
be able to cheat successfully, the amount that may be cheated is controlled by the 
merchant with the frequency of the periodic range check. The relative gain though, 
will not be worth being exposed as a potential cheat. 
6.5 Efficiency of Scheme 
The efficiency of the new scheme is now analysed, paying particular attention to the 
efficiency of the payment transaction, as it is most important that the payment 
protocol be performed in a timely and efficient manner. Unless otherwise stated 
precomputed values (such as y) are ignored, additionally the hash operations during
the withdrawal and deposit protocols are ignored; these are considered in more detail 
during payment. The new scheme is then compared to some other well-known 
micropayment schemes, demonstrating comparable efficiency whilst Microcash 
fields a number of additional cash-like properties. 
It is assumed that the RSA modulus n is 1 024 bits, p and q are 1 024 and 1 60 
bits respectively, and the hash function produces a digest of 1 60 bits in length. 
Although the size of parameters are set to those required of full cash systems, in 
practice these may be lower given the small financial amount of each coin. 
6.5.1 Complexity 
During withdrawal the merchant is only required to perform one RSA modular 
exponentiation to sign an arbitrary number of coins. The customer performs one 
modular exponentiation to compute b, and the more efficient RSA verification 
exponentiation to verify the bank's signature on all coins withdrawn. A total of 148 
bytes is transmitted between the customer and the merchant. The customer is only 
required to provide storage for 1 68 bytes (for S, s, and b). 
Let us first consider payment by assessing the hash operations performed 
during each payment. An initial modular multiplication/addition is required during 
the proof, and an arbitrary number of additional modular multiplications/additions 
are required for range checking (perhaps 1 for every 50 payments). The customer is 
required to perform at most 1 .5n hash operations to create the coin and its signature 
for each payment. This can be reduced to n/2 operations if the child node of the root 
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node, not in the path of the coin, is stored (this will be at a cost of 20 bytes storage). 
Furthermore, much of the work here can be precomputed, and optimised 
significantly further if more intermediate tree nodes are stored. The merchant 
processing involves one RSA verification and two discrete log modular 
exponentiation during the proof phase. In addition to the proof, the recreation of the 
binary tree using the supplied coin and signature residue is required for each coin 
payment, this costs O(log n) hash operations9. A probabilistic range verification is 
also required. If follows that the cost of verification is generalised to O(log n) hash 
operations, with the effort of three modular exponentiations amortised over a large 
number of successive efficient payments. The additional range verifications 
contribute an additional 2 modular exponentiations for every 20 to 50 payments, 
where the specific frequency is determined by the merchant. As such, there is an 
efficiency versus security trade-off that is determined by the merchant. 
During the deposit transaction the merchant requires no specific processing 
other than a selection process to identify the required signature residue nodes to be 
supplied for the coin(s) to be deposited. Similar to the merchant, the bank performs 
four discrete log exponentiations and one RSA verification. Additionally, 
approximately O(log n) hash operations are required to build the binary tree. This of 
course can be performed off-line some time after the payments have been made, 
perhaps at the end of each billing day. 
6.5.2 Comparative Analysis 
Microcash is now compared to several well known micropayment schemes. 
Specifically, the schemes of PayWord [RS96], Millicent [GMA95] ,  and MicroMint 
[RS96] shall be contrasted. During the comparison it is assumed that RSA 
signatures are used for the bank's signature on coins. The following list summarises 
the properties of the Microcash scheme. 
• Coins may be spent at different merchants, 
• Microcash is a debit based scheme, 
• Microcash is an off-line scheme, 
9 For example, if the batch consists of I ,000 coins only 1 1  hash operations are required for verification. 
1 3 6  
• No wastage of computational activities,
• No protocol is necessary to redeem unspent coins,
• Coins do not have an expiry period 10,
• Coins may not be stolen or replayed, and
• No additional security mechanisms are required.
The PayWord scheme relies on the creation of a sequence of commitments 
which are vendor specific (cannot be used with any other vendor). During 
commitment generation, equivalent to withdrawal of the new scheme, the customer 
creates a sequence of commitments and signs the root, this requires one RSA 
modular exponentiation. When making payments the merchant verifies the 
customer's signature on the PayWord sequence, and verifies the brokers signature on 
the customers certificate: this consumes two RSA verifications. To confirm each 
payment only one hash operation is required, furthermore each payment is 20 bytes 
in length. The new scheme is more expensive in computation during payment, 
however several additional functional advantages are provided: 
• PayW ord coins are merchant specific, whilst Microcash coins may be spent
with any merchant.
• PayW ord coins expire at the end of each day. Microcash coins do not have
this restriction.
• PayWord is primarily intended as a credit based scheme, a debit based
version would expose signed PayW ords to theft.
Millicent [GMA95] relies on the creation of vendor specific scrip, obtained 
from a broker. The scrip tokens comprise two parts: a text scrip and a keyed hash of 
the scrip using a symmetric scrip secret key known by the merchant and customer 
alike. The distribution of the secret key requires some additional cryptographic 
protocol overheads if security is to be maintained, this will decrease the efficiency of 
10 Under some payment circumstances this feature may be a desireable requirement, for these systems Microcash 
can easily be modified to accomodated such an expiry period. 
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the scheme. Additionally, Millicent requires that the broker is on-line during the 
payment transaction. The following list summaries these properties: 
• Millicent coins are only valid for a specific vendor, Microcash coins may be 
spent with any merchant. 
• Unspent Millicent coins must be presented at the bank in a coin return 
protocol to obtain unspent funds. 
• Millicent coins have an expiration date, and customer must renew or cash in 
unused scrip; no such expiration applies to Microcash coins. 
• Millicent is an on-line protocol. 
The MicroMint scheme is similar to Microcash in that coins are generated 
which may be spent at any merchant. MicroMint coins are represented as a k-way 
hash function collision, a 4-way collision is suggested as reasonable. To create 
coins, equivalent to a Microcash withdrawal, the broker must engage in extensive 
computation of hash transformations to find 4-way collisions. For example, to 
create 230 coins, approximately 254 hash computations are required, and 128 
gigabytes of storage for 230 coins. Each coin expires at the end of the month, so the 
minting process must be done monthly. Conversely, an arbitrary number of coins 
may be signed in each Microcash withdrawal, hence no lengthy precomputation is 
required and no expiry time need be observed. During payment a MicroMint coin is 
forwarded to the merchant, who performs k hash operations to check if the coin is 
good, i.e. k-way collisions. The bank performs similar processing during deposit. To 
prevent theft of MicroMint coins additional encryption primitives such as private 
and symmetric key technologies are suggested, or user-specific coins may be 
introduced. Both these techniques will contribute to a decrease in efficiency. 
Summarising the properties of the scheme: 
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• Micro Mint coins expire at the end o f  each month. 
• MicroMint requires a lengthy precomputation phase. 
• MicroMint coins may be stolen and replayed, additional cryptographic 
mechanisms are required to protect the scheme from theft. Microcash coins 
cannot be stolen and used by other parties. 
• Signatures are not used in MicroMint thus cheaters cannot be pursed in court.
• Unused MicroMint coins are no longer tenable and constitute non-productive
processing.
The following table, Table 6. 1 ,  summarises the properties and supported features of 
Microcash and the well known schemes reviewed. 
Microcash Payword Millicent Micro mint 
Non-specific to Merchants -/ -/ 
Supports Debit Based -/ -/ -/ 
Of -line Payments -/ -/ -/ 
Avoid Computation Wastage -/ -/ 
No Redemption Protocol -/ * 
Expiry Period Not Required -/ 
Protection from Theft -/ * -/ 
Replay Protection -/ * -/ 
* Partially supported feature ofPayword only; supported when used as a credit based scheme. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of Micropayment Schemes 
6.6 Some Extensions to Microcash 
Since the merchant may deposit coins in batch manner, it follows that a similar 
protocol may be adopted by both the customer and merchant that enables the 
payment of multiple coins during one transaction. Hence, payments can be made 
one coin at a time, or can be made with multiple coins spent at a time. This can be 
quite useful in providing a protocol for exact payment of amounts in a single 
execution of the protocol. 
Where an RSA signature scheme is used, it is straightforward for the 
customer to blind the coins from the bank using an RSA blinding factor. Later the 
customer can obtain all coins by dividing out the blinding invariant. However, a 
further technique is required to allow the bank to reveal the customer's  identity if he 
double spends. Two ways to achieve this include owner tracing and embedding the 
customer's identity within each coin. All known protocols to achieve this incur a 
significant computational penalty, which may render the scheme inappropriate for 
small payments. 
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The range check conducted during payment is a computational overhead to 
prevent the collusion attack described. Whilst fraudulent payments will be 
detectable the offending party may not be distinguished. It may be noted that one of 
the two participating parties will be guilty. As such, if the activity is repeated it 
would be a straightforward process to determine that the common party is guilty of 
fraud, unless of course it is always the same two parties in which case both accounts 
may be terminated by the bank. Given that the relative financial loss may be small it 
may be acceptable that these losses are absorbed by merchants. This is in the 
knowledge that parties involved in any suspect payments will be monitored for 
repeat offenses. Furthermore, the fact that this an observable behavior, may be 
sufficient to deter any attempts at double spending. Under these circumstances the 
scheme may be very practical without the range check. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented a practical off-line electronic cash system for conducting 
a number of efficient small payments. The scheme offers a number of cash-like 
properties, such as off-line coin validation and merchant independence whilst 
maintaining the efficiency required of small successive payments. The coins are 
light-weight in terms of the relatively low computational cost when compared to 
conventional electronic cash schemes. The batch signature techniques are applied in 
a novel way to provide this efficiency, which allows the withdrawal of several coins 
at once, each bearing their own signature from the bank. A comparison to some 
micropayment systems demonstrates that the efficiency of the new scheme is 
comparable. This is achieved whilst providing a number of additional cash-like 
properties. 
Some extensions discussed involve the inclusion of some additional 
properties usually found in anonymous electronic cash protocols, namely anonymity 
and revealing the identity of a double spending party. The next chapter explores 
these ideas more fully by introducing a cash scheme based upon a broad selection of 
tools available in batch cryptography. 
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Chapter Seven 
Non-Divisible Electronic Coins 
"A scholar who loves comfort is not fit to be called a scholar" 
� Confucious, 
Analects, 
d.479 B.C.
7. Non-Divisible Electronic Coins 
The previous chapter introduced several new ideas from which a new cash system 
was developed. The scheme illustrated how a batch signature can be used to 
withdraw several coins efficiently. In this chapter, these concepts are further 
explored by devising an anonymous off-line cash system that uses several 
homomorphic verification techniques to assist in the validation of multiple coins 
during payment and deposit. Suitably modified here, these primitives provide the 
opportunity to construct some new cash schemes that operate more efficiently than 
their predecessors. Specifically, it is possible to use a batch signature to withdraw 
multiple coins, and to present these to merchants during the payment protocols. 
Furthermore, by modifying some well known batch verifiers, multiple coins that are 
presented during one execution of the payment protocol may be authenticated in 
batch. 
The naive approach to signature generation is initially applied to demonstrate 
how the Brands cash scheme may be extended to improve the efficiency of 
withdrawal. Then some homomorphic batch verifiers are modified to illustrate how 
more efficient validation of coins may be accomplished during the payment and 
deposit transactions. Using these basic tools, a more formal cash scheme is 
constructed that utilises the tree adaptation of the batch signature scheme, at each 
point confirming the security of the proposed techniques. The resulting cash model 
is shown to be comparable to the most efficient divisible coins schemes, whilst 
providing an alternative model for building electronic cash systems. 
7.1 Motivation and Basic Ideas 
Electronic cash has been witness to much activity over the past several years [Bra93 , 
Fer93 ,  Fer93a, NMV97, 0089, 009 1 ,  Oka95, CFT98].  It is however, still largely 
restricted to the domains of research and development initiatives. One factor 
influencing this impasse is the inability of commercial entities to conduct electronic 
cash transactions in an efficient manner. 
In this chapter a new electronic cash system is proposed that provides 
efficient withdrawal and payment, and exhibits computational advantages for 
deposit. The scheme differs considerably to other forms of electronic cash in that it 
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does not rely on divisibility for improving efficiency when dealing with multiple 
coms. Rather, an alternative approach is illustrated where electronic coins are 
withdrawn and spent using protocols that employ batch signers and batch verifiers. 
It is shown that the efficiency of the new scheme exceeds previous solutions [Bra93, 
OKA95] and is comparable to the most efficient electronic cash protocols that 
employ a divisible coin structure [CFT98].  The fundamental protocols are based 
upon the restrictive blind signature schemes introduced by Brands [Bra93] and the 
batch signature and verification technologies discussed in chapters three and four, 
whilst observant of the weaknesses and attacks identified in chapter five. 
A batch signature generation procedure is able to improve the efficiency of 
the blind signature generated by the bank in the withdrawal protocol. In effect, batch 
signatures allow many coins to be withdrawn using the one withdrawal procedure. 
The computational expense to the bank under this model is equivalent to just one 
blind signature. There is an associated cost with this approach that results in a 
marginal increase in the size of coins; for the naive approach this increases linearly 
with the number of coins withdrawn and logarithmically for the improved variant. 
During payment of the original scheme, the merchant must execute the 
protocol for each coin to be verified and checked. This interaction may also be 
improved by applying various homomorphic batch verifiers to improve the 
representation checks. These tools increase the efficiency for the merchant when 
verifying many coins simultaneously. In addition, the general technique of allowing 
multiple coins to be exchanged in a single payment enables a customer and a 
merchant to conduct transactions of exact change. When conducting the deposit 
protocol, similar benefits may also be obtained by the bank to that realised during 
the payment protocol by the merchant. 
To give an understanding of the non-divisible cash model, some basic 
protocols are established by applying some straightforward techniques, then the full 
cash scheme is presented. 
7.2 Extension of Schnorr Signature Scheme 
In chapter four a naive batch signature was shown for RSA. This may be applied to 
the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch9 1 ]  in a similar way so that a set of messages may 
be combined into one batch for signing. The batch signature and the individual 
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messages may be forwarded to n different parties for individual verification. This 
variation is also shown to be as secure as the existing Schnorr signature scheme, 
again with an appropriate choice ofhash function. 
Recalling that the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch9 1 ]  works in the set of 
integers modulo p, for a large prime p. An element g is selected which has order q, 
where q is a prime dividing p - 1 mod p. A signer is able to generate a signature (c, 
r) on the message m as follows. 
a = gw mod p where w is a random element and 1 � w � q 
c = h(m 11 a) 
r = cx + w mod q 
Verification of a claimed signature is accomplished by checking that the 
value c = h(m 1 1  gr he mod p). Now, by applying the naive hatching idea (shown for 
RSA in chapter four), it is possible to sign and verify a set of messages with the 
following steps. 
1 .  Generate signature on the set of messages {m1, m2, . . .  , mn} :  
a = gw mod p where w is a random element and 1 � w � q 
C = h(ho(ml) 11 ho(m2) 11 . . .  11 ho(mn) 1 1 a) 
r = xC + w mod q 
2 .  The batch signature on mi consists of the tuple (C, r, h 1 ,  h2, . . .  , hn, i), where 
hj = ho(mj). 
3. Verification of the claimed signature (C, r, h 1 , h2, . . .  , hn, i) on message mi is 
performed by checking that ho(mi) = hi, and confirming the following holds: 
C = h(ho(ml) 11 ho(m2) 1 1 . . .  1 1 ho(mn) 1 1 g he mod p) 
The proof of security for this scheme is essentially the same argument to the 
RSA case, where dependence upon an appropriate choice of hash function prevails. 
Following on, it is now shown that if a secure hash function is used then the batch 
signature is as secure as the basic Schnorr signature. However, it must be 
established what should be considered a successful forgery attack, since this is not 
quite so obvious as in the case of the signature of a single message. 
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To illustrate that the batch signature scheme is secure against existential 
forgery, implies showing that an attacker should be unable to forge the signature of 
any message which has not been previously signed by the owner of the private key. 
Furthermore, it is assumed the attacker is able to perform an adaptive chosen 
signature attack in which the owner of the private key can be induced to sign any 
sequence of messages of the attacker's choice, the next message in the sequence 
being allowed to depend on any of the previous messages. Finally the attack is 
regarded as successful if the attacker is able to derive the signature of any message 
not previously signed. 
In an adaptive chosen signature attack on the batch signature scheme the 
attack is regarded as successful if the final derived signature is not in any batch of 
previously signed messages. This is the only reasonable extension of such an attack 
on a basic signature scheme, because it could only be expected that the signer would 
sign a batch of messages if these were all presented together, rather than signing a 
single message in a batch of messages, the rest of which were chosen some other 
way (for example randomly). This assumption is made clear so as to prove that a 
possible forgery on the batch scheme leads to a forgery on the basic scheme. 
Theorem 7 .1. If the Schnorr signature scheme is secure against existential forgery 
using an adaptive chosen signature attack then so is the batch signature scheme. 
Proof. The main idea is that if (C, r) is a batch signature for the set of messages (m1 ,  
m2, . . .  , mn), then it i s  also a basic Schnorr signature on  the single message M= h1 1 1  
h2 1 1  . . .  1 1  hn, where hj = ho(mj). This provides the means to prove that a forgery for a 
basic batch scheme leads to a forgery for the Schnorr scheme. First, it is assumed 
that there is a successful adaptive chosen signature attack on the batch signature 
scheme. At each step a batch signature is obtained for the chosen message set, and 
finally a batch signature on a new message, say m' is obtained. 
This can be converted to an adaptive chosen signature attack on the Schnorr 
signature as follows. At each stage the chosen message is ho(ml) 11 ho(m2) 11 . . .  1 1 
ho(mn) if m1 ,  m2, . . .  , mn is the chosen message for the attack on the batch signature. 
After obtaining all chosen signatures the attack on the batch instance obtains the 
forged signature (C, r, h1 ,  h2, . . . , hn, i), where hi = ho(mi). As shown above, this is a 
Schnorr signature of the message M =  h 1 11 h2 11 . . .  11 hn. According to the definition 
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given of a forgery against the batch scheme m' has not appeared in any previous 
batch signature found during the attack. Therefore the signature on M is a successful 
existential attack on the Schnorr scheme unless M appeared before as the output for 
a different message set. In particular this must include a message m' with hi = h0(m') 
= ho(m") and m'=t:- m". But this contradicts the collision free property of ho, hence the 
proof is complete. 
7.3 Realising Batch Methods in Electronic Cash 
Brands' electronic cash scheme is a single term protocol that provides anonymous 
cash with detection of fraud after double spending occurs [Bra93] ; variations exists 
that provide prior restraint using wallets with observers [CP92, Bra93a] .  The 
fundamental tools used in the scheme include the representation problem and a 
restrictive blind signature scheme. A more detailed treatment of the scheme is 
presented in chapter two, where it is noted that each coin is identified by the pair (A, 
B) and corresponding signature cr(A, B) = (z, a, b, r). Execution of the withdrawal 
protocol provides the customer with one coin (A, B), cr(A, B), which may be spent 
with any merchant, provided the customer is able to demonstrate knowledge of the 
coins representation with respect to (g1, g2). 
In applying the batch extension to the Schnorr signature scheme it is possible 
to withdraw several coins at once, for the same computational expense at the bank. 
The new withdrawal resembles the original restrictive withdrawal protocol, however 
several coins, represented in (g1, g2), must first be qualified. This is determined by 
calculating the Bi portion ofthe coin, Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : Bi = g/1 ; g{2i. 
Using a batch withdrawal the tuple (t1 ,  t2, . . .  , tn, z, a, b, r, i) now becomes a 
signature of the pair (A, Bi) if, 
g = hc a  and Ar = zc b, 
where ti = ho(Bi) and c = h1(A, t1 , t2, . . .  , tn, z, a, b). The signature is shown as cr(A, 
Bi), and may be extended in the obvious way to any subset of Bi values which are 
signed with the same (z, a, b, r) values. 
In most cases the parameters of Brands' scheme will be adopted, as such 
these familiar notations will remain consistent as those in [Bra93] . Let the bank 
choose the large primes p and q as public keys where q is a factor of p - 1 .  The bank 
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also publishes a set of randomly chosen public generators g, g1 .  and g2. The 
generator g2 will have special meaning in the modified withdrawal that identifies the 
specific number of coins n within a batch instance. In this way all entities involved 
in cash transactions can verify that the correct number of coins are contained within 
each batch coin. The bank also has the additional public key h = gx mod p. Let h1 
and ho be publicly known collision resistant hash functions 
Before the withdrawal protocol can be executed, the customer must register 
the identity le with the bank. This is equivalent to the opening of an account with the 
bank in the physical model . During the registration process the customer and the 
bank securely exchange the value le = g11"\ which uniquely identifies the customer to 
the bank. The value J.! is a secret key value stored by the customer. 
7.3.1 Withdrawing Several Coins Simultaneously 
During the withdrawal protocol (see Figure 7. 1 )  the customer is able to generate a 
valid electronic coin with the assistance of the bank. As in Brands' cash protocol, it 
is assumed that when a customer wishes to withdraw an electronic coin from the 
bank, the customer has previously proven ownership of a valid account at the bank. 
On determining that the customer owns a valid account, the bank chooses a 
random number w ER Zq. The bank also calculates the values z = (leg2t, a =  gw, and 
b = (leg2)w. The value a represents the witness value which is normally generated by 
the Schnorr signature. The values b and z are to be used to build a representation of 
the electronic coin which hides the customer's identity. The values a, b and z are 
transmitted to the customer. 
At the same time, or at a previous time off-line, the customer chooses several 
random numbers s ER Zq, and 'Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : XJ;, X2; ER Zq where n is the number 
of coins to be withdrawn from the bank during the execution of the withdrawal 
protocol. These values are to be used to build a unique representation of the coin 
and to hide the customer's identity within the coin. The customer generates the 
coins' representations by computing A = (leg2t, B1 = g{1 1 g{21, • • •  , Bn = g1x1n g{2n, 
and z' = '?!. 
On receiving a, b, and z from the bank, the customer chooses the random 
blinding factors u and v. The customer then computes a' = au gv and b' = bsu Av, then 
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calculates the challenge c' = ht(A, ho(Bt), ho(Bz), . . .  , ho(Bn), z', a', b') and sends the 
blinded challenge c = c' I u to the bank. 
The bank returns the appropriate response r = ex + w mod q to the customer 
and debits the customer's account by the amount withdrawn. 
Customer 
Choose: 
'\li E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : Xtb xzi ER Zq 
Calculate: 
Choose s, u, v ER Zq 
A =  (lcfJzY 
a' = au gv 
b' = bs u Av 
z' = �  
c' = ht (A,  ho(Bt), . . .  , ho(Bn), z', a', 
b') 
c = c' I u mod q 
Check: 
gr = a  he 
(Icgzf = b zc 
Compute: 
r' = ru + v mod q 
z, a, b 
c 
r 
Figure 7.1 Batch Withdrawal of Coins 
Bank 
Choose w ER Zq 
Calculate: 
z = {1cfJzY 
a = gw 
b = (Icgz)w 
r = cx + w mod q 
The customer can now construct the coins which have been withdrawn from 
the bank. The i1h coin and its signature is denoted by, 
(A, Bi, ho(Bt), . . .  , ho(Bi-I), ho(Bi+t), . . .  , ho(Bn), z', a', b', r', i). 
The string defined by (ho(Bt), . . .  , ho(Bi-t), ho(Bi+I ), . . . , ho(Bn), z', a', b', r', i) 
represents the bank's blinded signature on (A, Bi). The customer is able to generate 
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n of these coins simultaneously which can be spent separately with the same or 
different merchant. Each coin is uniquely identified by Bi. As each coin is spent the 
customer can delete Bi from memory but the customer must retain the values h0(B1), 
. . .  , h0(B11) until the last coin in the batch has been spent. 
Because Bi is transported within the coin it is not necessary for ho(Bi) to be 
also transferred with the coin. If this option is chosen, the value i must also be 
included in the coin so that the merchant can insert h0(Bi) in the correct order during 
the payment verification. 
Note that because each coin has a related signature, all the coins constructed 
from a single withdrawal process can be linked, although the identity of the customer 
who withdrew the coins is still hidden. (Presently, all divisible coins schemes also 
have this characteristic). If the customer is concerned about the traceability of 
purchases, due to the coin linkage, the option of spending several coins with a single 
specific merchant or withdrawing one coin with each batch is available. This will 
allow the customer to tune the magnitude of linkability required. In practice, banks 
would presumably charge for each withdrawal, as such this approach may prove to 
be too costly for a customer who desires no linkability at all. 
7 .3.2 Verifiers for the Representation Check 
As discussed in chapter three, a number of verifiers for signatures in batches have 
been previously developed [NMRV94, YL95,  Har98a] . Now, by modifying some of 
these schemes it is possible to build a verifier for the representation check, 
performed during the payment and deposit protocols. 
In the original Schnorr scheme, system parameters consist of two primes p 
and q, where q divides p - 1 ,  a secret key x E Zq, and public key h = g-x mod p. The 
signer computes a =  gw mod p, c = h(x 11 m), and r = w + ex mod q. The batch 
verification criterion proposed by Yen and Laih [YL95]  for the Schnorr signature 
scheme is shown below, 
Tin w. L� r;w; h"\'� C;W; a • I = g 1=1 L.. r=l • i=l I 
It was shown in chapter five that the above verifier may be attacked and that 
further assumptions are required to ensure that the verifier is provably secure in an 
electronic cash environment. Considering these weaknesses and incorporating the 
repair (p - 1 = 2rq, where r and q are both primes), such a tool may be used to 
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develop a batch checker of the representation values; or rather, a batch verifier for 
checking knowledge of several coin representations simultaneously. 
During a payment execution the customer may select one or a set of coins to 
be spent with a merchant. When spending several coins at once the coins (A, Bi, . . .  , 
Bj) and their related signature cr(A, Bi, . . .  , Bj) are sent to the merchant. A 
straightforward approach to verifying each of the coins would be to check 
individually the representation of the pairs (A, Bi) . . . (A, Bj) with respect to (g1, g2). 
This of course is of linear complexity. The alternative would be to perhaps perform 
this representation check as a batch. 
Checking representation of knowledge is a generalisation of the Schnorr 
signature scheme. Moreover, it is a check to see that the value A is of the form g11-1 
g2 and B is of the form g1x1 g2x2, which is the case of two or more values of a Schnorr 
signature. It can be seen that the batch verifier for the Schnorr signature scheme can 
be converted into a batch representation check, with reasonable assumptions. The 
original representation check is known by, 
and the batch representation check then becomes 
""" � w. """ r. w. d"'" w, ITn w, g L...Ji=l 1; I g L.Ji=l 2; I = A L.,.;=l B . I 2 i=l i 
This improvement is more clearly seen for the case of two coins (A, B) (A, 
B'). For each coin to be spent a unique response pair (r1 ,  r2) is required, where the 
responses are of the form r1 = d� + x1 mod q and r2 = ds + x2 mod q. Given two 
pair (r1 ,  r2) and (r' 1 ,  r'2), proving knowledge of (x1 ,  x2, /-l) and (x'1 ,  x'2, /-l), the original 
representation check involves confirming that the following holds, 
g{ g;2 = Ad B and g(1 g;'2 = Ad B'. 
This requires two multi-exponentiations, two modular exponentiations and two 
modular multiplications. Furthermore, this will increase linearly with the number of 
coins to be verified during payment. 
These two representation checks can be performed simultaneously by 
choosing randomly two small exponent test values (w, w') ER Zq, and multiplying or 
adding these out, 
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The computational requirements are reduced by now performing two multi­
exponentiations, one multiplication mod p, five multiplications mod q, and some 
inexpensive (perhaps negligible) modular additions. The specific computational 
savings will be more formally assessed when the complete payment protocol is 
presented. 
7 .3.3 Representation Screening and Improved Verifiers 
In addition to batch verification of signatures it may also be possible to use 
screening. As such the notion of representation screening is introduced. This has 
already been explored for the verification of RSA signatures [Har98b, BGR98] .  In 
addition to screening, it is discussed whether alternative more efficient batch 
representation checks may be applied, namely those of Bellare et al. [BGR98] . It is 
shown below that an improved batch verifier, the Bucket test, may be useful to the 
merchant during payment, and that representation screening may be practiced by the 
bank during deposit to improve the efficiency of the deposit transaction. 
In chapter three it was discussed how Bellare et. al. [BGR98] introduce the 
notion of screening for batch verification of RSA signatures. More specifically, they 
prove that a simplified batch verification does not represent a true signature 
verification but rather a weaker property called screening applies. They show that 
screening ensures that only the true signer could have participated in generating the 
purported signatures, even though the individual signatures presented may not be 
correct. In respect of the proposed cash system, this means that in order to derive the 
product n';=lri, the prover must know the representation pairs (XI ;, Xz i ), Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , 
n } .  
Several alternative batch verifiers are also introduced in [BGR98] and may 
be suitably fitted to the representation check. In the new system the security value 
w, introduced by Naccache et al. [NMRV94] and applied to the Schnorr signature by 
Yen and Laih [YL95] ,  are used to strengthen the batch representation check. This 
will prevent the customer, with high probability, from choosing incorrect r values 
that would otherwise satisfy the representation check. Some alternative techniques 
include the Small Exponents (roughly the approach introduced by Naccache et al. 
[NMRV94] and Yen and Laih [YL95]), Random Subset, and the Bucket tests 
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[BGR98].  To optimise efficiency further it is pointed out that an alternative batch 
verifier, the Bucket test, should be used as the number of coins spent in batch 
increases. Modifying the Bucket test appropriately (see chapter three), a revised 
batch representation check is presented, performed with a smaller test exponent m 
such that l ml < lwl . 
In this protocol, first select the security parameter m ?: 2; this is optimally 
chosen, as suggested in [BGR98], to be m � log(n + k1) - loglog(n + k1), where k1 = 
lg(I GI). Set M =  2111 and let W= w/(m - 1).  For a batch size of n, repeat the following 
W times (each individual test gives probability of cheating T(I1I-I), hence this IS 
performed r w/(m - 1) l times. 
1 .  Choose \7' i E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : fi E { 1 ,  . . .  , M} . 
2. For j = 1 to M, Fj = {i : jj = j}, (i.e., assign the set of elements to Fj). 
3 .  Forj = l to M, Rlj = " . rl ; mod q, R2j = " . r2; mod q, B' = I] . B; . L..Jz eFj L...Jz eFj z eFj 
4. Select new values w1, . . .  , WM E {0, 1 }111 and confirm that the representation 
check holds on the following batch instance (Rb, R2I, d, A, B'1), . . .  , (riM, 
It should be noted that the above verifier is less efficient than the small 
exponents test for small batches and is shown to be more efficient as the batch size 
grows beyond 200 in size. Although the operations differ from [BGR98], it is 
reasonable to assume 200 given that the exponentiation costs are consistent in form 
across batch verifiers. It is expected that an optimal batch verifier from amongst 
these possibilities is selected by the merchant during payment depending on the 
number of coins to be checked. 
7.3.4 Naive Approach and the Non-Divisible Coin 
The naive approach outlined in section 7.3 . 1  employs a batch signature to improve 
the computational efficiency of withdrawing non-divisible coins. This has 
similarities to the previous work of Tsiounis [Tsi97] . A significant drawback of the 
scheme is that the signature size becomes unacceptably large for an increasing batch 
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size n, increasing as O(n). For example, when withdrawing 1 ,000 coins in batch the 
associated signature, which is part of any one coin, will be 20 kilobytes in size. It is 
possible to avoid this linear increase by applying the batch signature scheme outlined 
in chapter four with a binary tree structure. Under the proposed new scheme, the 
corresponding signature residue now becomes 200 bytes ! 
An outcome of this construction is the first practical realisation of an 
electronic cash system that provides an efficient alternative to divisible based cash 
schemes. The efficiency gains are by way of improvements in computation, 
communications, and storage using novel batch signature and verification 
techniques. The binary tree structure specifically solves the problem of an 
increasing signature size for batch coins by reducing this to O(log n ) . Before 
continuing with the proposed system, the modified Schnorr scheme and some 
notations require formalisation. 
7 .3.5 A Tree-Structured Schnorr Signature 
Recalling that the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch9 1 ]  has public and private keys x 
and h, where 0 < x < q, and h = g-x mod p. To sign message m with the private key x,
outputting signature (c, r), one computes a = gw mod p, where 1 < w < q , c = h(m 1 1  
a), and r = w + xc mod q. 
To verify the signature (c, r), check a' = gr he mod p, and check that c = h(m 1 1 
a). In modifying the protocol, assume the existence of two one way hash functions
ha and hp. It is possible to generate n signatures ( C, r, 11i), where 11i is the signature 
residue on a sequence of n messages mi, Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n } ,  with the following steps. 
1 .  a = gw modp, where 1 < w < q. 
2. Assign messages as leaves of the tree and compute root node T. For some r,
the tree formed will have 2k - r messages at depth k and 2r messages of depth
k +  1 .  
3 .  C = h(T ii a). 
4. r = w + xC mod q .
5 .  Compute the residue pairs1 1  (ri, ti), Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n}  : 11i = {n, t1 , . • •  , rd;, td;} :
1 1  Sibling of c is denoted sib( c), direction of c is denoted dir(c). 
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c := ha(mi) 
for i := 1 to � 
do 
ri := sib( c), ti := dir( c) 
if ti = L then c := hf3( c 11 ri )
else c := hf3(ri 1 1  c) 
od. 
Any third party is able to verify the individual signature ( C, r, �i), on an 
associated message mi. To verify one checks a ' = g he mod p, then using the
claimed signature residue �i = {r1 ,  t1 , r2, t2, . . .  , rd, td} compute T '  and check that the
value C = h(T ' 1 1 a'); where T '  is calculated by:
T '  := ha(mi) 
forj := 1 to d 
do 
if lj = R then c := hf3(c 11 rj) 
else T '  := hf3(rj 11 c) 
od. 
Examining Brands' protocol [Bra93] ,  there is the reliance on the separation 
of m into A and B, with the identity encoded within A to detect double spending. 
This relationship is extended by replacing the B-part of each coin with a sequence of 
Bi values, signed with the batch signature tree structure. This results in the creation 
of several coins that offers detachability, rather than divisibility for the partitioning 
of coins. 
7.4 Detachable Electronic Coins 
With the basic tools outlined in section 7.3 in mind, the new cash scheme is now 
outlined in detail .  The scheme uses a batch signature to withdraw multiple coins, 
applies several batch verifications techniques to spend coins, with similar techniques 
exploited during the deposit protocol. This has the effect of minimising the 
computation to be performed by the bank during both withdrawal and deposit. This 
is an attractive option given that the bank would typically receive most transactions 
and can be viewed as a processing bottleneck in a distributed electronic cash 
environment. 
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The resulting scheme is shown to be more efficient than other well known 
electronic coin schemes [Bra93,  Oka95] , and is comparable to the most efficient 
divisible based systems exhibiting similar e-cash properties [CFT98] . Furthermore, 
the option of screening, a more efficient batch verification technique, is assessed for 
both the payment and deposit protocols. 
In the following, although the prime p is chosen to be of the form p - 1 = 2rq 
to avoid the general attack mentioned in chapter five, it is feasible that elements of 
low order 2 may still cause a problem. However, it is shown in the security analysis 
below that in fact such an attack is avoided. 
7.4.1 Setup and Environment 
The bank selects large primes r, p, and q, where q divides p - 1 = 2rq; suitable 
values for these parameters are IPI = 1 024 bits, l ql = 1 60 bits, and l rl = 864 bits. The
bank also chooses the generator triple (g, g1 , g2) of the group G of order q. The 
customer selects a secret number J.l ER Zq, computes the account number le = g1l-l,
and forwards le to the bank. The bank stores the customer's details, unique account
number le, and publishes the bank's public key h = gx, for corresponding private key
x ER Zq. The bank also publishes two collision resistant strong one-way hash 
functions ho and h1 • The bank may also publish the value g{, permitting computation
of z = (J�zr by the customer, rather than sending this during withdrawal. In this 
environment gz is used to indicate the number of coins that are withdrawn at any one 
time. Different generator values for g2 may be used to identify both the 
denomination and the number of coins to be withdrawn in the cash system. This 
generator is later put to use by both the merchant and bank to confirm that a correct 
number of coins have been withdrawn and that there are not counterfeits. 
In the cash system each coin is identified by (A, Bi, i), '1/ i E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} , and its 
corresponding signature cr(A, Bi) = (�i, z', a', b', r'). Alternatively, a set of coins is
identified by (A, Bh . . .  , Bk, lj, . . .  , ik) and the signature cr(A, Bh . . .  , Bk). Each coin 
instance (A, Bi) is valid when the following equations are satisfied. 
g '= a h ho(A, T ', z', a ', b')
Ar '  = b Z ho(A, T ', z', a', b')
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The merchant can be sure that the customer presenting the coins took part in 
the withdrawal protocol when the customer is able to prove knowledge of the coin's 
secret representation pair (xi ,  x2) with respect to (g1, g2). 
7 .4.2 Withdrawal Protocol 
The withdrawal protocol enables the customer to receive a signature on a set of 
coins, in a way that enforces the encoding of the customer's identity for each coin in 
the batch. In the interests of efficiency, it is also assumed that the customer 
precomputes the electronic coin tokens Bi prior to interaction with the bank; this step 
is described first. 
Customer 
Choose: 
'ifi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : x1b x2i ER Zq 
Precompute: 
Bl = g!X]l g{2t, • •  . , Bn = g!X]n g{2n 
T=  fr(B� , . . .  , Bn) 
Choose s, u, v ER Zq 
A =  {1<£2Y 
a' = au gv 
b' = bs u Av 
z' = �  
c' = h (A T z' a' b') 0 ' ' ' ' 
c = c' I u mod q 
Check: 
gr = a  he 
CI<£2Y = b zc 
Evaluate: 
r' = ru + v mod q 
z, a, b 
c 
r 
Bank 
Choose w ER Zq 
Calculate: 
z =  (l<£2t 
a = gw 
b = (l<£2)w 
r = cx +  w mod q 
Figure 7.2 Withdrawal Protocol for Detachable Coin 
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The customer manufactures a sequence of n electronic coin tokens, the 
number n determined by the bank's advertised generator g2, encoding his identity 
and maintaining a representation with respect to (g1. g2). Choosing blinding
invariant s and secret representation values Vi E { 1 ,  . . .  , n} : x1;, X2; ER Zq; for
storage considerations these values may be determined as XI; = h(x1 ;_1) and x2; = h(x2;_ 
1), using some hash function h. The customer builds a unique representation of each
coin by calculating A = (lcf52t, B1 = g{1 I g2x21, • • •  , Bn = g1x1• g2x2•. Each coin (A, Bi) 
encodes the identity le, and is known to the customer by the unique representations 
(JJS, s) and (XI ;, x2;) with respect to (g1, g2) .
The coins are now placed into a tree to build the umque structure 
representing the batch of coins, (using the techniques in chapter five). Commencing 
with a hash of each Bi value assigned to the leaf nodes, the tree is assembled by 
applying function h1 to leaf nodes and recursively applying ho to internal nodes until
the root node T is constructed; let this build up phase be represented by /I{B 1, • • •  , 
Bn)- This provides a unique representation of the coin batch. At this point the 
customer has encoded the identity into several batch coins for an interactive 
signature from the bank, of which the representation is known. The internal node 
values are not discarded as they may be used later during payment when forming the 
signature for the unique selection of coins. 
Before commencing the on-line phase of the withdrawal protocol, it is 
assumed that the customer has proven his identity to the bank over an authenticated 
channel. The bank chooses a secret value w ER Zq, and sends to the customer
unblinded values a = gw and b = mw. The customer, using the previously 
manufactured sequence of coins, now performs a number of steps that involve 
generating the batch of blinded coins for signatory endorsement. In order to hide the 
true identity of the customer from the bank during signing, the customer chooses 
additional blinding invariants u and v E Zq, derives new values a' = au gv, b' = bsu Av,
and z' = �- The challenge c' = ho(A, T, z', a', b') is formed and the unblinded
translation c = c'lu is then forwarded to the bank. 
The bank responds to the challenge with r = ex + w mod q and deducts the
customer's  account by the amount withdrawn. The customer confirms the presence 
of a correctly formed signature by checking that gr = ahc and (Icf52Y = bzc hold. If the
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verification holds true the customer calculates r' = ru + v mod q. The signature on 
the batch of coins now becomes the tuple (�i, z', a', b', r). Figure 7.2 illustrates the 
protocol steps for withdrawal. 
Each coin forming the batch may be individually identified by (A, Bi, i, �i, z', 
a ', b ', r), where (�i, z', a ', b ', r) is the signature on the unique pair (A, Bi). Recall that 
�i is composed of each highest level node not in the path of the leaf node identified 
by Bi. Each coin may be detached from the tree and individually spent with different 
merchants. Multiple coins may also be spent with the same merchant during the 
same protocol exchange. For instance, three coins may be identified with the 
following bitstring sequence (A, B1 , B2, B3, i1 , i2, i3, ��=I , z', a ', b ', r). 
The customer has encoded the identity within each pair (A, Bi), such that 
double spending will reveal the identity value le of the customer. Once again the set 
of coins may be linked between different transactions, this is due to the related 
signature appearing on the coins. However, coins from different batches cannot be 
correlated. This linkability does not reveal the customer's  identity, rather it allows 
the bank to identify which transactions are from the same batch of coins. 
7 .4.3 Payment Protocol 
When a customer wishes to spend valid coin(s) at a merchant shop, the batch 
sequence (A, Bh . . .  , Bk, lj, . . .  , ik) and corresponding signature cr(A, Bh . . .  , Bk) = (�7=h 
z', a', b', r') are forwarded to the merchant. Note that the number of coins to be spent 
is defined by the number of B constructions forwarded. The coins may be spent 
individually or in batch manner, and may be forwarded in no particular order. For 
each set of coins to be spent in one transaction, the unique batch residue �1=h for leaf 
nodes j to k, must be prepared by selecting the appropriate intermediate nodes from 
the binary tree, let this be defined asft:..(Bj, . . .  , Bk). Note also that it is not necessary 
to recompute these values as they may be stored after their initial generation. 
On receipt of the coins, the merchant computes and returns to the customer 
the challenge d = ho(A, Bi, . . .  , Bj, lj, . . .  , ik, Im, t), where t represents a date-time 
stamp and I m is the identity of the merchant. 
Using the customers' secret value )l, and blinding invariant s, the customer 
demonstrates knowledge of the coins representation (x i .  x2) with respect to (g1 . g2) 
1 5 8  
by computing responses r1 ;  and r2;, ViE {j, . . .  , k} ; this is for each coin to be spent in 
the transaction as follows, 
r1j = dJ..!S + x1j , . . . , rl k = dJ..!S + XIk ,
r2j = ds + x2j , • • .  , r2k = ds + x2k .
On receipt of the response values, the merchant proceeds to verify the bank's 
signature on the coins and checks that the customer knows a representation of the 
coins with respect to (g1 , g2). The bank's signature on the blinded coins are checked
by rebuilding the root node of the tree T '  and confirming that If' = a' hho(A, T ', z', a', b')
r' h (A T ' z' a' b') and A = b' z' 0 ' ' ' ' hold. The root node T'  is rebuilt from the supplied residue
111k and coin values Bi, ViE {j, . . .  , k} using algorithm 2 from chapter four; let this be 
the functionfr{111k, Bh . . .  , Bk). The merchant establishes that the customer knows a 
representation of the coins by first selecting an optimal batch verifier such as the 
small exponents verifier. Assuming for the moment that the batch size is small, 
random security values w1, . . .  , wk ER {0, 1 } 1, where l = 30 is a security parameter, are 
chosen and the following representation check is performed, 
k k d"\'k W W· ""· .r1 . w1 ""' ·  r2 . w1 A £....;=1· 'I1k B 1 g L..Jl=) I g L.JI=J l = ,. I 2 i=j i 
(13) 
The values w1 through Wk are required to prevent the customer from choosing, 
with high probability, r values that would otherwise satisfy equation ( 13). The 
absence of these random security parameters means that it is possible for the 
customer to choose any values r1 , . . .  , r1h r21, . . .  , r2k and provided the sum of these
values is valid the merchant would be unable to detect the cheating scenario.  A 
consequence of this is that the bank would be unable to detect the identity of the 
customer if double spending occurs. The size of the random values w1 through wk 
can be chosen to be only 30 bits in length which allows more efficient modular 
exponentiations. The security of this choice is analysed by Bellare et al. [BGR98] 
and Yen and Laih [YL95] in their respective batch signature verification schemes. 
Although in chapter five it is shown that the schemes in [BGR98] and [YL95] may 
be attacked, these security parameters work here in strengthening the check due to 
the choice of strong prime p - 1 = 2rq, hence eliminating elements of low order. 
However the element of order 2 is still present, but poses not threat as discussed 
below in the security analysis. 
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If both the verification and representation check succeed, the merchant 
accepts the coins as valid and may then forward the goods to the customer. Coins 
that are detected to be from the same batch may be stored together, optimising the 
storage consumed by coins. In a similar manner, the customer can remove the coin 
values Bi from storage. Figure 7.3 summarises the payment protocol by viewing the 
payment steps to spend a coin sequence (Bh . . .  , Bk) from the same batch. 
Customer 
Select Coins: 
(A, Bi), ViE {j, . . .  , k} 
k !li=j = /11(Bj, . . .  , Bk) 
ViE {j, . . .  , k} : 
rl i  = df.lS + XI i 
rzi = ds + xzi 
Merchant 
(A, Bi> . . .  , Bk, ii> . . . , h) 
cr(A, Bh . . .  , Bk) 
d 
T' = fr(!l1=h Bh . . .  , Bk) 
ViE {j, . . .  , k} : Wi ER {0, 1 }1 
Check: 
g' = a' hho(A, T ', z', a', b) 
Ar' = b' z' h0(A, T ', z', a', b) 
"'k � W· �· r. W· dL:._ .W; IT
k W; g L..Ji=j 1; I g L...ti=j 2j I = A 1-J • •  B I 2 z=; i 
Figure 7.3 Payment Protocol for Detachable Coin 
The merchant stores the spent coins and transaction details, this consists of 
the following, 
(A, Bh . . .  , Bk, �' . . . , h), cr(A, Bj, . . .  , Bk), t, r1j, . . .  , rl!o rzj, . . .  , rzk· 
Under this scheme, coins spent from the same batch may be linked together. 
This however, may be controlled by the customer by increasing the number of 
distinct batch withdrawals, as different batches cannot be linked. 
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7.4.4 Deposit Protocol 
The merchant is able to redeem hard currency from the electronic cash during the 
deposit transaction with the banlc A transcript of the payment, including the 
merchant' s  identity, is forwarded to the bank. Similar to the merchant, the bank 
performs a signature verification; however it is possible that the bank is able to 
performs a more efficient representation check by screening the coins ' 
representation. 
In the deposit protocol (see Figure 7.4) the electronic com, merchant 
challenge d, response values r1j, . . .  , r1h rzj, . . .  , rzk, the date and time of the 
transaction and the merchant's identity 1111 are returned to the bank by the merchant. 
The bank verifies the coin by reconstructing d = ho(A, Bj, . . .  , Bk, ih . . .  , h, 1111,
t), using the date and time of the transaction and the merchant' s  identity. The bank 
can now go through a similar process of verification executed by the merchant 
during the payment protocol. The root node T is reconstructed verifying the link 
between the batch signature and Bh . . .  , B k· If this is valid the batch signature is
checked, which is then followed by the coin representation check. 
Merchant 
(A, Bh . . .  , Bk, ih . . .  , ik), 
cr(A, Bh . . .  , Bk), r1j, . . .  , r1k> rzj, . . .  , r2k> t, Im 
Bank 
d '  = ho(A,Bh· · · ,Bk,ij, · · · ,ik, 1111, t) 
T '  = fr{111=h Bj, . . .  , Bk)
Check: 
gr' = a' hhO(A, T ', z', a', b')
Ar' = b' z' hO(A, T ', z', a', b')
Figure 7.4 Deposit Protocol for Detachable Coin 
If either the representation screen or coin verification fails then the bank 
rejects the coins. Before crediting the merchant's account, the bank checks that the 
coins have not been deposited previously. This involves searching a database for the 
same coins, each one uniquely identified by (A, Bi) for i = j to k, note that each batch 
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instance may be identified by the A -part of the coin. If the coins have not been 
previously spent then the bank credits the merchant's account and stores the values 
(A, BJ, . . .  , Bk, ij, . . . , h), r11, . . .  , rlh r21, . . .  , r2k> t, and Ln· 
Under circumstances where verification fails during presentation of several 
coins, the obvious approach to detect the double spent coin is to perform a linear 
representation check of each coin individually. Whilst this is expected to be rather 
an infrequent problem to deal with it is an expensive proposition when it does occur. 
Fortunately techniques exist to perform this identification function efficiently. Shen 
et al. [SLH99] and Pastuszak et al. [PMPSOO] illustrate several examples, such as 
divide and conquer, that do this significantly better than the linear approach. 
It should also be noted that the general attack on RSA screening [CN99] does 
not apply to representation screening as duplicate messages constitute double spent 
coins which may be easily detected. It follows then that the pruning step of 
[BGR98] is not necessary. 
7.5 Security Analysis 
The new detachable coin scheme can be viewed as a straightforward variation of 
Brands' scheme in which the signature and coin verification equations have been 
changed to batched versions. It has been shown previously that the batched Schnorr 
signature scheme is secure as long as Schnorr' s original signature scheme is secure, 
where forgery of a coin is equivalent to a forgery of the batch Schnorr signature 
scheme with a modified hash function; which follows from the security of Merkle's 
authentication tree [ 1 1 ] , this is proven in chapter four. The security of the 
verification procedure also follows from the analysis of similar schemes given by 
Yen and Laih [YL95] and Bellare et al. [BGR98]. In spite of these late security 
analyses, all such verification schemes are susceptible to the new attack shown in 
chapter five, as such the new scheme requires further stronger assumptions so that 
the new attack is avoided. 
A representation of a value X, with respect to the bases g1 and g2, consists of 
exponents e1 and e2 such that X =  g1e1 g2e2. Following Brands, let us say that a 
customer knows a representation of a coin A, Bi, h0(B1), • • •  , ho(B11) if the customer 
knows a representation of A and Bi in the coins with respect to g1 and g2. Because A 
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= g1JlS g2s and the Bi values are chosen as representations in the withdrawal protocol,
the following holds. 
Proposition 7.1. If the customer accepts in the withdrawal protocol, then each pair 
(A, BJ is a batched coin of which a representation is known. 
In the payment protocol the merchant accepts the coms only if (with 
overwhelming probability) 
(14) 
It is straightforward to show that if the customer can solve equation (14) for two 
different values of d then they must know a representation of A and Bi. Consider the
merchant challenges d and d '. In order for the customer to correctly generate the pair 
(rli, r2i) to satisfy g{1i g{2i = Ad Bi, and the pair (r 't i, r '2i) to satisfy g{\ g{ '2i = Ad ' Bi,
the customer must know a representation of A and Bi with respect to g1 and g2• The
representation of A with respect to (gt, g2) is the pair (J.L, 1 ), conversely a
representation for each Bi with respect to (g1, g2) is the pair (xl i> x2i), for each Bi. 
With knowledge of J.l and (xl i> x2i), the customer is able to compute r1 i = dJ.!S + x1i 
and r2i = ds + X2i· Since A = (g1J..l g2Y and Bi = g1x1i g{2i, then the right hand side of
equation (14) is equal to g1dJ..ls g/s g1x1i g2x2i, which is equal to g1dJ..ls + x1i g/s + xzi.
Since r1 i = dJ.!S + x1i and r2i = ds + x2i , the customer is then able generate a pair (r1b 
r2) that will satisfy the equation g{1i g{2i = Ad Bi for any challenge d supplied by the 
merchant. This can be summarised in the following proposition. 
Proposition 7.2. A customer can spend a batched coin if and only if the customer 
knows a representation of the coin. 
The arguments given for security of the batch Schnorr scheme imply that 
existential forgery of a coin is possible only if Schnorr' s original signature scheme is 
existentially forgeable. Together with the above results this means that a coin may 
only be spent by the customer that withdraws the coin. 
7.5.1 Revealing Identity of Double Spender 
In the event that the bank detects doubling spending, either the merchant is 
attempting to deposit the same coin twice or the customer has double spent the same 
coin. As in Brands' original scheme [Bra93], it is now straightforward to identify 
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the perpetrator. If the date-time value t is the same as the value in the database then 
the merchant is guilty, otherwise the customer has double spent the coin. Where the 
customer is the guilty party, the bank has at its disposal knowledge of the two 
relationships r1 = dJ.lS + X1 , r'1 = d 'J.lS + x'1 , and r2 = ds + x2, r'2 = d 's + x'2· Using le 
= g1 (r1 - r '1) 1 (rz - r 'z), the bank is able to derive f.-l, which proves that the customer has 
double spent, as this is not publicly known by the bank. The bank is then able to 
identify the customer through the unique account number le. 
7.5.2 General Attack on Batch Representation Check 
In chapter five it was shown how an attack may be launched on a batch verifier using 
elements of low order. Additionally it was shown that this attack can be avoided 
with a strong choice of prime, in particular p - 1 = 2rq, where min{q, r} � 21• Since l 
is the security parameter, q and r must be greater than i to protect against the low 
order attack with probability at least i. Recalling from the proof for theorem 5 . 1 ,  
this means that if X is a solution for Wi then X+ i will be another solution, s o  that 
there is at most one solution for wi in the range {0 . . .  i} . 
Whilst a strong prime is chosen for the cash system presented, it is also 
evident that the element of order 2 is still present hence any batch verification 
scheme must still protect against this. The specific exposure here is the case where 
the element aB (where a is of order 2) may be supplied in lieu of B, thwarting the 
representation check and potentially compromising the ability of the bank to reveal 
the identity of a double spending customer. It will be shown however, that no 
exposure exists and even in the case where the customer successfully substitutes 
these values, both the representation check and identity revelation (when double 
spending occurs) will not be compromised. The general attack on the scheme would 
follow the following steps, 
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1 .  choose values x1 i> x2i ER Zq, 
3 .  set �i = -Bi mod p, 
4. calculate c' = h0(A, T, z', a', b'), and 
5 .  present (A, �i) and cr(A, �i) to the verifier as  a correct batch instance. 
Clearly a representation of �i, with respect to g1 g2, is not given by (x1 , x2). 
Moreover, since �i � G and gr g2 are generators of the G, then there exists no values
x1 , x2 such that g{1 g2x2 � G. But �i was signed by the bank during withdrawal. So
the question is can the representation check be foiled? Now since B/ = �/ mod p 
the representation check will succeed with the invalid number �i when si is even; 
occurring with probability of Y2. However to enable this representation check to 
succeed with �i, the response numbers rr and r2 must still be of the correct form so 
that 
k k J'Vk W; k W; 
g "._ .r1.w;g "._ .r2.w; _ A L...,=J I1 R 1 L.tl-} I 2 "-'1-J I  ' ' J-1  !=) i
remains true. This can be summarised in the following proposition. 
Proposition 7.3. If a customer double spends a coin of the form (A, -BJ, then the 
customer identity will be revealed. 
Given that B/ = �? mod p, then the representation check will fail with 
probability at most i when r1 = dJ..IS + xr and r2 = ds + x2 with Bi provided. Since
these values encode the customer's true identity J.l the customer will be caught. It 
follows then that the representation check will fail with probability at most i when
�i is supplied. Given that the customer must supply a valid pair (rr , r2) when either
Bi or �i is supplied, if the customer double spends the bank will be able to reveal the
identity. 
Since the value Bi is linked with the signature on (A, Bi) then it is not 
possible to supply Bi then -Bi, and still pass signature verification. It is 
straightforward to see that such values would hash to a different result during tree 
reconstruction. There are several other interesting scenarios that may also be 
considered here, 
• customer attempts to spend (A, -Bi),
• customer attempts to spend (A, -Bi, -Bi+I), and
• the customer attempts to spend (-A,  -Bi).
In each of these instances, the results outlined above apply in that there is no 
exposure. It must also be noted that a similar anomaly exists with the original 
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Brands protocol [Bra93], however it is possible to create a greater number of invalid 
coins and some theorems are now invalidated, this is detailed in Appendix I. 
Summarising, for the customer to exploit the general attack on the cash 
scheme, the value -B must be supplied in lieu of B. In the next section screening is 
considered in more detail.  With the results of chapter five and the analysis of this 
section it seems reasonable that screening during the representation check is a 
feasible option, however no formal proof is offered for this. 
7 .5.3 Security of Screening 
Recalling that screening may be applied to batch verify a number of signatures, and 
in the new cash system, this involves proving knowledge of the representation pairs 
(xl ;, xzJ In the following it is argued that if the merchant performs a fully qualified 
batch verification, using a small exponents test or buckets test, then the bank can 
perform a representation screening operation to confirm that the customer has 
knowledge of the coin's representation whilst still retaining the ability to reveal the 
customer identity when double spending occurs. On the contrary, it is also shown 
that if the merchant performs representation screening during payment, then it is 
possible for the customer to successfully double spend a coin without detection. 
7.5.3 . 1  Bank Screening 
As long as the merchant rejects false coins during payment, the bank is merely 
duplicating the merchant's check to ensure responses are of the correct form, i.e. 
dJ..!S + x1 i and ds + xzi. Suppose that during deposit a double spent coin is detected. 
Then the bank can perform a full verification on the coin in question with both sets 
of deposited parameters. Recall that the merchant' s  identity is stored with the 
deposited coin and used in the re-calculated challenge value d '. There are two 
possibilities: 
1 66 
1 .  The response values deposited by the merchant are correct, in which case the 
full verification will hold for both sets of parameters. This means that the 
customer has double spent and its identity will be revealed along with the 
secret value )..1. as proof of double spending. 
2.  The response values deposited by the merchant are incorrect. In this case the 
merchant has cheated and is trying to deposit the coin twice. Notice that this 
case includes the possibility that the merchant is in collusion with the 
customer. Since the merchant will always be caught if he colludes, there is 
no incentive for him to do so. 
7.5.3.2 Merchant Screening 
If the merchant only performs screening during payment, rather than a true 
verification, then it can easily be seen that the customer is able to double spend 
without identification. Suppose that the merchant performs a representation screen 
of the form 
during payment, the customer is able to provide an alternative set of r-values that 
enables him to double spend a coin. For example, the customer may compute new r­
values r'ra = (x.rra) and r'rb = (y.rrb) and double spend the coin Ba whose 
representation is rra = d� + xra and r2a = ds + X2a· Note that it is sufficient to provide 
a false set of rr-values, with correspondingly correct r2-values, to double spend 
successfully. The customer may then select x E R  Zq and compute y such that (x x 
rra) + (rr b - y) = rra + rrb, (e.g. If rra = 3 ,  rrb = 7, and X =  2, then y = 3). When mixed 
into a batch, these values would still enable the batch representation check to 
succeed. 
When the merchant finally deposits the coin, the bank will detect the double 
spent coin Ba and will see that it is the customer who has defrauded the system, this 
is due to the different merchant parameter t. Now, if the customer has provided a 
new set of r-values that satisfy the representation check, it is straightforward to see 
that the bank will not be able to reveal the associated identity. 
7.6 Efficiency 
The efficiency of the scheme may be directly correlated to the savmgs m 
computations due to the batch signature generation. There are however, some 
additional storage and communication overheads introduced. To consider these 
overheads in detail, the three types of coins discussed in this chapter are compared 
and contrasted, these are: 
1 .  the original Brands coin (A, B) and associated signature (z', a', b', r);
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2. a naive batch coin (A, Bi) and its signature (ho(B1), • . •  , ho(Bn), z', a', b', r', i);
and
3 .  a detachable coin (A, Bi) and its signature (L1i = (h0(B1), dir(h0(B1)), 
ho(Bd), dir(ho(Bd)), z', a', b', r', i), where d is the depth of the binary tree.
. . .  ' 
Where the batch size is n, the size of the naive batch coin will exhibit a linear 
increase by 1 60 bits (assuming the function ho produces digests of 1 60 bits), plus log 
n additional bits for i. For example, where p and q are 1 024 and 1 60 bits 
respectively, one original coin will be 5,280 bits in length: IAI = 1 024, IBI = 1 024, lz'l 
= 1 024, l a' l = 1 024, l b'l = 1 024, l r' l = 1 60. When viewing the naive batch coin, a set
of 1 0  coins would be 6720 bits, an increase of only 27%, for 9 additional coins. On 
the other hand, if the coins were individually generated using the original scheme, 
this would be 52,800 bits ! Thus, a comparative assessment of the original and naive 
coins, based upon the number of coins withdrawn, suggests that the naive scheme is 
already an improvement. In spite of this, each naive coin will be of the same, 
increased size and thus a communications penalty is incurred. Of course this can be 
improved upon further by implementing the batch tree signature. 
For an increasing number of coins the original coins increase linearly across 
all parameters, whilst the naive increase is linear across a subset of values, namely 
the values Bi. A detachable coin however employing the binary tree, reduces this 
linear increase to a logarithmic increase, hence 1 0  coins would require on average 
5 ,827 bits. For 1 0  coins k = 3 ,  r = 2, and I hi = 1 60 this gives an average residue 
length of, 
(k + ;r ) x (I hi + 1) = 547 bits, where r = 2k - (2k+I - n) .
2 + r 
The following table, Table 7. 1 ,  contrasts the size of the three different types 
of coins for several batch sizes n. 
n Original Naive Detachable 
1 5,280 5,280 5,280 
10 52,800 6,720 5,827 
100 528,000 2 1 , 120 6,362 
1000 5,280,00 1 65 , 120 6,886 
Table 7.1 Coin Size 
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The computational efficiency of the cash scheme will now be sketched, as 
the detachable coins is most efficient this will only be considered from this point on. 
Both the hash operations and precomputation will be excluded, where the 
precomputation tasks are assumed to be conducted during processor idle time. The 
scheme is first reviewed with respect to the original Brands protocol and then an 
informal comparison to other divisible coin based schemes is conducted, these are 
Okamoto [Oka95] and Easy Come Easy Go cash [CFT98] . With similar 
assumptions made in [CFT98], it is demonstrated that greater efficiency over 
Okamoto 's scheme is accomplished and a somewhat comparative efficiency to Easy 
Come Easy Go. 
Before presiding over some generic parameters it is noted that a common 
technique to improve the efficiency of discrete log based schemes is to use an 
exponent q which is smaller than the modulus p. This may be achieved whilst 
retaining strength of security when Gq is a subgroup of z;. Using this trick, the cost 
of a Schnorr signature, in comparison to an RSA signature, is significantly cheaper; 
particularly as the size of the modulus grows. Given that the effort for a modular 
square root is similar in complexity to modular exponentiation, a similar gain in 
effort may be obtained. It follows that the comparative efficiency may be 
generalised as (n + e) times cheaper [Kob87] .
Comparisons to the divisible schemes are conducted on the basis that the 
customer withdraws 1 ,000 coins from the bank12. The analysis of [CFT98] is 
borrowed, setting the security equivalent to a 5 12 bit modulus, even though today a 
much larger value would be desirable. Consequently, detachable coin parameters are 
I PI = 5 1 2  bits and I ql = 1 60 bits, with a 1 60 bit digest function. The divisible 
schemes employ a 5 1 2  bit RSA modulus N. Given that the complexity of modular 
exponentiation is O(log I ql log2 IPD [Kob87], it is noted that some of the divisible
scheme's operations (namely the square roots) are approximately 3 .2 (i.e. 5 1 2/1 60) 
times more expensive than modular exponentiations of the detachable coin scheme. 
This is calculated as each square root is equivalent in effort to an exponentiation, 
where the exponent value is equal to N (i.e. 5 1 2  bits). It is worth noting that this 
12 Divisible tree of 1 1  levels.
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difference would increase with a larger composite modulus such as would be 
required today for a secure implementation of divisible schemes. 
7 .6.1 Detachable Coins 
In addition to its relatively small (logarithmic) increase in coin size, there are some 
additional computations performed. These will now be viewed from the perspective 
of each interacting party in respect to the original Brands' scheme when withdrawing 
n coms. 
Bank. The scheme is specifically designed to reduce the computational load 
imposed on the bank during coin withdrawal. The cost of withdrawing one coin is 
exactly the same as the cost of withdrawing n coins. The bank performs exactly the 
same processing steps when signing a batch of coins, with respect to signing a single 
coin! The effort for this is 2 modular exponentiations. This could provide large 
savings to the bank as the batch size increases. For example, a batch of 1 0  coins 
would improve the efficiency by 90% over the original scheme. In addition, during 
communications 1 88 bytes of data is transferred. 
Later, when the merchant deposits the coin, the bank is required to store the 
additional log n bits per coin. It is possible though, that upon detection of the 
associated set of coins, the bank may store the spent coin with its parent batch and 
hence reduce the common storage overheads. The bank performs 4 modular 
exponentiations and 2 multi-exponentiations for an arbitrary number of coins 
received during deposit. The small exponents test introduces an additional 
computation to ensure that the representation check is valid. Borrowing the analysis 
of [BGR98] 1 3, a batch size of up to 200 remains efficient using the small exponent 
test. However, as the batch size increases beyond this, the Bucket test becomes the 
more efficient choice. Furthermore, where screening is sufficient for the bank no 
additional exponentiations are required. 
Customer. At the withdrawal stage, the customer performs two additional 
operations to obtain a batch of coins. This involves the creation of the Bi values, and 
the creation of its corresponding hash value. Ignoring the hash operations as 
computationally trivial, the preprocessing activities increase proportionally by the 
13 Whilst the analysis is applied to batch signature verification, it is noted that this is also applicable to the batch 
representation check. 
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number of coins in the batch. The on-line effort for the customer is 6 modular 
exponentiations. The original scheme requires all operations to be performed for 
each coin, while the batch scheme only requires the pre-processing of the multiple B­
part values. This translates to a saving of around 8 modular exponentiations for 
every additional coin after the first that is withdrawn in the batch. In addition to a 
fixed 296 bytes, the customer provides storage for each withdrawn coin consisting of 
64 bytes per coin. 
During payment the customer forwards the com and responds to the 
challenge in the same manner as the original scheme. This involves only two 
modular multiplications (ds and d!-IS are only computed once), plus two modular 
additions for each coin spent by the customer. When spending multiple coins, 
although the same processing is required to compute the responses, there will 
actually be a communications savings as the coin is only sent once. In terms of 
storage, once a coin is spent the size of the batch does not decrease, as all elements 
of the batch need to be kept for subsequent payments to merchants. It is not until the 
last coin of the batch is spent that the coin may be discarded. 
Merchant. When the merchant accepts a coin he must recompute the hash of Bi and 
insert this into its correct position to generate T. All other steps required to verify 
the coin are computationally identical to the original scheme for a single batch coin. 
This involves 5 modular exponentiations and 2 multi-exponentiations for an 
arbitrary number of coins received. When spending multiple coins the merchant 
computes an additional small modular exponentiation for each coin spent under the 
security parameter w. 
The exponentiation Bw is added to the merchant's  computations. However, 
since the w values are only 30 bits in length this adds only a small amount of
computation over to that required to verify a single coin in Brands' original scheme. 
The additional computation required for each w value can be estimated at less than 
6% of that required for individual coin verification with the parameters assumed 
above. Note that this is further amortised when several coins are verified as a batch. 
Under the original scheme the merchant is required to perform the complete 
merchant payment protocol for each coin spent, so the new scheme attracts n fewer
cr(A, Bi) verification operations and n fewer representation checks. This equates to
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6(n - 1 )  - 1 fewer modular exponentiations, noting that the additional Bw 
exponentiations contribute to the existing multi-exponentiation operation. 
Similar to the customer, the merchant must also provide storage space for the 
increased size of a batch coin. Again, this could be optimized by storing coins with 
an existing parent batch when received. To deposit a coin, the merchant merely 
forwards this to the bank, incurring only the communications penalty due to the 
increased coin size. 
It follows from the analysis that the detachable coin scheme is more efficient 
than Brands ' [Bra93] for the withdrawal, payment, and deposit of multiple coins. 
This is directly attributed to the batch techniques improving computational 
efficiency and containing the signature residue growth to a logarithmic increase, 
providing a storage and communications saving. This scheme is now compared 
against the divisible based schemes, generally accepted as the most efficient 
paradigm for electronic cash. 
7 .6.2 Okamoto Divisible Cash 
Okamoto [Oka95]  proposed the first true practical electronic cash scheme, recently 
improved upon by [CFT98] .  In the new scheme the withdrawal of each detachable 
coin is realised with 2 multi-exponentiations and 4 modular exponentiations by the 
customer; the bank performs 2 modular exponentiations. In communication, the 
bank transmits about 5 1 2  bytes of data whilst the customer transmits only 128 bytes. 
Okamoto's scheme involves only one modular exponentiation and a 1 28 byte 
message for both the customer and bank. As suggested in [CFT98], to accommodate 
unlinkability between different divisible coins an additional 4,000 exponentiations is 
required by the bank during each withdrawal, (the customer also incurs this expense 
however this may be conducted off-line). It follows from this observation that 
detachable coins are significantly more efficient to withdraw. 
The payment stage requires between 2 and 22 (average 1 1 ) exponentiations 
depending on the coin denomination, for both customer and merchant. As 
mentioned above, these exponentiations are 3 .2 times more expensive, and 
computationally equivalent to 35 exponentiations of the new scheme. In contrast, 
only 5 modular exponentiations and 2 multi-exponentiations are conducted by the 
merchant in the new scheme. On average 2,304 bytes are transmitted by the 
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customer, whilst the payment involves communication of 252 bytes + 1 04 bytes per 
coin, and log(n) signature residue bytes. Hence the new scheme is also more 
efficient during the payment exchange. 
7.6.3 Easy Come Easy Go Divisible Cash 
During withdrawal the merchant performs 2 exponentiations and the user conducts 
1 0  exponentiations, this is similar in complexity with the proposed scheme. At 
payment time, the merchant performs a similar initial computation to the new 
scheme plus the addition denomination revelation phase, on average contributing to 
an additional 1 1  modular square roots, equivalent to 35 of our modular 
exponentiations. 
The new scheme can be viewed as computationally more efficient during the 
on-line phase of payment, whilst the size of a detachable coin is greater; that is, an 
additional O(log n) signature residue bytes per coin is incurred for single coin 
payments. However, the detachable coin scheme possesses O(n) precomputation 
activities. 
Withdrawal Payment Deposit 
Customer Bank Customer Merchant Bank 
Detachable 
MultiExp2 Exp2 Mult2 MultiExp2 MultiExp2 
+ Exp4 + Exps + Exps 
Brands 
MultiExp2n EXP2n Mult2n MultiExpn MultiExpn 
+ EXP4n + Expsn + Expsn 
Okamoto Exp2 Exp4ooo EXP35 EXP35 Exp35 
Exp10 Exp2 EXP35 MultiExp1 MultiExp1 
+ Mult2 + Exp3s + Exp3s 
Easy Cash 
Table 7.2 Comparison of On-line Computation 
Table 7.2 summarises the comparisons conducted of the new cash protocol 
with regards to the original Brands protocol [Bra98] and the divisible based 
solutions [Oka95, CFT98]. The on-line computational requirements are shown for 
withdrawing n coins, assuming that coins from different withdrawal transactions are 
not to be linked. The operations considered are exponentiation (Exp ), multi­
exponentiation (MultiExp), and multiplication (Mult). For each operation Op, Opx 
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indicates that Op is performed X times. For example, MultiExp2 + Exp4n indicates 
that 2 multi-exponentiation and 4n exponentiations are performed. 
7.7 Summary 
In this chapter a practical electronic cash system is presented that is not based upon 
the divisible coin paradigm. The concepts of batch cryptography are applied in a 
novel way to obtain detachability of coins for the partitioning of cash. The naive 
hatching scheme is demonstrated to show some considerably computational savings 
may be initially obtained whilst the tree-structured scheme provides a practical coin 
size. In addition, several multiplicative verifiers are also applied together with 
signature screening. The security of the scheme is proven to be as secure as the 
original scheme extended. A comparison is conducted to the divisible-coin 
approach, noting that the efficiency of the detachable scheme exceeds previous 
divisible cash schemes [Bra93, Oka95]  and is comparable to the most efficient 
schemes based upon divisibility [CFT98] . 
This chapter has presented a complete set of batch protocols for use in 
electronic cash, demonstrating that the application of batch cryptography in such an 
environment is a practical option. This also suggests that the potential exists for 
several other security applications to apply these primitives in order to improve the 
efficiency of their protocols. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
"The more I read, the more I meditate; and the more I acquire, 
the more certain I am that I know nothing." 
� Voltaire, 
Philosophical Dictionary, 
1 764. 
8. Conclusions 
The central research focus of this thesis is to explore the use of batch cryptography 
in applications such as electronic cash. This has a key objective of bettering the 
efficiency of the protocols and providing an alternative way to construct electronic 
cash schemes. With this in mind, the contributions of the thesis may be considered 
as two parts, where chapters four and five relate to batch cryptography and chapters 
six and seven relate to its application in electronic cash. 
Digital signatures are certainly emerging as one of the key primitives for both 
electronic commerce and electronic cash in general, offering services such as non­
repudiation, authentication and integrity checking. Batch cryptography provides an 
alternative approach for providing improvements in efficiency. In a distributed 
environment batch signature, and verification, offers some new and interesting ways 
to achieve these efficiency goals. This thesis has added to the existing body of 
knowledge by presenting several new techniques and security requirements for 
extending cryptographic primitives such as signatures for simultaneous or batch 
operation. These ideas may be readily applied to security related applications such 
as electronic cash, or may feature in more general security solutions. 
As our economic society moves towards an inevitable electronic cash 
medium several opportunities exist to provide cash systems that may satisfy a 
number of commercial requirements. This may range from small payments, through 
conventional credit and debit payment protocols, to complete electronic 
replacements for physical cash. Most predominantly business-to-business electronic 
commerce, which has a strong requirement for digital signing, is recently emerging 
as one of the key commercial drivers for this virtualisation, as such these concepts 
may well see first relevance in this realm. 
8.1 Contribution and Results 
There are several key findings introduced in this thesis, in considering these it is 
useful to recapitulate the key research problems for this research. 
The first subproblem points out that the present batch signature generation 
algorithms possess certain restrictions. The research task is to consider alternative 
approaches to extend, or devise, new schemes that may overcome or address these 
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limitations. This also involved assessing potential application scenanos. The 
following findings are relevant to this problem. 
• A naive batch signature scheme is developed to illustrate the notion of
signature generation using a hash function combiner instead of the 
multiplicative variants.
• A tree-structured batch signature scheme is shown that g1ves greater
performance than the previous batch signature techniques.
• Applicability of a batch signature to electronic commerce, and electronic
cash, and other signature paradigms such as group signatures.
The second subproblem deals with batch cryptography in general and some 
open problems pointed out by Bellare et al. [BGR98] .  Specifically this is to devise 
batch verification algorithms for modular exponentiation in groups of non-prime 
order. The work conducted has also revealed weaknesses and attacks on batch 
cryptography. 
• Several batch verification schemes previously published have been shown to
be weaker than claimed and some are broken by specific attacks.
• A new general attack is devised that applies to most batch verification
techniques in the literature. And, a repair to the general attack has been
found and proven to work.
• A general batch verifier for exponentiation in any cyclic group is given.
The final sub-problem is concerned with specific electronic cash applications 
for batch cryptography. Complete protocols that both exercise and rely upon batch 
cryptography for improvements in efficiency is as yet unexplored. The problem is to 
explore how these signature generation and verification methods may be applied to 
electronic cash applications given is relatively high computational complexity. This 
has been addressed with the following results. 
• An off-line electronic cash suitable for small payments is introduced. The
scheme services several key cash-like properties including off-line payments,
signed verifiable coins, and prevention of fraud or theft.
1 77 
• An anonymous off-line electronic cash scheme for general cash transactions 
is devised. The scheme uses a batch signature to generate several anonymous 
coins during withdrawal and several new and modified multiplicative 
verifiers for improving payment and deposit. The security of the scheme is 
also proven, based on the proofs of security of its primitive operations. 
8.2 Open Problems and Further Work 
There are several open problems and extensions that are worthy of further 
investigation, these are now discussed. 
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• It is shown that the range check of the Microcash protocol may, in practice, 
not be required. However, the elimination or an improvement of this check 
would refine the overall security of the scheme. This may take form by 
adding some additional information to each coin so that it is uniquely 
identified with a particular payment execution or a general improvement in 
the type of range check executed. Another approach would be to perhaps 
engage a range bounded commitment protocol for the series of payments. 
This may be periodically renewed if payments exceed a set range. Naor 
[Nao90] illustrates an efficient bit commitment protocol based on a hash 
function, which may serve as a good starting point. 
• Whilst attention has been drawn to electronic cash, it is noted that the 
applicability of batch cryptography goes well beyond what is presented here. 
A number of applications are recognisable, for example general electronic 
commerce services (including payment services), certificate management 
protocols, and business-to-business activities (which typically batch 
transactions) may be ideal. 
• A batch verifier for exponentiation in groups of non-prime order is given. 
An open problem is to extend the algorithm and proof to devise a verifier that 
provides batch verification in the RSA group Z�. 
• Other signature schemes may be suitably modified such as group signature 
schemes. Some recent work involving groups signatures has included 
electronic cash. The presented concepts may be useful in devising some 
further alternatives here. 
• It is shown in Appendix I, that the low order attack is able to expose
anomalies with an original cash scheme. Hence the attack may work against
other published schemes in the literature. It is suggested that complex
interactive protocols may be more susceptible. An immediate possibility is
to develop an attack on group signature schemes, where a group member is
able to sign on behalf of the group in a way that prevents the group manager
from revealing the identity of the member.
Finally it must be noted that although digital signatures feature in the 
presented security protocols, the general primitive that is improved is modular 
exponentiation in groups of any order. In this observation, it is possible that several 
other interesting scenarios may find some relevance. 
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Appendix I. Anomaly in Proofs for Brands Cash
With the results of chapter five and seven, a weakness on Brands ' original electronic 
cash scheme [Bra93] is outlined. The customer may substitute A with sA mod p, 
where s is an element of any order t, such that t I p - 1 and t ::;; 2d, (d is the merchant
challenge during payment). The general attack introduced in chapter five may be 
applied on Brands' scheme under the following steps. 
1 .  Choose blinding invariant s E R  Zq, and s such that ord( s) = t. 
2. Compute A = (g1J.l gzt modp.
3. Set a =  sA modp.
4. Calculate c' = h(a, B, z' , a', b').
5 . Present (a, B) and cr( a,  B) to the verifier as a valid coin.
In Brands original scheme it would be possible to spend an invalid coin (a,
B) and pass verification with probability 1 /t. This is because r' = ru + v mod q will
be of the required value with probability l it. In practice the customer could examine
the response returned to confirm whether merchant verification of the false coin will 
pass with the derived response r', thus guaranteeing that signature verification will 
pass during payment. In addition, the representation check will pass with probability 
1 /t since d will also be of the required value l it of the time, if ord(s) = 4 this will be 
Y4 of the time. This can be seen in the following equations, 
g' = a' hh(a, B, z', a', b) , 
Ar' = b' z' h(a, B, z', a', b) ' 
When the bank goes to deposit the coin, the bank is equally likely to accept 
the coin as valid. If the coin fails the representation check, then the coin is rejected. 
It is interesting to note that in Brands original paper he suggests that the customer 
may in fact determine d, reducing the payment to a single move protocol. In this 
case the customer is able to spend an invalid coin with a 1 00% success rate; as 
suggested above during the withdrawal protocol the customer is able to check that an 
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appropriate value r is provided that will enable a false coin to pass verification using 
r' = ru + v mod q. 
Regardless of this, the question remains of any real exposure. The answer is 
negative, since if the customer spends a second instance of a, or even A itself, he 
must supply r-values during payment that pass the representation criterion. Since 
these values encode the customer's true identity the customer will be caught. So this 
observation is rather an anomaly of the scheme, where an invalid coin (a, B), such 
that a � G and B E G, may be in circulation. But to be able to spend these invalid 
coins the customer must have taken part in the withdrawal protocol. Since the 
customers' account is debited during withdrawal and double spending will reveal the 
identity there is no incentive to fool the system. 
It must also be pointed out that this observation now invalidates the theorems 
presented by Brands [Bra93] .  For it can be seen that a customer can present a coin 
(A', B) cr(A', B), where A' = eA and not know its representation with respect to (g1 , 
g2). More formally the following has been previously claimed [Bra93] ,  where U is 
the customer. 
Lemma. If U in the payment protocol can give correct response with respect to two 
different challenges, then he knows a representation of both A and B with respect to 
(gJ, g2). 
Corollary. U can spend a coin if and only if he knows a representation of it. 
From the results above it is clear that the lemma and corollary have been 
invalidated. Furthermore, the customer cannot possibly know a representation of A' 
and B with respect to (g1 , g2), since A' � G and (g1 , gz) are generators of G. 
Finally, in order to prevent the customer from spending invalid coins, the 
merchant should check that the value A lies in the group G. This is an added 
expense in performing the check Aq = 1 mod p. 
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Appendix 11. Binary Trees
A binary tree (see Figure E) has a unique root node, which is the only node with no 
parent. All other nodes have a unique parent node, while all nodes have zero or two 
child nodes. A node with zero child nodes is called a leaf node. Pairs of nodes, 
which share the same parent node, are called sibling nodes. Note that each non-root 
Depth = 2 Leaf Nodes 
Figure E. Binary Tree 
node has a unique sibling node. Any two 
siblings must be distinguished, so assign each 
node the direction left or right. Each node, 
except the root node, is connected to its parent 
node via an arc. The number of arcs traversed 
in the shortest path from a node to the root is 
called the depth of the node. The height of a 
tree is the number of nodes on the longest path 
from the root to a leaf. An ancestor of a node 
N is a node on a path from the root node to N.
A descendant of a node N is a node on a path from N to a leaf. The subtree of a node 
N is the left child of N plus its descendants from the left subtree, and the right child 
of N plus its descendants from the right subtree. 
Huffinan coding [CT91 ]  is a technique for compression of text, that uses a 
binary tree where each leaf node contains a single character and the code used to 
identify each character is defined by the its path from the root node to the leaf. 
When traversing the tree '0 '  indicates a branch to the left and ' 1 '  a branch to the 
right, this forms the code, (e.g. the left most leaf node in Figure E is represented by 
"00"). The Huffman tree is the representative set (or equivalence class) of full 
binary trees. 
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Appendix Ill. Basic Notation 
The following basic notations and definitions are provided as a reference. 
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• The concatenation of two binary strings a and b is denoted by a 11 b. 
• Let a I b denote that the integer a divides the integer b. 
• For some integer n, let { 0, 1 }  n define the set of all binary strings of length n. 
• Let { 0, 1 }  * define the set of all binary strings of no fixed length. 
• For some integer n, let Zn denote the set of integers modulo n, this is the set 
{0, 1 ,  . . .  , n - 1 } .  
• For some integer n, let Z� denote the multiplicative group of Zn, this is the set 
of elements ai E Zn, such that gcd( ai, n) = 1 .  
• Let a E S denote that element a is chosen from the set S. 
• Let a ER S denote that element a is chosen uniformly at random from the set 
S. 
• An element g E G is said to be a generator of a group G if there exists some 
integer x such that each element b E G of the group is generated under the 
exponentiation b = gx. 
• Euler's Totient function <J>(n) defines the number of elements from Zn 
relatively prime to n. 
• Let TI�=I ai denote the product a1 x a2 x . . .  x at. 
• Let L�=I ai denote the sum a1 + a2 + . . .  + at. 
• The order of a group G is defined as the number of elements in G. 
• Let a E G. The order of the element a, denoted ord(a), is the least positive 
integer t such that at = 1 .  
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